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Abstract 
 
 With decreasing public funding for scientific research and innovation (R&I) in Canada, the 
onus has fallen on public research institutions to partner strategically with industry to ensure that 
research generates innovative socio-economic gains. As a result, R&D has become more 
prescribed and more restricted, as private contracts and other proprietary intellectual property (IP) 
mechanisms regulate and often limit avenues of inquiry. This push towards commercialization has 
extended upstream into the process of research itself, and is not limited solely to product 
development (Mirowski and Van Horn, 2005).  
In response to the restraints on R&I imposed by commercialization and proprietary IP 
measures, concepts of open science and innovation have become increasingly prominent, 
particularly in discussions of pharmaceutical development. The push towards openness in R&I has 
offered a potential solution to navigating through complex networks of proprietary IP licenses and 
patents, primarily by releasing project data into the public domain and ensuring broad user access, 
expanding participation in R&I, and reducing commercial barriers (Gitter, 2013; Feldman & 
Nelson, 2008). Though open science initiatives offer low entry costs and increased methodological 
transparency, there is significant debate within the STS and innovation studies literature regarding 
the role of open and proprietary IP in R&I. While some, such as Lezuan and Montgomery (2015), 
argue proprietary mechanisms are necessary for collaboration and provide incentives for investing 
in research, others, such as Mirowski (2011), highlight the aforementioned roadblocks to 
innovation and collaboration brought about proprietary IP. In both cases, open and proprietary 
mechanisms are often presented as dichotomous and incompatible.  
This dissertation builds on the argument that, contrary to this dichotomy presented in current 
STS scholarship, these open and proprietary mechanisms may be complimentary at particular 
stages of R&I. I extend my focus to intermediary organizations established to facilitate the 
translation of basic research into marketable pharmaceutical products, in addition to public 
research institutes, small- to medium-sized private pharmaceutical firms, and incubator labs in 
Toronto. In doing so, this research aims to unpack how these mechanisms operate in the R&I 
process, as well as their role in facilitating or hindering collaboration and pharmaceutical R&I 
more broadly. 
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1 
1. Introduction 
 
In asserting the linear progression of scientific and technological innovation, Vannevar 
Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier (1945) argued that technological progress was founded on 
well-funded, independent fundamental scientific research. For the United States to prosper from 
its scientific enterprise, according to Bush, basic research had to be undertaken without any 
pressures of commercial application or necessity. Following the emergence of the biotech sector 
in the late 1970s, however, the biological and biotechnological sciences witnessed a dramatic shift 
away from idyllic “Big Science” designs towards an increasingly commercialized, entrepreneurial 
technoscientific enterprise. Organizational practises and institutional arrangements were 
reconfigured to accommodate new means of knowledge transfer, as demonstrated by the changes 
in university-industry-government relations and the emergence of national innovation systems in 
particular (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). New relational networks between government 
agencies, private industry, and academic institutes coincided with an increasing emphasis on 
application value, particularly as it related to issues of funding and investment in fundamental 
research. In effect, scientific research came to be seen as a primary wealth-creating mechanism in 
national research and development (R&D) systems, and subsequently came under pressure to give 
more obvious and proportional value for dollars invested (Ziman, 2002b: 73). Major policy and 
legislative changes in the United States during this period paved the way for new practices in 
techno-scientific and academic capitalism. For instance, the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) 
in the United States saw the creation of a new marketplace for scientific knowledge and its 
byproducts, as public research institutes such as universities and national laboratories were able to 
attract investment from private industry by patenting research results and funding projects with 
wealth-creating potential (Mirowski, 2011). Scientific research, in essence, became a commodity: 
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with the ability to patent knowledge and data, legal “owners” were entitled to claim payments for 
its use (Ziman, 2002a: 335).  
At the same time, biomedical research and innovation (R&I) practices saw a dramatic 
transformation with the emergence of the –omics era in the late 1980s, shifting the focus of 
research from objects (e.g. the gene, the protein) to systems (e.g. the genome, the proteome). As a 
result, scientific inquiry became largely data-accelerated and interdisciplinary, with R&D 
becoming dependent on the availability of and access to numerous databases to an increasing 
extent. For example, gene therapy in cancer research has become increasingly reliant on the 
collaborative development of sequence data (i.e. gene, protein, or other transcript sequences), 
wherein researchers rely heavily on databases to interrogate nucleotide sequences of interest, 
compare protein sequences, and search for sequence data in particular disease contexts. This shift 
in research practices, coupled with the increasing commodification, commercialization, 
privatization, and marketization of R&I itself, has led to the reorientation of public funding in 
universities towards public/private partnerships. This in turn has resulted in the reconfiguration of 
research agendas emphasizing both intellectual property (IP) and open science initiatives that 
increasingly impact how scientific knowledge is produced and shared, as well as the reshaping of 
R&I itself in accord with the commercial or social interests of the groups subsidizing it (Lave et 
al., 2010). With decreasing public funding of science in Canada (Science and Economic 
Development Canada, 2018), the onus has fallen on public research institutions to forge 
partnerships with private industry to ensure that research generates innovative socio-economic 
gains (such as much-needed novel pharmaceutical products). The Canadian Government has also 
encouraged the collaboration between universities and industry as a means of bridging this funding 
gap (NSERC, 2018b). 
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1.1. Key Challenges in Pharmaceutical R&D 
This dissertation focuses primarily on pharmaceutical R&D and the development of novel 
clinical products in this sector. Drug development is notoriously expensive, slow, and precarious. 
From initial laboratory target discovery through regimented clinical trials to U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval, pharmaceutical R&D averages 13 years and roughly $1.5 billion 
per new chemical entity (NCE) (Collins, 2011). These costs continue to rise. Table 1 below, 
adapted from DiMasi et al. (2016), demonstrates the growing costs of developing novel 
pharmaceutical products. The studies included in this table focus primarily on products developed 
in the United States and include the costs from all stages of development, however it nonetheless 
provides some clarity of the monetary scale associated with developing a new pharmaceutical 
product: 
Table 1: Costs of new drug development, 1983 – 2015  
*adapted from DiMasi et al., 2016 
 
According to a 2015 report by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the 
likelihood that a drug entering clinical testing would eventually be approved by the FDA was 
estimated to be less than 12 percent (PhRMA, 2015). At the same time, though basic research often 
produces promising results upstream, research outputs lag far behind associated costs and the 
Study Study Period Inflation  
Adjustment 
Cost  
Estimate 
(USD) 
DiMasi et al. (2003) First-in-humans, 1983–1994  
 
2000 dollars  $802 million 
Adams & Brantner (2006)  First-in-humans, 1989–2002 2000 dollars  $868 million 
Adams & Brantner (2010)  Company R&D expenditures, 1985–2001  2000 dollars  $1.2 billion 
DiMasi & Grabowski (2007)  First-in-humans, 1990–2003 (large molecule)  2005 dollars $1.2 billion 
Gilbert et al. (2003) 2000–2002 (launch) 2003 dollars $1.7 billion 
O’Hagan & Farkas (2009) 2009 (launch) 
 
2009 dollars $2.2 billion 
Paul et al. (2010)  ≈2007  2008 dollars  
 
$1.8 billion 
Mestre-Ferrandiz et al. (2012) In clinical development, 1997–1999  2011 dollars  
 
$1.5 billion 
DiMasi et al. (2016) New drug and biologic development 2013 dollars $2.8 billion 
  
4 
number of new medicines has not increased proportionately with investments made in basic 
pharmaceutical R&I. Attrition rates in late stage clinical trials are especially high and contribute 
to the risk and unpredictability associated with investing in pharmaceutical R&I (Gassman and 
Reepmeyer, 2005). Similarly, the paradigm of the “Blockbuster drug” (e.g. the one-disease-one-
drug-one-target era, where products with broad, simple applications netted colossal revenues for 
firms) is seemingly over, and the shift to personalized medicine has presented new challenges for 
firms seeking to profit from their innovations (Jorgensen, 2011). 
Moreover, issues related to the lack of financing for R&D have also negatively impacted 
innovation in the Canadian pharmaceutical sector. A 2013 report by Industry Canada noted that 
market growth in this sector has continued trending down, while brand-name pharmaceutical firms 
have experienced “record levels of revenue losses” in Canada and elsewhere (Industry Canada, 
2013: 4). Further, these losses and their resulting poor pipeline productivity have required firms to 
re-examine investment strategies and adopt new business models “built upon external networks 
and third-party partnerships” – essentially outsourcing large portions of their business functions 
(e.g. development, testing, and manufacturing of new drug products) (ibid). The same report also 
noted that inadequate access to capital has also had a profound and negative impact on the ability 
of small- to medium-sized biopharmaceutical firms to flourish in Canada,  
In terms of the Canadian pharmaceutical landscape, the 2017 Patented Medicine Prices 
Review Board (PMPRB) reported that total business expenditures on R&D by Canadian 
pharmaceutical firms have fallen below $1 billion since 2011 and industry R&D spending from 
2001 to 2017 fell by 20% (PMPRB, 2017). Moreover, contract research organizations (CROs) are 
undertaking growing share of R&D in this sector, as new medicines and drug candidates are 
“increasingly being developed externally via partnerships with academia, small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs), government and research centres as well as contract research organizations 
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(CROs). Drug research and development is increasingly done via external partners, as over the 
past decade, 60% of innovator small molecules and 82% of innovator biologics have their roots 
outside of big pharmaceutical companies” (Industry Canada, 2019). The country’s major 
biopharmaceutical clusters are located in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Canada’s 
pharmaceutical pipeline is predominantly oriented towards oncology (with 35% of new 
pharmaceutical products specializing in this category), diseases of the central nervous system 
(17%), infectious diseases (12%), and cardiovascular diseases (7%) (Industry Canada, 2017a). The 
majority of these products currently being developed (76%) are in early stages of R&D (i.e. target 
discovery and validation through phase I/II clinical trials), while the remaining 24% are in mid- to 
late-stages of development. The PMPRB report (2017) also documents 80 new patented medicines 
first reported to the PMPRB in 2017 (compared to 128 in 2016). The PMPRB (2017) also noted 
that since 2010, 82.1% of patented medicines introduced offer “Slight or No Improvement” in 
therapeutic benefit over existing therapies (p. 12). However, sales of patented medicines in Canada 
rose by 7.6% between 2016 and 2017, from $15.6 billion to $16.8 billion (ibid: 22). As a share of 
overall medicine sales, patented medicine sales in Canada have been trending upward from 55.8% 
in 2010 to 61.5% in 2017, while non-patented and generic medicines have grown at lower rates 
(ibid:23). Stemming from this, sales of patented medicine as a portion of Canada’s GDP tripled 
from 0.25% in 1990 to 0.78% in 2017 (ibid). More broadly, Canadian pharmaceutical sales account 
for a 2% share of the global market, making Canada the 10th largest world market (Industry 
Canada, 2019). Stemming from this, brand-name products account for 79.3% of Canadian sales 
and 30% of prescriptions, while generics account for the remainder (ibid). 
Setting aside issues related to drug sales or the difficulties of creating drugs in the era of 
personalized medicine, the issue at stake in this dissertation stems from the fact that 
commercialization threatens to enclose crucial knowledge and information and restrict its access 
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behind IP protection, slowing drug development even further. The rationale for the widespread use 
of proprietary IP tools such as patents is, essentially, to allow firms recoup the growing costs 
associated with development, regulatory application, and marketing by charging a high cost for 
the drug based on market exclusivity granted via the patent (Barton and Emanuel, 2007). As will 
be discussed in greater detail in ensuing chapters, however, patents tend to have an anticommons 
effect (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Murray and Stern, 2007). This has wide-ranging implications, 
as the need for novel diagnostic and therapeutic drugs able to combat increasingly insidious and 
prevalent diseases has grown in recent years. Meeting these needs has been hindered by 
bottlenecks in the development process stemming from aforementioned issues of funding scarcities 
to high attrition rates in clinical trials to slow translation times associated with pharmaceutical 
development. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Four and Six, while the industry 
presence in Canada is significantly smaller, and the legal architecture underlying the Canadian 
patent system differs somewhat from its American counterpart, pharma R&I in Canada is similarly 
hindered by these bottlenecks (Science and Economic Development Canada, 2018). 
Given that research in –omics fields relevant to pharmaceutical R&D often relies heavily 
upon collaboration and access to diverse knowledge, duplication of research is prohibitively costly 
for institutions lacking access to significant datasets or findings generated via contract-based 
research. The enclosure and restriction of scientific research behind proprietary barriers – for 
instance through broad upstream patenting or the use of material transfer agreements (MTAs) – is 
constitutive of the commercialization process and is, more often than not, a requisite in 
public/private research agreements. Proprietary IP devices, however, generally result in increased 
R&D costs (from associated legal fees to royalty fees etc.). Basic research projects deemed to be 
unprofitable or unable to be captured via proprietary IP rights might also be defunded (Caulfield 
et al., 2011). For example, both the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the National 
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Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada require an explicit demonstration of 
application value as part of grant applications (NSERC, 2018a). Moreover, demands for 
commercialization and the subsequent expansion of broad proprietary IP rights further upstream 
in the research process necessarily impedes R&D further downstream, as even the most 
commercially irrelevant research can be encumbered by MTAs and broad patent claims (Scherer, 
2002).  
In response to the restraints on R&I imposed by commercialization and proprietary IP 
measures, practices and concepts of open science, permissive licenses, and translational R&I have 
become increasingly prominent, particularly in discussions of pharmaceutical development (Getz 
and Kaitin, 2012). The push towards openness in R&I has offered a potential solution to navigating 
through complex networks of proprietary IP licenses and patents, primarily by releasing project 
data into the public domain and ensuring broad user access (Gitter, 2013). Likewise, open science 
initiatives aim to make use of data through non-proprietary devices (e.g. through creating open 
source databases), expanding participation in R&I, and reducing commercial barriers (Feldman & 
Nelson, 2008). While open science initiatives offer low entry costs and increased methodological 
transparency, they do not necessarily offer a remedy for the impediments arising from 
conventional, proprietary forms of IP management (Birch et al., 2018). There is significant debate 
within the science and technology studies (STS) and innovation studies literature concerning open 
and proprietary IP devices (such as patents, research agreements, open access databases, 
permissive licenses, etc.) and their effect on the processes and products associated with R&I. While 
some, such as Lezuan and Montgomery (2015), argue proprietary devices are necessary for 
outlining collaborative research relationships and provide incentives for investing in research, 
others, such as Mirowski (2011), highlight the aforementioned roadblocks to innovation and 
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collaboration brought about by patents and MTAs. In both cases, open and proprietary devices are 
often presented as dichotomous and incompatible. 
This research builds on the argument that, contrary to the dichotomy presented in current 
STS scholarship, open and proprietary devices may be complimentary at particular stages of R&I 
and that their respective net effect on the commercialization of research is context-dependent. 
Furthermore, this research seeks to tease apart how these devices operate within the R&I process, 
and to understand the impact they have on collaboration efforts more broadly. My aim is to 
highlight the substantial gaps between existing theoretical discussions of innovation and 
intellectual property and the strategies and practices employed in pharmaceutical R&D; gaps that 
potentially skew our understanding of innovation ecosystems and impede sound policy decisions. 
Namely, as will be discussed further in Chapter Seven, a primary argument of this dissertation is 
that scholars of STS and innovation studies fail to discuss the nuances of pharmaceutical 
development, largely in terms of differentiating between tools and products and the ways in which 
this distinction impacts the efficacy of certain IP tools. I endeavour to parse the relationship 
between innovation and entrepreneurship in the pharmaceutical sector and analyze the ways in 
which open and proprietary devices help to turn pre-clinical or early-stage research into a revenue 
producing asset. Moreover, I situate these devices within the larger context of corporate strategy, 
scientific competition, technology transfer, and academic and government policy. In doing so, I 
intend to highlight the variations in innovation strategies between industry and academia as well 
as the varying role and efficacy of open versus proprietary devices in each environment. 
Unpacking the R&I process – focusing specifically on the mechanisms that enable disparate actors 
to collaborate, that facilitate or hinder innovation and investment in R&D, that engender 
groundbreaking advancements in the pharmaceutical sector, and so on – is of critical importance 
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not only for scholars of STS, but for scientists, policymakers, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists 
alike.  
 
1.2. Background 
This research analyzes and critiques the parameters of open and proprietary devices and their 
respective roles Ontario’s rapidly changing R&D landscape, specifically addressing the network 
of actors and institutes shaping Canada’s pharmaceutical sector. I extend my focus to intermediary 
organizations established to facilitate the translation of basic research into marketable products, in 
addition to public research institutes, small- to medium-sized private pharmaceutical firms, and 
incubator labs in Toronto. Specifically, I focus on MaRS Innovation and its affiliate firms and 
public research hospitals, the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research (OICR) and the Fight Against 
Cancer Innovation Trust (FACIT), Johnson & Johnson’s incubator space JLABS @ Toronto and 
its affiliate firms, the Structural Genomics Consortium (SGC). This section provides a brief 
overview of these organizations, to be elaborated upon more significantly in Chapter Three. 
 
1.2.1. MaRS Innovation, the OICR, and FACIT 
MaRS Innovation (MI) is a pan-provincial non-profit organization created in 2008 as a 
Centre of Excellence for Commercialization and Research by the Networks of Centres of 
Excellence (NCE). As such, the purpose of MI is to accelerate the translation of academic 
discoveries to marketable products and services by providing researcher groups with capital, 
industry networks, and laboratory space (MaRS Discovery District, 2016). As Canada’s largest 
research cluster, MI works in conjunction with academia and other public research institutes, 
industry partners from a range of sectors, venture capitalists and angel investors, and government 
agencies. MI’s commercialization model identifies early-stage inventions with high market or 
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patent potential and provides support to its members through the licensing of intellectual property, 
funding, the development of business plans, and/or the creation of startup companies (NCE, 
2017a).  
Likewise, the OICR is a non-profit translational research organization established in 2005 
by the Government of Ontario, focusing primarily on “the prevention, early detection, diagnosis 
and treatment of cancer” (OICR, 2016). As “receptors” to translational pharmacology research, 
OICR and MI work in partnership, connecting researchers in fields like genomics and 
bioinformatics from their public partners with private organizations to facilitate innovation in 
cancer medicine. FACIT, a provincial business trust working in conjunction with MI and OICR, 
funds and licenses early stage research through its Intellectual Property Development and 
Commercialization (IPDC) fund (FACIT, 2016). 
 
1.2.2. JLABS @ Toronto 
In 2012, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) opened JLABS @ Toronto, an incubator space housed in 
the MaRS Tower and the first JLABS site operating outside the United States. Working in 
collaboration with J&J Innovation, Janssen Inc., the Government of Ontario, and the University of 
Toronto, JLABS leases wet and dry laboratory space to its residents, the majority of which are 
early-stage companies focused on therapeutic or medical device technology development (JLABS 
@ Toronto, 2017). As an incubator, the purpose of JLABS is to help catalyze innovation, 
particularly for small firms (ibid). 
 
1.2.3. The Structural Genomics Consortium 
As a non-profit public-private consortium, the SGC undertakes basic scientific research 
“…of relevance to drug discovery. [Its] core mandate…is to determine 3D structures on a large 
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scale and cost-effectively – targeting human proteins of biomedical importance and proteins from 
human parasites that represent potential drug targets” (SGC, 2017a). Operating out of the 
University of Oxford in the UK and the University of Toronto in the MaRS Tower, the SGC works 
in collaboration with a network of academic, industry, and government partners in Canada, the 
US, and the UK (ibid). Research at the SGC is focused on determining the crystal structures of 
proteins that act as “targets” for drug therapies for various types of cancer, diabetes, and psychiatric 
disorders. Importantly, the SGC releases its crystal structures into the public domain with no 
strings (i.e. proprietary IP rights) attached.  
Each of these three groups – MI and the OICR, JLABS, and the SGC – and their affiliated 
firms and organizations has a unique approach to innovating and collaborating. Some, in particular 
the SGC and a number of affiliate firms of MI and JLABS, have embraced open devices and 
openness broadly speaking as a means of forming broad working relationships outside the confines 
of their respective firms, and of navigating around what some scholars of STS and innovation 
studies see as a cost-prohibitive web of proprietary IP rights and their associated legal architecture 
and personnel issues. Others, namely the OICR, FACIT, MI’s in-house IP office and many of its 
affiliate firms have been reluctant to fully embrace the push for openness previously discussed 
(e.g. through increased methodological transparency, increased use of open IP tools, and low 
transaction costs and barriers to entry), and have maintained a more traditional, proprietary 
commercialization model. The point of this dissertation is to unpack the innovation process and 
the role played by open and proprietary mediating devices in the pharmaceutical sector. To do so, 
it is necessary to explore why some institutes or firms embrace openness and others do not, why 
some actors see open devices as facilitating innovation in theory but not in practice, why others 
are able to successfully form commercial partnerships on the basis of using open devices and others 
aren’t, and why the success of open devices is dependent on what’s being produced and in what 
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context. These three groups provide an interesting case study, as they are located in close proximity 
to one another, have similar broad mandates (to accelerate the development of novel 
pharmaceuticals), and are all subject to the same provincial and federal laws and regulations. As 
will be discussed in further detail in chapter five, however, open and proprietary devices play 
markedly differing roles for each group in terms of enabling collaboration, attracting investment 
in early-stage research, and bringing profit-generating innovations to market.  
 
1.3. Theoretical Overview 
1.3.1. Mediating Devices 
In terms of a theoretical framework, this research builds on the premise that particular open and 
proprietary mechanisms enable public and private research groups, government regulators and 
policymakers, and investors from a broad range of organizations to interact, collaborate, and bring 
innovative research forth from the lab to clinical practice. I theorize these mechanisms as mediating 
devices. For the purposes of this research, mediating devices consist of patents, MTAs, NDAs, 
reach-through license agreements, copyrights, open-source licensing (such as copyleft), and open-
access databases. In essence, I argue these devices are the linchpins that enable collaboration, 
commercialization, and knowledge transfer, and/or determine valuation of the products and 
processes of R&I. 
Notions of “mediating instruments” have been have been discussed at length in the 
accounting and economic sociology literature, largely in the context of the broad range of financial 
and economic models (Morrison and Morgan, 1999), instruments, metrics, and mechanisms related 
to practices of calculation, valuation, budgeting, and computation (Miller, 1992; Miller and 
O’Leary, 1987). Others have similarly outlined market devices as “the material and discursive 
assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets,” suggesting these objects encompass 
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“analytical techniques to pricing models, …purchase settings to merchandising tools, …trading 
protocols to aggregate indicators” (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, 2007, p. 2; see also Muniesa, 
2007). However, the concept of mediating devices as outlined above has yet to appear in the STS 
or innovation studies literature, and I argue that this concept both adds nuance and sheds a political 
economic and epistemic light on these debates. 
Mediating devices are particularly salient in the context of pharmaceutical development. As 
discussed above, scientific research has become progressively more data-accelerated, 
internationally collaborative, and interdisciplinary in recent decades. At the same time, however, 
the ability to rapidly and cost-effectively translate innovative research findings from the lab to the 
clinic is limited by the increasingly complex entanglement of science and capitalism and the 
commercialization of science itself (Chiappetta and Birch, 2018). On the one hand, “duplicating 
research findings is prohibitively costly, creating an imperative for (‘pre-competitive’) 
collaboration; on the other hand, enclosing research results behind IP rights provides incentives 
for private investment in R&I” (ibid: 68). I argue these mediating devices, situated within complex 
networks of researchers, investors, incubators, labs, patent offices and so on, play a crucial role in 
configuring the organization, process and products of pharmaceutical R&I. Patents, MTAs, NDAs, 
open-access libraries (among numerous other devices) shape the ways in which information and 
data are diffused and circulated, and help to frame collaborative networks of disparate actors. 
Moreover, they attach value to the interactions of actors within these networks (e.g. by stipulating 
potential royalties), determine how and when innovative research is translated across disciplinary 
boundaries, and regulate how value may be appropriated from the products of these interactions 
(ibid). 
Further, this work draws primarily on the existing body of literature relating to knowledge 
production and translation, commercialization and valuation, business and innovation models, 
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intellectual property, and innovation strategies. The literature underpinning this research is divided 
into three broad sections focusing on the following areas: firstly, STS and innovation studies; 
secondly, economics of science and the political economy of science; and finally, intellectual 
property. 
 
1.3.2. STS and Innovation Studies 
STS scholars have debated the nature of science as an epistemic enterprise to the point of 
exhaustion. While my intention with this dissertation is to avoid esoteric debates surrounding the 
properties of scientific knowledge itself, it is necessary to provide an overview of critical works in 
the field that inform this dissertation, however tangentially.  
Regarding knowledge production more abstractly, the work of Michael Gibbons et al. (1994) 
extensively detailed a “new” mode of knowledge production in contemporary science – that is, 
knowledge produced in the context of application (versus “pure” or “basic” scientific knowledge). 
The mode 1 and mode 2 distinction has been criticized as promoting a reductive and inadequate 
basic/applied dichotomy (Whitley, 2001), as scientific knowledge production has historically 
never been free from the pressures of commercial necessity. In an attempt to move beyond 
stereotypical basic/applied distinctions, John Ziman (2005) coined the term post-academic 
science, referring to the research paradigm that emerged following the birth of the biotech industry 
in the 1970s wherein knowledge is constructed by heterogeneous groups “in accord with the 
commercial, political, or other social interests of the bodies that underwrite its production” (p. 
174). Ziman’s concept is an especially useful descriptor, as the science to be examined and 
discussed in this project does not fit under the mode 1/mode 2 or basic/applied umbrellas: the R&D 
in question in this research is not undertaken solely with the objective to produce theoretical 
knowledge about natural phenomena, nor is it intended solely to produce marketable products. 
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Rather, it is mission-based, oriented to market principles (ibid), and guided by the desire to solve 
particular social and economic problems. The solutions to these problems may be tangible artifacts 
(e.g. a marketable therapeutic agent) or something more abstract (e.g. a digital technology, such 
as a drug screening platform, or improved clinical trial expediency). 
Innovation and technological change have been discussed extensively in historical and 
economic literature. As a standalone discipline, innovation studies evolved from two existing 
frameworks in the 1960s: one, a sociological perspective concerned with inventions and cultural 
lags, and the other a historical approach that came to be called the linear model of innovation 
(Godin, 2010a). Early works in the field of innovation studies highlighted the need for proprietary 
research, particularly in terms of “gales of creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942), natural 
trajectories and selection environments (Nelson and Winter, 1977), technological paradigms and 
trajectories (Dosi, 1982), and regimes of appropriability (Teece, 1986). These works emphasized 
the role of proprietary market forces as necessary determinants of techno-scientific change. 
Recently, some (Nightingale, 1998; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2009; Martin, 2012a, 2012b) have 
sought to provide a conceptual framework of the field, highlighting its intellectual and 
organizational characteristics. Others (Godin, 2015, 2010a, 2010b) have been critical of innovation 
studies as a field, critiquing the conflation of innovation with commercial invention and 
technological change by its scholars, as well as the overly broad focus of the discipline.  
In terms of examining business and innovation models in the biotech sector, there has been 
a flurry of publications focusing on the emerging field of open innovation in recent years 
(Chesbrough 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006; Gaul, 2006; West et al., 2006). In particular, Chesbrough 
(2003b) focuses on the paradigm shift from closed to open innovation models, arguing that ideas 
and technologies hold no inherent value, but rather that business models used to bring them to the 
market that determine their value. He highlights the need for a combination of open and proprietary 
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measures in order for firms to achieve market success. Some have been critical of Chesbrough’s 
definition of openness. Hayden (2010) argues that the public domain extends only so far as 
property regimes do and serve to prop up existing IP monopolies, and thus open innovation 
nonetheless remains neoliberal in nature. Looking to the success of openness in the field of 
software development, Hope (2008) proposes a “bazaar” model as a means of increasing openness 
in scientific R&D, wherein decision-making and resource control are autonomous, and 
participation is voluntary. Gassman and Reepmeyer (2005) have written specifically about open 
business models in the context of pharmaceutical development, making the case for increased 
openness as a means of combating the growing lag between research output versus its associated 
costs. Of particular importance for this research is the work of Elmquist et al. (2009), who argue 
that the locus of innovation (i.e. within or outside the confines of a single firm) affects our 
understanding of how the innovation process actually occurs. Foray (1997) and Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff (2000) have also made the case for increased openness in the properties and 
distribution of scientific knowledge, particularly as it relates to university-government-industry 
interactions.  
While these works play a critical role in outlining a conceptual foundation for this 
dissertation, there are critical gaps in this literature that need to be addressed. Namely, there is a 
noticeable lack of discussion in the STS and innovation studies literature on the role of open and 
proprietary devices (versus strategies) in the innovation process. Chesbrough’s (2003b) notion of 
open innovation simply extends R&I beyond the confines of a single firm and makes little room 
for the material and notional objects that control the flow of knowledge across these organizational 
boundaries (such as contracts, research agreements, databases, etc.).  
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1.3.3. Economics of Science and the Political Economy of Science 
This section focuses on the evolving political economy of science and technology and the 
current entanglement of science and capitalism. To understand the state of today’s pharmaceutical 
R&I paradigm, it is necessary to outline its evolution in the last four decades. Regarding the 
changing political economy of science and technology, Mirowski (2011) has extensively discussed 
the science-business model that emerged following the birth of the biotech sector in the 1970s, 
wherein for-profit enterprises engaged in basic scientific research and universities actively sought 
to profit from it. The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) affirmed the right of universities to 
patent government-funded inventions, while the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 
ensured that microorganisms could be patented. As a result, discovery and application became 
increasingly integrated, and the marketplace for scientific knowledge and its biproducts extended 
beyond a single university or firm laboratory to include technology transfer offices, funding 
agencies, policymakers, venture capitalists, and so forth (Popp-Berman, 2012).  
Mirowski (2011) has been particularly critical of proprietary R&I, extensively detailing 
notions of commercialization, commodification, privatization, and marketization that have 
continued to shape research and innovation since 1980 and discussing the ways in which 
proprietary demands on R&I actually hinder innovation. Lave et al. (2010) have also discussed the 
entanglement of neoliberalism and science, specifically emphasizing the consequent narrowing of 
research agendas at public institutions, while Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) have the 
commercialization of scientific research in the current paradigm. Moreover, Mazzucato (2012) has 
also discussed the critical (and increasingly challenged) role that universities play in conducting 
basic research, highlighting the importance of government investment in fundamental R&I. 
Mirowski and Sent (2002) and Radder (2010) have been critical of the ways in which proprietary, 
commercialized R&I is inherently self-limiting, while Stephan (2012) has examined the negative 
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changes to academic science brought about by market systems. Much like the case with innovation 
studies, there have been a number of works attempting to outline the theoretical and organizational 
framework of the economics of science (Dasgupta and David, 1996; Sent, 1999; Ballandonne, 
2012; Tyfield, 2012b, 2012c). 
 
1.3.5.. Intellectual Property 
The existing STS and innovation studies literature concerning intellectual property has been 
largely framed as a debate around open versus proprietary R&I. In the legal context, Posner (2002, 
2003) has been particularly critical of the ways in which expansive, proprietary property rights 
limit the production of intellectual property itself. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have also argued 
against the use of certain proprietary devices in biomedical research, such as material transfer 
agreements and reach-through license agreements, while Caulfield et al. (2012) have discussed at 
length the potential for bottlenecks in the R&I process that result from broad IP claims upstream. 
Conversely, Lezuan and Montgomery (2015) have argued that proprietary devices are necessary 
for outlining collaborative research relationships and provide incentives for private firms to invest 
in basic research. In his discussion of the tension between science and business in the biotech 
sector, Pisano (2006) argues that the monetization of IP has shaped the process of R&I itself, 
resulting in an inherently corporate model of innovation.  
Feldman and Nelson (2008) and Hope (2008) have provided detailed accounts of the birth 
of open science, particularly as an extension of the growth of open source software in the mid-
1990s. As the sharing of data and information is paramount in the –omics era, there have been a 
number of works examining the impact of openness on the scientific knowledge and its byproducts 
as well as the changing practices of research itself in this era. For instance, one aspect of open 
science is the idea of open access (OA), specifically as it relates to publishing. As Wellen (2013) 
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and Harnad et al. (2008) note, OA journals offer one solution to navigating around the prohibitively 
costly user fees traditionally associated with academic journals so that published data is, in theory, 
broadly and freely available. Gitter (2013) and Rhoten and Powell (2007) have discussed open 
approaches to licensing in the context of scientific R&I, specifically highlighting the ways in which 
non-proprietary licensing arrangements such as Creative Commons, copyleft or GNU Public 
Licenses (GPL) help to navigate around issues of data ownership by ensuring that users may freely 
use, modify, and distribute data or information on the condition that its derivatives are bound by 
the same conditions (see also Birch et al., 2018). 
Again, though these works form a crucial component of the theoretical skeleton of this 
research, there is nonetheless a significant gap in this literature that has yet to be addressed: 
scholars in STS and innovation studies have yet to analyze how proprietary and open devices vary 
in terms of their efficacy when they are employed in academic versus industrial settings. Moreover, 
there is little nuanced discussion in the existing literature regarding why open and proprietary 
devices operate effectively at different stages in the innovation process, or how they can be 
employed to facilitate collaboration. Existing works have yet to analyze how open and proprietary 
devices may be used together in the context of interdisciplinary pharmaceutical research and 
public/private collaborations, and how researchers might navigate through IP gridlocks when 
potentially competing or conflicting interests are guiding knowledge translation. 
 
1.4. Research Objectives  
This dissertation addresses the following research questions:  
1. How do social actors in the pharmaceutical sector understand innovation? By extension, how 
can we theorize open and proprietary devices? 
 
My aim here is to provide a conceptual outline of mediating devices as the linchpins that enable 
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collaboration, commercialization, and knowledge transfer, and/or determine valuation of the 
products and processes of R&I. In doing so, I endeavour to highlight the substantial gaps between 
existing theoretical discussions of innovation and intellectual property and the strategies and 
practices employed in pharmaceutical R&D; gaps that potentially skew our understanding of 
innovation ecosystems and impede sound policy decisions. This is discussed at length in Chapter 
Five, where I examine what it means to innovate, how innovation is measured and valuated, the 
factors drives certain actors to invest in the development of innovative new biotechnologies, and 
the factors that accelerate or inhibit the commercialization of these innovations. 
2. Which proprietary and open devices are used in pharmaceutical R&I? For whom, and why? 
 
Here I examine the ways in which patents, NDAs, MTAs, reach-through license agreements, open 
licenses, and open libraries and databases are used by actors at the institutes overviewed in section 
1.2. This is examined in Chapter Six, where I discuss MTAs as they relate to academic TTOs, 
emphasizing the difficulties and costs associated with executing MTAs and the impact of these 
costs on pharmaceutical research and innovation. In this chapter I also discuss how mediating 
devices configure collaboration agreements, focusing specifically on the effects of proprietary 
contracts and open databases and libraries on research and innovation. Finally, I discuss patents 
and their role in the legal architecture of research and innovation, highlighting how they 
(re)configure the commercialization of new pharmaceutical products in Ontario and the 
implications this has for the use of open devices. In situating these devices within the larger context 
of corporate strategy, public policy, and technology transfer, I analyze the ways in which these 
devices are incorporated into innovation strategies and business models at these institutes. 
3. How do different devices facilitate or hinder collaboration and knowledge translation in this 
sector? At what stage in the innovation process are they most effective, and why? 
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I examine this question at length in Chapter Seven, where I evaluate the impact of broad versus 
narrow patent claims and their impact on innovation. Here, I argue that the efficacy of open and 
proprietary devices, both in terms of accelerating the translation of pharmaceutical research and 
encouraging collaboration, is dependent on: firstly, when they are employed in the innovation 
process (i.e. upstream versus downstream); and secondly, what they are applied to (i.e. tool 
compounds used to develop candidate drug products versus the products themselves). More often 
than not, the implementation of proprietary devices too early in the R&I process, particularly in 
the case of broad upstream patent claims, results in bottlenecks that slow down or stop knowledge 
translation entirely. Conversely, the use of open devices downstream in the commercialization 
process of new drug candidates is likely to derail private investment. Moreover, the role of open 
versus proprietary devices in facilitating or hindering innovation is dependent on several variables: 
namely, collaborative arrangements and the nature of the IP in question (e.g. a tool used in the 
development of drug candidates versus a pharmaceutical product itself).   
4. How can they be employed in the development of innovation strategies so as to streamline the 
process of drug development? 
 
This final question is also addressed in Chapter Seven, where I conduct a case study of the open 
molecule JQ1, a tool compound used in the development of therapeutic products for certain types 
of cancer. Building off observations made previously in the chapter, I highlight the issues 
associated with broad proprietary IP claims and the limitations (particularly related to funding and 
investment) associated with open devices in certain cases. I argue that, contrary to the dichotomous 
and incompatible image of open and proprietary devices that is presented in the STS and 
innovation studies literature, these devices may be complimentary at particular stages of R&I, and, 
when used together, can accelerate advancements in the pharmaceutical sector. 
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These questions are summarized in Chapter Eight, where I endeavour to draw policy 
implications from the previous three chapters. My overall aim is to parse the relationship between 
innovation and entrepreneurship in the pharmaceutical sector and analyze the ways in which open 
and proprietary devices help to turn pre-clinical or early-stage research into a revenue producing 
asset. The results of this project are relevant to public research institutes and private firms, and are 
applicable in cases of less commercially oriented projects in addition to late-stage product 
development. My hope is that this research may be used in part to form an explanatory model for 
sustainable pharmaceutical R&I and can be used to help shape institutional R&I policies in Canada 
so as to streamline the drug development process. 
 
1.5. Methodology 
Data for this research was collected via database and literature analyses, and semi-structured 
qualitative interviews. This will be elaborated upon significantly in Chapter Three. In light of the 
research questions outlined above, data collection and analysis was divided into three stages: 
firstly, a theoretical synthesis of the existing literature on open innovation, commercialization, and 
knowledge translation in the life sciences, outlined in Chapter Two. Secondly, an analysis and 
secondary literature review of existing provincial and federal policy regarding pharmaceutical 
innovation and technology transfer, outlined in Chapter Four. Finally, an analysis of qualitative 
interview data on the use of mediating devices in pharmaceutical R&I in Ontario, with 
interviewees drawn from the organizations outlined in in section 1.2. This analysis occurs in 
Chapters Five through Seven. 
Following transcription and prior to analysis, interview data was coded using NVivo. The 
coding process involved describing, classifying, and connecting (Blaikie, 2011). Primary coding 
categories included innovation, collaboration, business models, funding and investment in R&I, 
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and open and proprietary devices (among others), with sub-categories including definitions, 
metrics, and strategies (of innovation), barriers to and facilitators of (collaboration), and so on. 
Classification also entailed an evaluation of the causal and intervening conditions behind the use 
of each mediating device (ibid).  
 
1.6. Contribution to Knowledge 
In terms of contributions to theory, this research seeks to fill gaps in the existing STS, 
innovation studies, and political economy of science literature concerning the relationship between 
intellectual property and open innovation. As discussed in section 1.3., while notions of “mediating 
instruments” have been discussed at length in the accounting and economic sociology literature, 
the concept of mediating devices as outlined has yet to appear. I argue that situating and analyzing 
these devices within the broader context of corporate strategy, technology transfer, scientific 
competition, and academic capitalism sheds light on the ways in which information and data are 
diffused and circulated in the context of pharmaceutical development and helps frame 
collaborative networks of disparate actors. Moreover, examining mediating devices in this context 
may help to the refine and streamline institutional innovation strategies, and may help to rapidly 
and cost-effectively translate innovative research findings from the lab to the clinic, particularly 
by highlighting which devices work for whom, and when. Ultimately, by examining the context in 
which pharmaceutical innovations develop as well as the devices that enable innovations to be 
rapidly and cost-effectively diffused to clinical settings, Canada will be better suited to solving 
salient health policy issues (e.g. how to foster a sustainable and efficient environment for 
pharmaceutical R&D) and to answering the demand for novel diagnostic and therapeutic drugs. 
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1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the issue at hand – namely, the limitations posed to 
pharmaceutical R&I by proprietary IP and the commercialization of science itself. This research 
examines the development of new drug candidates at public research institutes and private firms 
in Ontario, focusing specifically on MI and its affiliate firms and research hospitals, the OICR and 
FACIT, JLABS and its affiliate firms, and the SGC. I introduce the concept of mediating devices 
and their role as intermediaries within the broad network actors and institutes shaping Canada’s 
pharmaceutical sector and provide a brief overview of the scholarly works informing this 
dissertation. Finally, I outline the objectives of this research and hypotheses associated with each 
research question. The remainder of this dissertation is organized as such:  
Chapter Two provides an in-depth theoretical and conceptual framework, focusing on key 
works in STS, economics of science, and innovation studies. Specifically, this chapter begins 
broadly with a theoretical discussion of how knowledge is produced and the role of 
interdisciplinarity in the sciences, before moving on to detail the commercialization of knowledge 
and academic entrepreneurship. I then discuss business and innovation models and strategies, 
before focusing finally on intellectual property and mediating devices. In addition to providing a 
theoretical foundation for the remainder of this dissertation, the purpose of this chapter is also to 
situate this research within the broader existing body of relevant work in STS. 
Chapter Three is a comprehensive overview of the methodological approach undertaken in 
the collection and analysis of qualitative data. Here I discuss in detail the approach to interviewing 
that was undertaken, the coding and analysis process, and potential limitations to this research. 
Chapter Four offers a background of the landscape of pharmaceutical R&D in Ontario, 
providing a more detailed discussion of the institutes and actors involved in this study as well as 
the legal and regulatory architecture behind drug development research in Canada. This chapter 
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also examines relevant international legal agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) agreement.  
Chapter Five focuses on the concept of innovation itself and attempts to unpack what the 
term meant to interview participants. Stemming from this, this chapter also seeks to analyze how 
the concept of innovation and the ways it is measured sheds light on funding and investment 
decisions. Here I highlight the role of mediating devices in driving pharmaceutical R&I in 
Toronto’s innovation ecosystem and assess the relationship between the lack of public funding for 
research in Canada and the consequent profit-driven nature of research. I also evaluate the role of 
mediating devices in attracting external investment, in addition to the ways in which these devices 
affect the commercialization of new technologies. 
Chapter Six focuses on the embeddedness of mediating devices in the architecture of 
Canadian research and innovation. I begin by discussing MTAs in the context of university TTOs 
and unpacking the difficulties and costs associated with the execution of these devices. Secondly, 
I evaluate the ways in which these devices configure collaboration agreements, focusing 
specifically on the effects of proprietary contracts and open databases and libraries on R&I. 
Finally, I examine the case of patents and their role in the legal architechture of R&I in Ontario, 
highlighting the ways they (re)configure the commercialization of new pharmaceutical products. 
Chapter Seven examines the impact of broad versus narrow patent claims and their effect on 
innovation. Here, I evaluate the ways in which broad upstream patent claims on tool compounds 
results in bottlenecks that slow down or stop knowledge translation entirely. I also analyze the use 
of open devices downstream in the commercialization process of new drug candidates, and the 
impact of this on private investment. This chapter concludes with a case study of the open molecule 
JQ1 as a means of highlighting the importance of distinguishing between research tools versus 
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marketable products when attempting to understand the overall impact of open and proprietary 
mediating devices on pharmaceutical innovation. 
Finally, Chapter Eight summarizes this dissertation and offers concluding remarks 
concerning the state of pharmaceutical development in Canada and future research areas.  
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2. The Business of Pharmaceutical R&I: A Review of the Literature 
 
Pharmaceutical development has grown to be a business in its own right in recent decades, 
and the process of developing new pharmaceuticals has become an engine of wealth creation for 
national economies, particularly in the United States, Canada, and the UK. Aided by a series of 
policy and legislative reforms in the early 1980s, the rapid growth of biotechnology presented the 
opportunity for both universities and private firms to commodify research projects with wealth-
creating potential and subsequently capitalize on the results (Mirowski, 2011). The expansion of 
intellectual property rights further upstream into the research process has ensured that universities 
play a more active role in reconfiguring research agendas toward more commercial and social 
interests (Lave et al., 2010). Whether or not the net effect of this expansion has been to hinder 
innovation in the pharmaceutical sciences remains to be seen.  
This chapter is divided into five broad sections and provides an overview of the existing 
body of scholarly work in the following areas: firstly, science and technology studies (STS), 
specifically in the context of knowledge production and interdisciplinarity; secondly, economics 
and the political economy of science; thirdly, innovation studies; fourthly, intellectual property; 
and finally, mediating instruments and mediating devices. This research is focused specifically on 
pharmaceutical R&D and the development of novel clinical products. However, a significant 
component of R&D nonetheless involves the production of knowledge, and as such this chapter 
begins with a broad overview of the properties of scientific knowledge and a discussion of 
interdisciplinarity and collaboration in the sciences. Following this, I provide a historical overview 
of major changes to the political economy of science in recent decades affecting the pharmaceutical 
R&I in question, focusing on academic capitalism and commercialization. Next, I discuss 
innovation studies as a discipline and innovation models used to bring research results to the 
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market. Subsequently, I provide an overview and analysis of intellectual property and open 
science, concepts at the center of drug development policy today. Finally, I introduce the concept 
of mediating devices that will play a critical role in the remainder of this dissertation. 
 
2.1. Science and Technology Studies 
As a discipline, STS emerges from the intersection of history and philosophy of science 
(HPS) and sociology of science, borrowing theoretically and methodologically from these fields, 
and, recently, economics and policy studies. Given its transdisciplinary orientation, STS theory – 
particularly as it relates to interdisciplinary collaboration and knowledge production – is well-
suited to shedding light on the ways in which the epistemic enterprise of science shapes and is 
shaped by social, political, and economic factors, and further provides a useful lens through which 
to understand how these elements affect the translation and commercialization of scientific 
research. 
This section focuses on seminal discussions of knowledge [co]production and 
interdisciplinarity in STS; more specifically, on the works of Merton (1942), Shapin (1984), 
Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Gibbons et al. (1994), and Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000). While 
these works may seem abstract or too theoretically removed to be relevant, I argue there is a link 
worth briefly exploring between these works and the topic at hand. In particular, between 
knowledge production for Shapin and Schaffer and the idealized version of science articulated by 
Merton, and how the arguments of these authors contrast with the realities of how knowledge is 
enclosed behind proprietary barriers, how commercialization affects interdisciplinarity and 
inhibits the movement of knowledge across interdisciplinary barriers. Further, discussing these 
works (however briefly) helps to situate this research within the significantly broader field of STS. 
Understanding science not as a representation of an objective reality, but rather as the product of 
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social processes, requires an unpacking of the things that fall in between an experiment and the 
knowledge it produces, and by extension, unpacking the things that mediate the interactions of 
those responsible for producing that knowledge and ultimately bringing it to market (e.g. in the 
form of a clinical product such as a drug). It necessarily involves closely examining the tangible 
and intangible devices that enable scientific knowledge to move from the laboratory through a 
clinical trial, or that prevent scientific data from being circulated and shared beyond the confines 
of a single firm. Thus, while notions of knowledge production and interdisciplinarity seem 
abstract, the development of new pharmaceutical products begins in the lab and extends across a 
global network of firms and institutes, incorporating varying methodologies and expanding upon 
past experiments. At its core, pharmaceutical R&D ranges a broad array of disciplines and 
incorporates a similar diversity in its actors. To that end, understanding innovation in and of itself 
– either to streamline the process, to interrogate the mechanisms that enable it, and so forth – 
requires discussion of the abstract before an examination of the finer details of drug development 
specifically. This section focuses firstly on scientific knowledge production as discussed by STS 
scholars, before discussing “new modes” of knowledge production, and finally interdisciplinarity 
and collaboration in scientific R&D. 
 
2.1.1. Knowledge Production  
The social nature of science has been discussed at length by sociologists, historians, and 
philosophers of science, and the argument that scientific knowledge is a product of the actions and 
interactions of social actors is not particularly novel. In fact, arguably the most prominent vein of 
early STS scholarship focused almost exclusively on the epistemics of the scientific enterprise, 
with scholars seeking to understand how scientific matters of fact are generated and solidified (see 
Shapin, 1984; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985), how scientific knowledge results from the actions of 
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complex groups of actors and institutions (see Galison, 1985), and the notion of social construction 
in the broad context of the scientific enterprise (see Pinch and Bijker, 1987; Latour, 1987; Hacking, 
1999).  
For Shapin (1984) (and later Shapin and Schaffer [1985]), producing and disseminating 
matters of fact amongst a community of scientists – essentially creating knowers – involves a 
distinct set of practices unique to scientific disciplines, the first being the standardization of 
methodology. The scientific method, he argues, ensures a uniform process in which experiments 
are conducted, demands consistency, allows for replication, and creates trust amongst the scientific 
community at large (Shapin, 1984). The basis of this method lies in the consistent, regimented 
repetition of steps and observations in each investigation, which reduces the potential insertion of 
personal biases and the serendipitous reoccurrence of experimental outcomes. Secondly, Shapin 
and Schaffer (1985) highlight the use of mimetic devices as a means of creating matters of fact. 
Pictorial representations (i.e. schematic diagrams, anatomical drawings, infographics showing 
patterns or trends in large amounts of data etc.) generally functioned to establish matters of fact by 
communicating ideas, results, and information, and “[serve] to announce…that ‘this [experiment] 
was really done’ and that ‘it was done in the way stipulated’” (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985: 61-2). 
Finally, creating scientific knowledge involved the extension of experience from the few to the 
many. Given the elaborate, and costly nature of scientific experimentation, the need for multiple 
testifiers to validate experimental results becomes problematic, and thus the multiplication of 
witnesses was an integral step in producing matters of fact. Providing complex and heavily detailed 
testimonies “to be taken as undistorted mirrors of complex experimental outcomes” (i.e. publishing 
and reporting experiments) creates a virtual witness in the reader, thereby facilitating trust in the 
knowledge claims being made (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985: 64). Moreover, as Jasanoff (2005) 
notes, scientific matters of fact hold weight not necessarily because they objectively reflect nature, 
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but because they have been certified as true by those with the authority and competence to do so. 
For now, the general consensus appears to be that the notion of a lone scientist in noble pursuit of 
an abstract truth is both outdated and false.  
In 1942, Robert Merton outlined what he saw as the normative structure of science – that is, 
the non-codified rules and customs informing the behaviour of scientists, determining what 
counted as “good” science, and, broadly, shaping the scientific ethos (Merton, 1973). Merton’s 
norms, neatly encapsulated by the initialism CUDOS, are as follows: if scientific knowledge were 
to be accepted as legitimate and incorporated into the “communal stock” by the scientific 
community, and by extension, trusted as a matter of fact by society at large, it had to be communal 
in its availability, universally assessed on the basis of established impersonal criteria, disinterested 
in nature, and evaluated with organized scepticism (ibid).  
As it relates to pharmaceutical innovation, the authors discussed above all (indirectly) touch 
on notions of openness. For Merton (1942), “legitimate” scientific knowledge was communally 
available. As will be discussed in the ensuing sections of this chapter, the notion that scientific 
knowledge must be communal in nature (and thereby that scientific findings cannot be owned 
exclusively by any group or individual) is debatable, to say the least, and the realities of knowledge 
production (particularly in the context of developing new pharmaceutical products) contrasts 
significantly with Merton’s views (Shapin, 2008). Moreover, given the increasing involvement of 
private, for-profit research institutes and firms in fundamental research, the norm of 
disinterestedness holds increasingly less weight. For Shapin and Schaffer (1985), the “extension 
of experience from the few to the many” (p. 64) was a critical component of objective scientific 
fact-making – a task made especially difficult today when knowledge and data are enclosed behind 
proprietary barriers.  
In light of the growth of industry-funded R&D and the expectation that scientific research 
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produce results with direct commercial value, the abbreviation PLACE may be more appropriate 
in the context of research conducted by means of public-private partnerships. In contrast to what 
he describes as academic science, wherein Merton’s norms hold true at least in part, Ziman (2002a) 
argues industrial science,  
…produces proprietary knowledge that is not necessarily made public, it is focused 
on local technical problems rather than on general understanding, [its] researchers 
act under managerial authority rather than as individuals, their research is 
commissioned to achieve practical goals, rather than undertaken in the pursuit of 
knowledge, [and] they are employed as expert problem solvers, rather than for their 
personal creativity (78-79). 
 
Ziman’s distinction between academic and industrial science is significant here: whether or not 
scientific inquiry can be neatly classified as one or the other, the contrast between Merton’s idyllic 
view of science as an independent pursuit of fundamental truths about nature versus Ziman’s 
somewhat more pragmatic vision highlights the importance of interrogating the social processes 
that underpin scientific practices. While Merton’s norms highlight the social nature of scientific 
knowledge production, their relevance today is disputable. Nevertheless, they continue to affect 
scholarship in cognate fields such as the economics of science (see section 2.2), perpetuating an 
impractical version of scientific research that has negatively impacted science policy and research 
in recent decades. 
 
2.1.2. Mode 1/Mode 2: A Useful Distinction? 
While traditionally speaking, scientific knowledge is often considered to be produced under 
and reflect specific disciplinary identities, in recent years research projects have been undertaken 
in “…the ‘context of application,’ that is, [emphasizing] the growing importance of the socio-
economic environments of knowledge production” (Heimeriks, 2013: 98). The work of Michael 
Gibbons et al. (1994) was an important attempt to extensively detail a “new” mode of knowledge 
production in contemporary science – that is, knowledge produced in the context of application 
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(versus “pure” or “basic” scientific knowledge). Gibbons et al.’s distinction between what is 
described as Mode 1 and Mode 2 science is intended to illustrate the varying and elaborate 
methods, values, theories, and communities in which scientific research occurs and in which 
knowledge is produced and disseminated. Though the Mode 1/Mode 2 distinction is reductive and 
overly simplistic, it is worth unpacking the terms, particularly as they apply to pharmaceutical 
development. 
Scientific knowledge derived in Mode 1 generally upholds the Mertonian norms discussed 
above and highlights the principles of “pure science” put forth by Merton and reinforced by 
Vannevar Bush in 1945. According to Gibbons et al. (1994), “Mode 1 is identical with what is 
meant by science. […]Its cognitive and social norms determine what shall count as significant 
problems, who shall be allowed to practice science, and what constitutes good science” (3). The 
locus of Mode 1 science is the university: it is characterized by its homogenous, discipline-based 
focus and practitioners, and occurs in the absence of specific practical goals (ibid: 3-4). It is, in 
essence, pure science: neutrally conducted research intended to produce universal knowledge 
about natural phenomena to be used to test theories in specific discipline-based contexts.  
Conversely, Mode 2 knowledge is produced in the context of a specific application and is 
motivated by real-world concerns. With the advent of “Big Science” following the Second World 
War, scientific research became “socially accountable and reflexive,” and was produced in 
industrial settings by a “more temporary and heterogeneous set of practitioners, collaborating on 
a problem defined in a specific and localised context” (ibid: 3). According to Gibbons et al. (1994), 
Mode 2 knowledge production blurs disciplinary boundaries and is inherently transdisciplinary. 
Its focus is practical and application-based, though application is not necessarily synonymous with 
product development; rather, the production of Mode 2 knowledge involves an attempt to solve 
real-world problems. Unlike in Mode 1 where members of a specific discipline determine the 
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legitimacy and integrity of knowledge, the value of Mode 2 knowledge is determined by a broad 
range of stakeholders extending beyond the core research group (ibid). Importantly, it is the 
product of specific supply and demand factors: as a result of the rapid growth of scientific and 
technical “professionals” and the subsequent proliferation in specialised knowledge since the 
1950s, “…the market for knowledge – the number of places where it is wanted and can be used – 
is now wider and more differentiated than it has ever been” (ibid: 49). There was (and is) now a 
greater opportunity than ever before for scientists of disparate backgrounds to temporarily come 
together to solve a particular problem. For instance, for Gibbons et al., developing novel cancer 
therapeutics would constitute Mode 2 knowledge production: research in this context is conducted 
to solve a particular real-world problem. It isn’t carried out solely by pharmacologists or solely by 
molecular geneticists, but rather it applies the knowledge and expertise from multiple disciplines, 
from biochemistry to applied mathematics to biomedical ethicists. Its value is assessed not only 
by those who those who produce it, but by those who fund it and make use of the products or 
solutions it may yield. 
While the notion of supply and demand factors for knowledge production is a useful one in 
the context of this work (to be discussed), the Mode 1/Mode 2 distinction has been criticized as 
promoting a manifestly reductive and inadequate basic/applied dichotomy. Whitley (2001) is 
particularly critical of the lack of consideration given to the changes to organizational 
characteristics scientific disciplines have experienced in recent decades. He notes certain fields 
(particularly the biological sciences) have developed increasingly “fluid and overlapping 
organizational boundaries,” in part due to the development and generalization of molecular biology 
and to “…the expansion of funding by mission-oriented agencies on a project basis” into the 
academic sphere (Whitley, 2001: xix). The focus on disciplines and discipline-based knowledge 
production inherent in the Mode 1/Mode 2 distinction (recall, Mode 1 is discipline-based while 
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Mode 2 is interdisciplinary) overlooks the social nature of scientific knowledge production, even 
the most fundamental sort. What Gibbons et al. would describe as Mode 1 science is not 
immediately supplanted by Mode 2 at the suggestion of application or interdisciplinarity. Scientific 
research across the basic/applied spectrum, Whitley argues, has long been “entrenched in 
educational institutions and employment markets” that shape how it is conducted and determine 
the products it yields (2001: 9). The advent of Big Science did not precipitate a chasm between 
academic (“pure”) and industrial (applied) science, as Fuller (2000) notes, and the Mode 1/Mode 
2 distinction mischaracterizes universities as autonomous institutions free from external pressures 
of industrial or commercial influence. Moreover, it ignores the relationship between science and 
technology on the one hand, and enterprise and society on the other (Shinn, 2002). For centuries, 
the majority of scientific discoveries have been motivated by attempts “to solve problems in 
navigation, mining, etc.,” and the “solution of practical problems through scientific means has 
been an important factor in scientific development, whether in German pharmaceutical science in 
the 17th century…or in the British-sponsored competition to provide a secure basis for navigation” 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000: 116). What is described as Mode 2 science is not a “new mode 
of knowledge production,” rather,  
 
it is the original format of science before its academic institutionalization in the 19th 
century… Mode 2 represents the material base of science, how it actually operates. 
Mode 1 is a construct, built upon that base in order to justify autonomy for science, 
especially in an earlier era when it was still a fragile institution and needed all the 
help it could get (ibid). 
 
As an additional explanatory model for the current state of scientific R&I, Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff (2000) describe the triple helix model of knowledge production. In this particular 
model, universities, industry, and government are argued to be the primary, co-equal helices the 
scientific enterprise, largely due to the increasingly prominent role played by scientific knowledge 
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in society broadly speaking, and the growing importance and variety of non-academic 
collaborators (ibid). The significance of these institutions in the triple helix model is determined 
by the dynamics of wealth generation in the economy, novelty generation by scientific research, 
and the governance of both via policymaking in the public sphere and corporate management in 
private industry (Leydesdorff, 2010). As will be discussed in ensuing sections of this chapter, 
interactions between these institutes often produce entrepreneurial intermediary organizations 
such as incubator labs, spin-offs or startups, science parks (such as MI, for instance), and venture 
capital firms (Etzkowitz, 2007). Innovation in the triple helix model generally takes place when 
collaborative, reciprocal relationships are established between each of the three helices: for 
instance, enhancing the R&D performance of universities “often becomes the key issue as part of 
a strategy to renew an older economy or create new economic activity on the basis of intellectual 
capital” (ibid: 11). Once this policy strategy is established, government and industry may then 
become involved in supporting academic R&D, often through the establishment of research centres 
and funding initiatives (ibid). Unlike the Mode 1/Mode 2 model, the triple helix model does not 
erase or ignore the historical relationship between the scientific enterprise and the state; rather, it 
posits a co-evolution of these institutions and their organizational structures such that knowledge 
production is inextricably linked between each helix (Shinn, 2002). 
In yet another attempt to navigate around the limits of the Mode 1/Mode 2 distinction, Ziman 
(2002a) coined the term post-academic science, referring to the research paradigm that emerged 
following the birth of the biotech industry in the 1970s wherein knowledge was constructed by 
heterogeneous groups “in accord with the commercial, political, or other social interests of the 
bodies that underwrite its production” (174). What differentiates Ziman’s post-academic science 
from the Mode 1/Mode 2 notion of science put forth by Gibbons et al. is the emphasis on utility 
versus application. Post-academic science, however theoretical or applied in nature, is evaluated 
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based on its utility. Even the most commercially “useless” sciences (i.e. cosmology) are required 
to demonstrate short- or long-term utility (though not necessarily immediate application) to 
institutions outside academia to justify funding and are seen as being in service of the nation. 
Science, in the post-academic paradigm, is a “…driving force in a national R&D system, a wealth-
creating techno-scientific motor for the whole economy” (ibid: 73).  
But why is all of this useful in a discussion of the open and proprietary dimensions of 
pharmaceutical innovation? Are Merton and the Mode 1/Mode 2 distinction not outdated by now? 
A quick scan of papers published in Social Studies of Science and Science, Technology and Human 
Values – two of the highest impact journals in STS – since 2009 reveals several dozen citations of 
Gibbons et al. (1994). These works cite the Mode 1/Mode 2 debate largely in discussions of the 
blurring of boundaries between industry and academia (Tuunaienen and Knuuttila, 2009; Parker 
and Crona, 2012), science as a public good (Stengel et al., 2009), the epistemics of scientific 
knowledge and current technology (Hoffman, 2015), and entrepreneurial science (Lam, 2010), 
among numerous others. Ziman’s post-academic science is an especially useful descriptor here: 
the Mode 1/Mode 2 (“pure”/applied) delineation seems to depict science as though all theory-
directed, explanatory, or classificatory research occurs in a vacuum, unaffected by the politics of 
funding bodies or institutions, while anything outside this bubble is intended solely to produce 
marketable products. The science examined and discussed in this dissertation does not fit under 
either the Mode 1 or Mode 2 umbrellas; it is interdisciplinary, mission-based, market-oriented, 
and situated within the broader context of corporate strategy, scientific competition, and 
government policy. It is useful, commercially and otherwise. Regardless, it bears examining the 
ways in which the production of scientific knowledge has come to be understood by STS scholars, 
and how these discussions contrast with the complex realities of pharmaceutical R&D. 
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2.1.3. Interdisciplinarity, Collaboration and the Organization of Science 
Whether the Mode 1/Mode 2/post-academic distinctions are generally useful or relevant 
today, these discussions nevertheless highlight one crucial characteristic of contemporary 
scientific R&D: interdisciplinarity. Heimeriks (2012) differentiates between multidisciplinarity 
(“a conglomeration of disciplinary components”), transdisciplinarity (“an application-oriented 
type of heterogeneous knowledge production”), and interdisciplinarity (“a more synthetic attempt 
at mutual interaction”) (1). Interdisciplinary is a subjective concept and a slippery one to pin down. 
Interdisciplinary research may be narrow in nature and include fields that are conceptually close 
to one another, in which interaction between participating fields “is not exceptional or particularly 
challenging in epistemological terms, since the concepts, theories and/or methods are relatively 
similar in their epistemological presuppositions,” such as in the case of systems biology 
(Huutoniemia et al., 2010: 82). Conversely, it may be broad in nature, wherein conceptually 
heterogeneous fields covering broad intellectual areas interact (e.g. medicine and law, molecular 
biology and history). It may refer to skillsets, infrastructures for research designs, application of 
methodologies, knowledge bases, and/or tools for data acquisition and analysis (Heimeriks, 2012).  
This dissertation employs a general, somewhat generic definition, in that “research becomes 
interdisciplinary whenever the research activity involves several fields” (ibid). In the –omics era, 
knowledge production is no longer inwardly oriented, and disciplinary boundaries have become 
increasingly difficult to draw, while knowledge flows have become increasingly fluid. 
Historically, drug development was primarily based in chemistry. Today, studying the complex 
interactions of biological systems to develop new drugs and medical technologies and to 
understand diseases and population dynamics necessarily extends beyond the confines of any 
particular discipline and includes in part the methods and tools of genomics, proteomics, 
metabolomics, mathematics, physics, computational biology, and statistics (Pisano, 2006). 
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Disciplinary interests, constraints, and methodologies are constantly dissolving, merging, and 
overlapping in response to external challenges. Knowledge production has also become coupled 
more directly to broad social and economic problems, involving fluid organizational structures of 
disciplines “mediating between knowledge and knowledge markets” (Weingart and Stehr, 2000: 
xiv).  
Interdisciplinarity is now synonymous with innovation and progress (ibid) and it has become 
increasingly difficult to justify funding for research that is not interdisciplinary to some degree. 
Heimeriks (2012) argues that in fields with high commercial potential such as nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, and genomics, there is a strong incentive for government R&D policies that 
promote and fund interdisciplinary research. This is evident in the growth of government-funded 
interdisciplinary research institutes across North America and Europe. For instance, in 2007 the 
U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) launched an interdisciplinary research consortia 
consisting of nine institutes (including the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard University, and the 
Oncofertility Consortium at Northwestern University), the aim of which was not only to address 
complex health challenges, but to dissolve departmental boundaries within institutions, forge 
“inter-disciplines,” and provide training for students in multiple disciplines (NIH, 2007). In 
contrast to multidisciplinary research, in which researchers approach particular problems from 
their own disciplines, interdisciplinary research conducted by consortia members  
 
integrates elements of a wide range of disciplines, often including basic research, 
clinical research, behavioural biology, and social sciences so that all of the scientists 
approach the problem in a new way. The members of interdisciplinary teams learn 
from each other to produce new approaches to a problem that would not be possible 
through any of the single disciplines. Typically, this process begins with team 
members first learning the language of each other's discipline, as well as the 
assumptions, limits, and valid uses of those disciplines' theoretical and experimental 
approaches. Experiments are then designed in ways that cut across disciplines, with, 
for example, an experiment based in one discipline producing data that can be 
correlated — or otherwise connected to — data generated in experiments based in 
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another discipline. The common understanding by the team of the disciplines involved 
assures that this tight linkage across the disciplines is valid (ibid). 
 
Likewise, Canada’s primary federal funding bodies for research in the sciences – the Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council (NSERC) 
– both explicitly emphasize the need to adapt research practices in the post-disciplinary paradigm 
by promoting and advancing a national interdisciplinary research program (CIHR, 2018; NSERC, 
2018a). Since 2012, both agencies have offered funding for multidisciplinary training and 
collaborative health research projects, the purpose of which is to “encourage the NSERC and CIHR 
research communities to collaborate and integrate their expertise” and to “train highly qualified 
personnel in collaborative and interdisciplinary research relevant to health” (NSERC, 2018b). 
Institutes such as the European Molecular Biology Lab (EMBL) and the UCL Centre for 
Computation, Mathematics and Physics in the Life Sciences and Experimental Biology 
(CoMPLEX), for instance, again demonstrate the push for researchers to move away from 
“reductionist” discipline-focused and engage in collaborative, interdisciplinary R&D (EMBL, 
2018). Interdisciplinarity has evidently become a key component of scientific knowledge 
production in this particular research paradigm, one that is now tied directly to funding 
opportunities. 
As R&D has become more interdisciplinary in nature, it has become more collaborative – a 
product of the growing access to human capital offered by new communication technologies, in 
addition to the rising costs of R&D and the increasing complexity of science itself. The “burden 
of knowledge” as described by Jones (2009), has necessitated more collaborative efforts among 
scientific researchers. Knowledge begets new knowledge, Jones argues, and as the total stock of 
knowledge (about cancer, targeted therapies, and so on) accumulates and individuals “know an 
increasingly narrow fraction of it,” a growing breadth of expertise is needed to undertake scientific 
R&D (Jaffe and Jones, 2015: 3). Scientific R&I is an aggregate process of producing new 
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knowledge and the narrowing of expertise, argues Jones (2009), reduces the capabilities of the 
individual scientist, and, by extension the scope of their methodologies, research tools, and 
knowledge base. To continue making advancements in biotechnology or pharmaceutical sciences, 
then, increased numbers of researchers are required to collectively pool their skills and expertise 
(Freeman et al., 2015; Raasch et al., 2013). Further, the advancement of information and 
communication technologies since the 1990s has coincided with the rapid growth of STEM PhDs 
and researchers around the world – essentially, the growth of human capital has been coupled with 
an increased ability to tap into it (Freeman et al., 2015). As a result, there has been a marked 
increase in international collaborations, particularly in the biotech sector, as demonstrated by a rise 
in international research collaborations and co-authorships of scientific papers (ibid), particularly 
between graduate students, post-docs, and faculty (Conti and Liu, 2015). Freeman et al. (2009) 
argue the growing number of international scientific collaborations suggests a positive link 
between authorship, interdisciplinarity, and collaboration; essentially “…the greater the 
knowledge that goes into a paper, the greater the scientific contribution of the paper – at least to 
the extent that these measures are a valid ‘paper trail’ of flows of knowledge” (43). Increasingly, 
research across all disciplines – including STEM fields, the social sciences, and the humanities – 
is conducted as a collaborative effort, particularly high-impact research (Wuchty et al., 2007). 
Naturally, communication barriers arise when disparate and physically distant groups with varying 
expertise come together, however the rise of “team”-based R&D suggests that collaboration offers 
researchers growing returns (in reputational and intellectual property markets), and is 
demonstrative of the fundamental changes to both the organization of scientific activity and the 
production of scientific knowledge that have occurred since the early-2000s (Agrawal et at., 2015).  
As discussed briefly in chapter one, the –omics era brought about a shift in the focus of 
research from objects (e.g. the gene, the protein) to systems (e.g. the genome, the proteome). As 
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noted above, R&D is now increasingly interdisciplinary and collaborative, particularly in the 
context of drug development. By extension, the –omics era has been accompanied by a rise in the 
cost of R&D itself, compounding the push towards interdisciplinary collaboration. The average 
cost of clinical trials for new chemical entities, from initial protocol approval to final clinical trial 
report was “US$3.4 million for phase I trials involving patients, $8.6 million for phase II trials and 
$21.4 million for phase III trials” in 2017, with everything from the number of subjects randomized 
per trial to strategic choices (e.g. the selection of country in which to conduct trials) affecting 
overall costs (Martin et al., 2017: 381). Towards the upstream end of the R&D spectrum, the costs 
of early-stage research can also run quite high. In the case of structural genomics for instance, 
high-throughput technologies employed to determine the three-dimensional structure of proteins 
used in drug targeting and discovery are expensive to run and maintain, with the average cost of 
deciphering a protein structure estimated to be roughly US$300,000 (Chandonia and Brenner, 
2006; Sá and Tamtik, 2011). As Stephan (2015) notes, while some of the equipment used in 
contemporary R&D, “…although expensive, [is] still affordable at the lab or institutional level. 
Some, however, such as nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), [carry] sufficiently large price tags 
to encourage, if not demand, collaboration across institutions” (339, emphasis added). R&D in 
certain fields (notably drug discovery and development) is, more often than not, prohibitively 
costly to duplicate. As discussed previously and outlined in table 1, DiMasi et al. (2016) estimate 
the cost of drug development to be roughly $2.8 billion. and requires research groups to pool 
resources (either tangible or intangible) at every stage of the R&I process. Thus, in addition to it 
being interdisciplinary in nature, R&D generally relies heavily on collaborative efforts both within 
and across institutional boundaries. 
The purpose of highlighting the various modes of knowledge production discussed in STS 
scholarship in this literature review is to shed light on the relationship between the consideration 
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given to contextual application at the outset of research projects and the consequent 
interdisciplinarity of practices in the sciences. Knowledge production extends beyond the technical 
work occurring within the laboratory and is a product of the ebb and flow of information across 
disciplinary boundaries. If, as discussed, the internal structure of science is a social formation 
(Ziman, 2002b) and scientific collaborations have extended to broader and more heterogenous 
networks over time, it is important to examine the devices that facilitate or impede social 
interactions and collaborations in the process of scientific research – that is the aim of this work. 
Moreover, it is worth examining these devices not only in the lab, but also in the intermediary 
institutions (e.g. science parks and tech transfer offices) that have grown from the interactions 
between universities, industry, and government, as this research aims to do.  
 
 
2.2. The Changing Political Economy of Science  
If the economy is socially embedded, and the scientific enterprise is a complex social 
institution with a politics, it must therefore also have an economics (Nelson, 1959). As Ziman 
(2002b) has argued, it is based on a system of financial and notional markets, driven by competition 
and based on the exchange of commodities for currencies. The relationship between science and 
economic growth is impossible to disentangle: today, science is seen “as an economic engine, a 
source of innovation that can create new products, firms, or even industries” (Popp-Berman, 2012: 
6). Scientific research frequently tasked with “kick-starting the moribund economy,” the idea 
being that innovations stemming from research will provide opportunities for dynamic investment, 
offer commercial solutions for societal problems to a broad consumer base, and create new 
markets, services, and jobs (Birch et al., 2018: 596). This section focuses on the changing political 
economy of science in recent decades, focusing first on the economics of science broadly, before 
discussing the current paradigm of academic capitalism and the commercialization of scientific 
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research.  
 
2.2.1. The Economics of Science and Technology 
It has become a truism to argue that economic growth in industrialized nations is rooted in 
part in the exploitation of scientific knowledge (Dasgupta and David, 1994). In fact, there is a long 
history of economic studies of science and technology focusing on theoretical and empirical 
explanations of the sources and trajectories of technological innovation, science as a process of 
production, the relationship between technological innovation and economic power, research 
funding, the commodification of knowledge, and so on (for example, see Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 
1959; and Polanyi, 1969).  
Sent (1999: 97-98) identifies six groups endeavouring to analyse the economic structure of 
science and the effects of economics on the conduct and content of science, noting there is little 
movement or dialogue between any group: first are the orthodox economists seeking to understand 
the economic drivers of research funding and the incentives driving scientific research. Second, 
the historians of science and technology attempting to historicize the pure/applied dynamic of 
science. Third, the sociologists of science producing “micro-studies” of laboratory activity and the 
social operations of science. Fourth, the philosophers of science analyzing the construction of 
scientific knowledge via economic processes. Fifth, the science policy experts analyzing funding 
and organizational patterns of science as they relate to market models. Finally, there are actual 
working scientists discussing funding conditions in the sciences. As Tyfield (2012b) notes, “there 
are almost as many definitions of the ‘economics of science’ as there are practitioners” (13), and 
while the organizational structure of the field has undergone significant changes since in recent 
decades, there is no dominant paradigm of an economics of science that has emerged since. 
The growth of Mertonian sociology of science coincided with the work of economists and 
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philosophers of science such as Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962), Popper (1963), Polanyi (1962), and 
Feyerabend (1975) that rose to prominence shortly following the Second World War, marking the 
first wave (or historical phase) of an “old” economics of science (Sent, 1999). Favouring a 
simplistic basic/applied dichotomy, this cohort of scholars focused predominantly on measuring 
the impact of scientific research on economic growth, understanding the reward structures 
embedded in the scientific enterprise, institutional structures, and funding and grant patterns 
(Ballandone, 2012). During this time, a “concertedly nationalized system of science” was 
established in the United States, wherein antitrust laws were strengthened while IP was weakened, 
universities were generously funded, and the notion of science as a public good was dominant 
(Mirowski, 2011: 114).  
The National Science Foundation (NSF) became the face of “pure” science, while the 
military acted as the primary managers for research universities and national laboratories and 
promoted basic science as a means of protecting national security (ibid). As the Cold War 
intensified, a new paradigm emerged in the early 1980s, marking the second phase of the “old” 
economics of science that lasted until the mid-1990s. At this time, scientific knowledge was 
deemed to be a commodity in a generic market that was seen as the general model for all social 
organization, and science itself was implicitly treated as just another market phenomenon 
(Mirowski and Sent, 2009). Moreover, economists of science had “essentially abandoned the field 
to philosophers of science and science studies scholars,” as evidenced by the dominance of works 
by Latour and Woolgar (1982), Collins (1984), and Fuller (1988) examining the social and socio-
economic foundations of science during this period (Sent, 1999: 102). The linear model of techno-
scientific innovation, in which basic scientific knowledge flowed sequentially from discovery to 
applied contexts to the development and diffusion of a commercial good, dominated this paradigm 
in both theoretical discussions and policy practices (Godin, 2006).  
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Since the mid-1990s, the political economy of science has been shaped largely by the rise of 
neoliberalism and characterized by a growing entanglement of science and capitalism. The primary 
outcome of this entanglement has been the push towards increased commodification, 
commercialization, privatization, and marketization of scientific research (Lave et al., 2010). 
Science is seen as an engine of prosperity, where the value of research and its byproducts is 
qualified in terms of returns on investment (Chiapello, 2015). Moreover, it has become 
fundamentally market-oriented, in that profit and cost are prioritized over other (ethical) 
considerations.  
The effect of market considerations on the scientific enterprise is exemplified by 
pharmaceutical development and drug pricing. In this particular case, economic returns are 
increased when knowledge contributes directly to solving problems affecting large population 
percentiles. Diseases such as diabetes, chronic hypertension, and hyperlipidemia have large target 
populations, and thus offer a greater opportunity for drug manufacturers to earn a higher return on 
their investment. Conversely, rare diseases that may, in fact, be easier to target (e.g. those with 
single gene defects) are extremely costly, both for pharmaceutical manufacturers as well as for 
health insurance providers – this is reflected in drug pricing. In the current free market economy, 
rather than the price of a new drug inversely reflecting its worth (i.e. if a product has a higher life-
saving potential it should be more readily available), prices generally reflect what the market bears 
(Abboud et al., 2013). Recall, it costs roughly USD$1-1.5 billion per NCE, from initial laboratory 
target discovery through clinical trials and including all other ancillary costs such as advertising 
and salaries (Collins, 2011). Following those figures, drug manufacturers net profits after roughly 
a billion dollars in sales. However, drug prices for diseases with small target populations continue 
to be prohibitively high even after production costs are recouped, and compromise access to live-
saving therapies (Abboud et al., 2013).  
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The case of imatinib is a particularly interesting example of mediating devices (to be 
discussed at length in section 2.5) negatively impacting the clinical application of new medicines 
in this new era of commercialized science. Patented by Novartis and marketed under the brand 
name Gleevec, imatinib was the first successful treatment (and the most successful targeted cancer 
therapy developed at the time) for chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), a particularly aggressive 
blood cancer (Pray, 2008). Unlike with other solid cancers, with treatment CML is “more similar 
to indolent disorders like diabetes, hypertension, and cardiovascular disorders, where daily therapy 
is required indefinitely to produce the anticipated benefit of long-term survival” (Abboud et al., 
2013: 4440). Despite the extremely promising results imatinib offers to patients, the population of 
those affected with CML is quite small (~90,000 patients in the United States), and the price per 
annual treatment course fluctuates between $90,000 and upwards of $138,000 depending on the 
brand name product versus the generic with insured patients in the United States paying on average 
20% out of pocket (ibid). In 2012, annual revenues for imatinib for Novartis were roughly 
USD$4.7 billion, long exceeding its original development cost, as monthly costs continue to grow 
(Johnson, 2016).  
The case of imatinib demonstrates both the negative impact of a market monopoly granted 
via a patent as well as the primacy of market considerations (over other considerations) in terms 
of shaping scientific research and its biproducts in this current paradigm. As will be discussed in 
Chapters Five through Seven of this dissertation, these market considerations shape not only what 
kind of research is conducted, but also the IP tools that are used to bring that research to market in 
the form of new drug products. 
This paradigm has also seen a rollback of public funding for scientific research, as the end 
goal of scientific knowledge production in this paradigm has primarily been to yield profits (Lave 
et al., 2010). The production of science (or scientific knowledge) for specific commercial actors 
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and markets has led to a consequent narrowing of research agendas and has limited the ability of 
researchers to pursue tangential and potentially fruitful avenues of inquiry (Mirowski, 2011). 
Given that it is especially difficult to appropriate returns from basic scientific research, “which is 
at best years away from contributing to products that may or may not be of value to the market,” 
the commodification of scientific knowledge and the push to commercialize research has 
potentially significant implications for upstream R&D in this paradigm (Stephan, 2012: 111). 
Specifically, as noted in chapter one, basic research projects deemed to be unprofitable or unable 
to be captured via proprietary IP rights run the risk of being defunded (Birch et al., 2016). 
Correspondingly, this phase has also seen a weakening of antitrust legislation and a strengthening 
of IP rights as a means of commercializing knowledge produced in both the public and private 
sphere (Lave et al., 2010). As will be discussed in the ensuing section on intellectual property, 
while fortifying proprietary IP helps in part to navigate around previously mentioned issues of 
appropriability, various forms of IP protection (e.g. patents or copyrights) may actually hinder the 
production and dissemination of scientific knowledge by preventing others from building on and 
translating knowledge. As public funding for basic research and public research institutes has 
fallen, this particular political-economic phase has also seen the collapse of in-house corporate 
research labs and the growing practice of outsourcing corporate research (Mirowski, 2011).  
In terms of scholarship during this phase, by the mid-1990s the economics of science turned 
in a new direction with the publication of the seminal paper “Toward a New Economics of 
Science” by Dasgupta and David (1994). In outlining a framework for research and policy 
development, the authors identify three key areas of focus in the “new” economics of science 
(NES): the production, dissemination, and use of scientific knowledge. “Science” is defined and 
analyzed according to Mertonian norms, and the NES 
…has the two-fold ambition of (1) exposing the underlying logic of salient institutions 
of science, and (2) examining implications of those differentiating institutional features 
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for the efficiency of economic resource allocation within this particular sphere of human 
action (ibid: 492). 
 
In defining science along sociological lines, NES then endeavours to provide explanatory 
economic models for the emergence, stability, and problems of the [Mertonian] norms of science 
(Tyfield, 2012b). Although science here is seen as a social phenomenon that includes tacit 
elements, Sent (1999) is particularly critical of the tendency of theoretical work in NES to conflate 
science with knowledge, and knowledge with information by “presuming that the treatment of 
‘knowledge’ is unified in economics” (115). Moreover, knowledge in NES is treated as an 
uncomplicated commodity to be exploited, overlooking the complex ways in which knowledge 
and research agendas are shaped by both funding arrangements and the economy broadly 
(Mirowski, 2011; Mirowski and Nik-Kaah, 2016). 
Further still, the Mertonian sociology of science and its associated norms (CUDOS) have 
essentially been invalidated by a generation of work in STS and the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK) demonstrating the inextricable relationship between social factors and scientific 
knowledge production (Tyfield, 2012b). While the current political economy of science remains 
market-oriented for the time being, the economics of science as a field remains poorly defined. An 
effective approach to studying the economics of science would incorporate a broader examination 
of the reciprocal interaction between science and economics, in addition to reflecting the 
contributions of science to the production of economic goods (ibid). As Mirowski and Sent (2009) 
point out, the notion that there is even a singular, monolithic economics of science is misleading. 
The economics of science, they argue, has evolved in tandem with the sciences, and thus the field 
should reflect the complexity of social and cognitive networks that shape the scientific enterprise. 
Much like the field of innovation studies (see section 2.3), economic studies of science as a 
discipline leaves many questions unanswered.  
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2.2.2. Academic Capitalism 
With the growing entanglement of neoliberalism and science since the end of the Cold War, 
the scientific enterprise was seen as an economic engine. By neoliberalism, I refer simply to the 
political economic ideology favouring market fundamentalism, increased competition (via the 
opening of domestic markets to foreign competition), and deregulation and privatization of state 
enterprises (Ostry et al., 2016). During this time, universities began focusing on the commercial 
impact of science, a move that coincided with both the stagnation of government funding for 
academic science in the 1970s and the decline of in-house corporate R&D, in turn leading industry 
to rely on universities to conduct basic research (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1996). It was therefore 
determined that the market “[was] the best way of getting university breakthroughs into the hands 
of the public, and patents create the incentive that [made] that happen” (Popp-Berman, 2012: 6). 
Prior to the birth of the biotech industry in the late 1970s, there was a clear boundary between the 
university and industry. While faculty served as advisors and consultants to industry, academic 
entrepreneurship was relatively limited – a result of a dearth of capital for early-stage industry 
developing academic inventions (ibid: 58). However, following the emergence and rapid growth 
of the biotech sector in the 1970s and a relaxed regulatory environment towards the end of the 
decade, a series of legislative reforms in the United States ushered in a new era of academic 
capitalism (see Hackett, 1990; Slaughter and Rhodes, 2004). Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) and the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) led to an 
explosion of patent filings by American universities (Sterckx, 2010). After the loosening of 
recombinant DNA research regulations in 1977, the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 
1980 determined that genetically modified microorganisms could be patented (Mirowski, 2011). 
That same year, the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act affirmed the right of universities to patent 
government-funded inventions (ibid). Both created an opportunity for public research institutes to 
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attract investments from private industry, thus expanding the marketplace for scientific knowledge 
and its byproducts.  
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, after Bayh-Dole became law, universities 
began to develop technology transfer offices (TTOs) with the idea that patenting research was 
necessary to attract investment in research projects. TTOs operated (and continue to operate) under 
the idea that “universities had a responsibility to patent to prevent publicly funded research from 
languishing unused. […]Simply creating knowledge and making it accessible was not enough. 
Universities needed to harness the power of the market” (Popp-Berman, 2012: 95). Further, 
universities “were urged to help revitalize U.S. technological competitiveness by taking steps to 
transfer technology to industry,” and the number of patents awarded to universities continued to 
rise – doubling between 1991 and 1997, while licensing revenues tripled (Geiger and Sá, 2008: 
12). Through the fortification of its national patent regime and the enactment of patent policies 
and research regulations founded on the bedrock principles of ownership and profiting from one’s 
ownership, the U.S. government ensured a means of return on public capital investment in 
scientific research (Kraemer, 2006). As it relates to the Canadian landscape of innovation, the 
period of the Mulroney administration (1984-1993) in particular saw the rise of neoliberal 
ideologies in Canadian public policy, especially as Canada became a signatory to several 
international trade agreements (discussed further in Chapter Four) (Warner, 2002). Canadian 
universities similarly began to develop TTOs to commercialize academic research, though on a 
much smaller scale with significantly less revenue than their American counterparts (Thon, 2018). 
Ziman (2002b) argues that it is the market-like mechanisms currently in place that ensure 
scientific research remains flexible, open, progressive, relatively impartial, and self-critical. The 
market “is a social institution for the systematic exchange of commodities for currencies between 
vendors and customers” (ibid: 323). Prior to 1980 and the rise of patenting at American 
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universities, primarily notional commodities and currencies were traded on a reputational market: 
scientists presented their contributions to knowledge (i.e. published papers) in exchange for 
communal recognition. In this notional market, “the vendors are individual researchers, the 
commodities are research results, the customers are ‘invisible colleges’ of other researchers, and 
the currency is simply a public sign of personal esteem” (ibid: 331). However, as the end goal of 
scientific knowledge production in the current paradigm has primarily been to profit, scientific 
knowledge cannot only be traded for recognition but can also be sold for cash. As Ziman (2002b) 
notes, once research has been disclosed publically (i.e. in the form of a published paper), it is 
essentially a public good and appropriating rent becomes difficult. A good in economic terms is 
defined by two characteristics: rivalry and excludability. In this particular case, “a good is 
appropriable (or exclusive) if it is possible for the person using or consuming it to prevent any 
other potential user or customer from doing the same,” and it is rivalrous when two or more actors 
are competing for its use (Callon, 1994: 399). Conversely, a public good is both non-rivalrous and 
non-excludable: it can be accessed and put to use by all members of the public with no particular 
group benefiting from its exclusive use or property rights, and without its usefulness being 
undermined.  
As will be discussed in section 2.4 of this chapter, while debates in STS regarding the status 
of scientific knowledge as a public good remain ongoing, knowledge (i.e. research results) is made 
both rivalrous and excludable when enclosed behind proprietary IP rights. For instance, patenting 
a chemical compound ensures its excludability, prevents others from freely mobilizing that 
knowledge, and establishes a legal owner with the power to demand payment for its use. Ziman 
(2002b) points out that the financial value of basic research is speculative at best, as estimates of 
the value of knowledge claims are conjectural and the majority of early-stage discoveries are 
ultimately commercially worthless. However, even if this is the case, the extension of the 
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commercial market into academia and the ability to commodify research results via patents that 
followed has permanently ensured “the orientation of academic research toward technological 
advancement and socioeconomic priorities” (Radder, 2010: 13).  
 
2.2.3. The Commercialization of Science  
As discussed previously, basic scientific research has traditionally been funded almost 
exclusively by government, while private industry has taken on translational- and late-stage 
development. The state has historically been less productive than the private sector in terms of 
commercialization, however it has also taken on the bulk of funding for the riskiest, path-breaking 
research (Mazzucato, 2013). This occurs namely because the market value of fundamental science 
is often difficult to forecast, and the “realization of economic rents (‘profits’) from a basic research 
advance…are intrinsically difficult to establish and defend,” making private returns to investment 
highly uncertain (Dasgupta and David, 1994: 490). The commercialization of pharmaceutical 
research is especially difficult given the associated sizeable upfront costs and high risks, and 
further requires marketing, manufacturing, distribution, and regulatory compliance assets that are 
generally unavailable to university researchers (West, 2008). Moreover, a significant amount of 
time, investment, and know-how is needed to translate the majority of [early-stage] research 
conducted at universities into marketable goods – it is industry, not academia, that excels in doing 
this, as development has long been a product of industry (Stephan, 2012).  
With that said, however, commercialization (in the pharmaceutical sciences) today is a 
product of the relationships between universities and biotechnology firms, and biotechnology 
firms and large pharmaceutical companies (ibid). In fact, the majority of NCEs emerging from 
biotechnology firms originated in public research institutes, as universities have become active 
participants in the commercialization process and the primary recipients of biotech patents 
(Edwards, Murray, and Yu, 2003). Extending from this, in a 2017 survey of 34 Canadian academic 
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and non-profit research institutions, the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) 
found that patent disclosures increased by 10.9% since the previous year, to 1,882 in 2017 (AUTM, 
2017a: 3). The AUTM’s survey of American academic and non-profit research institution similarly 
found 7,459 US patents issued in 2017 – the highest number reported in the survey’s history (ibid, 
2017b). Therefore, if “economists measure productivity by comparing the amount of input into 
production with the amount of output that emerges,” then large private pharmaceutical companies 
have arguably not been particularly productive in recent years (Mazzucato, 2013: 72). In this 
model, universities play an active role in the commercialization process by establishing large 
patent portfolios (particularly in the life sciences) and providing a ready supply of knowledge and 
data to industry, after which point small- to medium-sized biotech firms continue to develop 
products, often licensing them to large pharmaceutical firms.  
Mirowski and Sent (2008) argue the root cause of the new model of 20th century 
commercialization can be found in the spreading practice of outsourcing corporate research: with 
the weakening of antitrust laws and the strengthening of intellectual property in the early 1980s, 
an unfettered corporate sector was now free to contract research to external firms (such as research 
parks and academic start-ups) as a cost-reduction measure. The decline of public research funding 
and demise of in-house R&D in fact corresponded to a rise in both the private funding for R&D 
and the volume of research conducted outside of the corporation funding it (ibid: 659-660). 
Contract research organizations (CROs) grew to prominence following the implementation of 
higher efficiency and safety standards by the FDA in the late 1980s (Mirowski and Van Horn, 
2005). Originally offering narrowly focused outsourcing services to their clients, CROs such as 
Charles River Laboratories and Covance have grown to dominate nearly all stages of drug 
development (i.e. from basic research through discovery phase, pre-clinical nonhuman trials, and 
clinical trials) while manufacturing, commercialization, and marketing generally remains the 
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purview of the firm itself. Offered services range from “initial screening of molecules for 
biocompatibility, in vitro screening, pharmacokinetic modeling, chemical synthesis and analysis, 
all phases of clinical testing, dosage formulation and pharmacy services, to all aspects of the 
regulatory process” (ibid: 507). In a particularly interesting example of the growing significance 
of the CRO, a 2017 study conducted by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and published 
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) evaluated the supply and demand for nonhuman 
primates used in pharmaceutical research and testing at NIH-funded National Primate Research 
Centers and other academic institutions, federal facilities, and private firms (NIH, 2017). The study 
found that of the total 38,799 nonhuman primates used in pharmaceutical research and testing by 
private firms in 2017, Charles River Labs and Covance accounted for 11,179 and 8,412 (or 12.2% 
and 9.3%) respectively (ibid). Merck and Pfizer, two of the largest pharmaceutical firms in the 
world, accounted for 1,432 and 1,157 (or 1.8% and 1.5%) respectively (ibid). What can be inferred 
from this is that CROs are indeed bearing the brunt of pharmaceutical development outsourced by 
large firms, as evidenced by the scale of preclinical nonhuman testing managed by Charles River 
Labs and Covance above. Arguably, as Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) note, CROs are 
paradigmatic of the current “regime” of industrialized/privatized science: the imperative of 
commercialization that has been injected into R&D has fundamentally changed how innovations 
are filtered through from the university to the market, as well as the extent to which scientific 
research is contracted out to external firms. 
As discussed in the previous section, science has always been motivated by some practical 
application or socio-economic supply and demand factors (Shapin, 2008). However, the growth of 
university patenting practices and the increasing interconnectedness between universities and 
industry is indicative of more sweeping changes to the practices and organization of science in this 
paradigm. As will be outlined in more detail in Chapter Five, universities have become 
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increasingly entrepreneurial since the 1980s, while industry has relied more heavily on external 
firms to help bring products to market. Research and its byproducts have increasingly become 
market-oriented and shaped by the tenets of neoliberalism in this paradigm, often to the detriment 
of its end-users (in this case patients/consumers of pharmaceutical products). Further, the ubiquity 
of intellectual property rights (discussed further in section 2.4 and 2.5 of this chapter) represent a 
clear extension of the market into academia, and have become a linchpin in the R&D process. 
 
2.3. Innovation Studies  
Much like the economics of science, innovation studies has followed a circuitous path to 
becoming a discipline in its own right. Despite lacking any distinct methodological tools, 
designated journals, or field-wide associations, innovation studies is centered on a cognitive 
platform that extends from early studies of technological change and invention. It is composed of 
networks of communities of scholars in cognate fields (e.g. geography, policy studies, 
management studies, industrial economics) bound together by strong working relationships 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2009). This section focuses first on the establishment of innovation 
studies as a discipline before discussing recent changes to biotech business and innovation models 
specifically.  
 
2.3.1. Innovation as a Discipline 
As a discipline, innovation studies is rooted in three stages of early economic thinking; 
namely invention, technological change, and finally technological innovation (Godin, 2010a). 
Innovation studies is considered to have stemmed from early work by the economist Joseph 
Schumpeter, and a large majority of core works in the field proceed from his discussions of 
evolutionary economics (Coriat and Weinstein, 2002). In distinguishing entrepreneurial 
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innovations from inventions, Schumpeter argued innovation followed organized patterns whereby 
entrepreneurs innovated primarily by introducing new means of production (Schumpeter, 1942). 
Capitalism, he asserted, “is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only is but 
can never be stationary,” and thus economic structures are revolutionized from within through 
what he described as creative destruction (ibid: 82). Entrepreneurial innovation, fueled by 
competition, therefore plays a role in the “perennial gales of creative destruction:” new consumer 
goods, new modes of production, new markets, and new forms of industrial organization created 
by the capitalist enterprise sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion (ibid: 83-84). Innovation 
in the capitalist system upsets job markets, caused old technologies and ideas to become obsolete.  
Decades later, “mainstream” economists shifted their focus to economic studies of technical 
change, concentrating largely on innovation as technological invention, factors of production, 
market structure, and economies of scale (Godin, 2012). At the time, Nelson and Winter (1977) 
were especially critical of this economic turn to innovation studies, arguing there was no coherent 
intellectual structure to the field and as a result its body of work was either shallow or theoretically 
disjointed. Building off Schumpeter’s discussion of capitalism and innovation, Nelson and Winter 
(1977) argue innovation follows a set natural trajectory, which determines how technologies 
change over time and are affected by economic parameters. Dosi (1982) is also highly critical of 
the lack of theoretical unity in economic studies of innovation. Extending the natural trajectory 
argument, Dosi describes innovation as a product of both continuous change along a technological 
trajectory, and radical change following the emergence of a technological paradigm (1982: 152). 
Broader economic and social factors, he argues, affect technological development and innovation 
namely by selecting the direction of change (i.e. shaping the technological paradigm) and selecting 
among changes (through competition between old, new, and alternative technologies) (Dosi, 1988, 
1997). Later, Nightingale (1998) uses the term technological tradition to extend Dosi’s concept 
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and acknowledge the social construction and socially embedded nature of technological 
production. 
A number of publications in recent years have offered empirical studies, models, and 
historical explanations of economic growth fueled by technological change (see Freeman, 1994; 
Nelson, 1995; Coriat and Dosi, 1995, Dosi et al., 2006). These works, produced by a small number 
of academics, have provided the core literature and cognitive platform on which innovation studies 
is currently based (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2009). As Fagerberg et al. (2012) note, there are two 
main poles in the innovation studies literature today, one focusing on innovation in firms and the 
other focusing on the role of technology and innovation in facilitating economic and social change. 
Godin (2015) has been critical of categorizing innovation studies as a discipline, particularly of 
the absence of reflexivity among its scholars (namely in assuming all innovation is good), and of 
the dominant (quantitative) framework of neoclassical economics in the study of technological 
innovation. He argues the field of Schumpterian innovation studies has essentially constructed a 
tradition of research on technological innovation as the commercialization of technical inventions, 
focused almost exclusively on firms, rather than examining innovation as a cultural force affecting 
social, political, and economic thought (Godin, 2015). As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the 
disjointedness of the field – particularly the conflicting definitions of innovation offered by its 
scholars – pose significant problems for policymakers attempt to guide the innovation process. 
 
2.3.2. Biotech Business and Innovation Models 
The emergence and rapid growth of the biotech sector in the late 1970s essentially created 
today’s science-business model. Three technologies emerged in the same decade that expanded 
knowledge targets and by extension the landscape of drug development; specifically, recombinant 
DNA for the production of proteins, hybridization for the production of monocolonal antibodies, 
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and combinatorial chemistry for mass chemical synthesis (Pisano, 2006). As discussed in section 
2.1, the emergence of these technologies resulted in an increased complexity of practice and 
heterogeneity of practitioners in the field of drug development. In 1976, the firm Genentech was 
founded Robert Swanson (a venture capitalis) and Herbert Boyer (a biochemist) specifically to 
capitalize on recombinant DNA technology (Mirowski, 2011). Aided by the strengthening of 
intellectual property laws at the time, Genentech (and later Biogen and Amgen) established a 
model for monetizing intellectual property that remains in place today. The model consists of three 
connected elements: firstly, technology transfer from universities to the private sector through the 
creation of new firms (versus selling technologies to existing companies); secondly, venture capital 
and public equity markets that provide funding at critical stages and reward founders for the risks 
they have taken; and finally, a market for know-how in which young companies provide their 
intellectual property to established enterprises in exchange for funding (Pisano, 2006). Today, the 
majority of biotech firms are university spin-offs, and the biotech model “amounts to…the 
outsourcing of many of the upstream R&D functions that had previously been performed in-house 
by Big Pharma,” with small-to medium-sized firms often negotiating temporary joint R&D 
projects with large pharmaceutical firms (Mirowski, 2011: 203). In fact, they do not actually 
produce drugs or marketable products; rather, they undertake commercial science via contract and 
equity agreements (Coriat et al., 2003). Stemming from this, a 2018 survey by Deloitte and 
BIOTECanada found that Canada’s biotech sector is composed primarily of early-stage start-ups 
and spin-offs, the majority (67%) of which identified as undertaking either discovery or emerging 
phase R&D (Deloitte, 2018). 
Following the coinage of the term “open innovation” by Chesbrough (2003b), there has been 
a flurry of publications focusing on the emerging field of open innovation (Gassman and 
Reepmeyer, 2005; Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2006; Gaule, 2006; West et al., 2006; 
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Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Getz and Kaitin, 2012). As Teece (2010) notes, it is the business model 
that determines how value is both delivered to the customer and captured. Focusing on the 
paradigm shift between [pre-1970s] closed and [post-1980s] open innovation models, Chesbrough 
(2003b) further argues that ideas and technologies hold no inherent value – rather, it is the business 
models bringing them to market that determine their value. Recall, an element of the current 
neoliberal era of scientific R&D has been the collapse of in-house corporate research labs and the 
growing practice of outsourcing corporate research (Lave et al., 2010). Chesbrough (2006) as 
argued this has led to the proliferation of open innovation in response – defined as “the use of 
purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the 
markets for external use of innovation, respectively” (1). Prior to this paradigm shift, firms were 
inwardly focused and developed, marketed, financed innovations without external input. Open 
innovation, however, is the phenomenon of “firms making greater use of external ideas and 
technologies in their own business, and letting unused internal ideas and technologies go outside 
for others to use in their business” (Chesbrough and Bogers, 2014: 9-10). Two emerging factors 
eroded the closed innovation paradigm that allowed a near monopoly condition to exist in many 
industries throughout most of the 20th century, namely: the mobility of skilled workers who were 
no longer tied to one company for the duration of their career, and the growth of the venture capital 
market allowing startups to commercialize new technologies (ibid). To capitalize on the open 
innovation model, firms often license their innovations out externally.  
Criticisms of the open innovation model have argued Chesbrough (2003b) creates an 
oversimplified and false open/closed dichotomy, and that his description of open innovation is not 
a new phenomenon (Trott and Hartmann, 2009; Mowery, 2009; Bonvillian, 2013). Following this, 
Nightingale and Martin (2004) argue there has not actually been a paradigm shift in terms of the 
innovation model that followed the birth of the biotech sector, and the notion of a paradigm shift 
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in this particular sector has created unrealistic expectations regarding the rate of development for 
new technologies. Instead, the development and transmission of innovations in medical 
biotechnology continues to follow a “well-established pattern of slow and incremental diffusion” 
(ibid: 564). Elmquist et al. (2009) argue that innovation as a process remains a black box in 
Chesbrough’s discussion of open innovation (and in subsequent publications on the subject), and 
these works neglect to answer how the process of innovation occurs, if its locus is anywhere on a 
field of collaboration between the firm and outside actors. In criticizing the use of the term open 
in open innovation, Hayden (2010) argues Chesbrough’s model is not truly open; rather, it simply 
circulates knowledge within monopolistic IP regimes.  
The work of Chesbrough and others on open innovation plays a critical role in outlining a 
conceptual foundation for this dissertation. However, whether it is novel in quite the same way as 
it is sold is debatable. Chesbrough’s (2003b) not-particularly-open notion of open innovation is 
traditional business model employing proprietary intellectual property tools and maintaining high 
barriers. It simply extends R&D beyond the confines of a single firm and makes little room for 
discussion of the material and notional objects that enable and control the flow of knowledge 
across these organizational boundaries (such as contracts, research agreements, databases, etc.).  
 
2.4. Intellectual Property and Open Science  
Various forms of intellectual property (IP) have become critical tools in the 
commercialization of scientific research, determining how universities and firms capture value and 
shaping the interactions between each. As will be discussed, there is significant debate in the STS 
and innovation studies literature regarding the impact of enclosing research and information 
behind proprietary intellectual property rights, and whether or not the expansion of IP upstream 
negatively affects downstream development. This section first defines intellectual property rights 
  
62 
and examines the role played by patents and various forms of contracts before discussing their 
open counterparts. 
 
2.4.1. What is Intellectual Property? 
Simply put, intellectual property rights (IPRs) afford proprietary legal protection to any 
original intellectual creation (e.g. ideas, inventions, creative expressions, logos, etc.), whether it is 
artistic, literary, technical, or scientific in nature (Brown, 2003). IPRs are a means of protecting 
and rewarding innovators and are generally granted as trademarks, copyrights, or patents – the 
latter two are particularly important in the context of this dissertation. Copyrights are property 
rights in expression, essentially giving the author or artist of any creative works (from music and 
literature to scientific publications to computer software) the legal right to determine whether and 
how copies of their work are made and distributed (ibid). Patents are property rights in useful ideas 
and are awarded for inventions that “satisfy the criteria of global novelty, non-obviousness, and 
industrial or commercial application,” and may be granted for either products or processes (Saha 
and Bhattacharya, 2011: 89). Unlike rights of physical property, both patents and copyrights are 
limited in duration due to the fact that IP presents a more serious issue of “rent seeking” than 
physical property does (with rents defined as “excess revenue over cost”) (Posner, 2002: 9). If IP 
is created rather than found, then by defining IPRs too broadly “the rents generated by them will 
be so great that excessive resources will be drawn into efforts to be the first to create a valuable 
piece of intellectual property and thus to obtain the property right to it” (ibid). Moreover, limiting 
the duration of IPRs ensures the distribution and use of that IP is not hindered. For instance, in the 
context of science and scientific innovation, the fruits of basic research (such as Planck’s constant 
or e = mc2) are not patentable, thus ensuring that research building off basic scientific findings is 
not subject to related costs (e.g. royalty fees) (ibid).  
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2.4.2. Proprietary IP and the Tragedy of the Anticommons 
Paradoxically, limiting IPRs may, in fact, be necessary to facilitating the production of 
knowledge and ensuring its widespread use. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) identify what they 
describe as the tragedy of the anticommons in biomedical research, whereby “a proliferation of 
intellectual property rights upstream may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in 
the course of research and development” (698). Privatization holds both risks and rewards: 
although patenting may offer incentives for researchers to undertake risky research projects, too 
many owners holding property rights in previous discoveries may present barriers to future 
research (Cohen, 2004). An anticommons may inadvertently be caused by three mechanisms in 
particular: firstly, requiring “bundles” of patent rights with more than one owner (such as multiple 
protein structures for the development of a therapeutic), often compounded by the lengthy delays 
between the filing and issuance of patents, slows down the innovation process (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998). Secondly, the expansion of broad proprietary IP rights further upstream in the 
research process may also impede R&D further downstream, as even the most commercially 
irrelevant research can be encumbered by MTAs and overly broad patent claims (Scherer, 2002). 
As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, broad upstream patent significantly limit the ability of 
researchers to freely pursue potentially fruitful avenues of inquiry that may arise over the course 
of their research. Finally, stacking licenses through the use of reach-through license agreements 
(RTLAs) may also cause an anticommons effect, as it gives the owner of upstream patents rights 
in subsequent downstream discoveries. In effect, the employment of RTLAs “gives each upstream 
patent owner a continuing right to be present at the bargaining table as a research project moves 
downstream toward product development” (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998: 699). Given that drug 
development involves a high volume of patent filings and license negotiations, these are legitimate 
concerns in the pharmaceutical sciences. The oncomouse, a genetically modified mouse used in 
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cancer research and originally patented by DuPont, is an especially interesting example of the 
pitfalls of RTLAs: initially, DuPont offered sublicenses requiring licensees to seek approval before 
passing on new discoveries that resulted from use of the oncomouse, thereby granting DuPont the 
right to participate in future negotiations concerning the development of commercial products 
falling outside the scope of their patent claims (ibid).  
Like RTLAs, material license agreements (MTAs) are proprietary license agreements that 
offer similar impediments to pharmaceutical R&I. MTAs make up “all species of contracts 
between parties engaged in the same or similar scientific research, which [aim] to legally encumber 
that research in some fashion” (Mirowski, 2011: 140). They have become the primary means of 
imposing restrictions on the dissemination and disclosure of research, limitations on actual use, 
and liability indemnification (Ku and Henderson, 2007). For instance, Party A transferring a 
proprietary cell line or reagent to Party B may dictate the terms of Party B’s use of that material 
through an MTA. MTA restrictions often lead to onerous and prohibitively costly negotiations 
over research materials and also carry hidden associated costs. Rodriguez (2007) notes that MTAs, 
like patents, may also lead to an anticommons, as they essentially bring research to a halt – creating 
bottlenecks as legal departments and tech transfer offices representing each party are inundated 
with thousands of MTAs each year and the bureaucracies at each institute and associated 
paperwork add time to the execution of each contract. The widespread use of proprietary IP 
“devices” such as patents, MTAs, and RTLAs in university and industry research is a product of 
the previously discussed changes to R&D brought about in the 1980s. As will be discussed further 
in Chapter Five, patents and the MTA (“accessories to the patent system”) have become crucial 
tools in the commodification and commercialization of research, particularly in the case of 
academic research (Mirowski, 2011: 143).  
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2.4.3. Open Licensing, Open Access, Open Science 
In response to the potential restraints on R&I posed by proprietary IP devices such as patents 
and MTAs, concepts and practices such as open science, open access, and permissive licensing 
have become increasingly prominent, particularly in discussions of pharmaceutical development 
(Getz and Kaitin, 2012). The perceived negative impact of proprietary research tools by some has 
led to a push towards openness in R&I, which has consequently offered a potential solution to 
navigating through complex networks of proprietary IP licenses and patents, primarily by releasing 
project data into the public domain and ensuring broad user access (Hope, 2008; Gitter, 2013). 
Open science initiatives aim to make use of data through non-proprietary devices (e.g. through 
creating open source databases), expanding participation in R&I, and reducing commercial barriers 
(Feldman & Nelson, 2008).  
Open science grew out of the open source movement in the field of computer science and 
was founded on the principle of open access to technological information (Gitter, 2013). As in 
Hope’s (2008) bazaar model, open source meant information (such as source code) was freely 
accessed (i.e. unhindered by proprietary restrictions), altered, and shared; barriers to entry were 
lowered or removed; decision-making was relatively autonomous; resources were self-controlled; 
and participation was voluntary. The issue of ownership within the open source movement is 
solved by open licensing arrangements such as copyleft, Creative Commons, or GNU Public 
Licenses (GPLs). In contrast to their proprietary counterparts, these open licensing arrangements 
ensure that users may freely modify and share work on the condition that its derivatives are bound 
by the same conditions (Rhoten and Powell, 2007; Hope 2008). In the case of GNU GPLs, 
licensees may choose to charge an initial fee, allowing for commercial redistribution of the 
licensed product but forbidding the redistribution of that product under a contract or non-disclosure 
agreement. Both copyleft licenses and GNU GPLs make use of copyright law essentially to 
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accomplish the opposite of its ordained purpose: that is, rather than imposing restrictions on the 
use of the licensed work, copyleft and GNU GPLs grant legally enforceable distribution rights 
(Rhoten and Powell, 2007). In response to criticisms of openness in terms of property protections 
and questions raised as to how firms are to profit if they embrace openness, Hope (2008) argues 
that  
 
open source licenses are not inherently anti-intellectual property; rather, they are a 
legitimate, if unconventional, form of intellectual property management. Nor are open 
source licenses inherently anticommercial; on the contrary, they enable an 
economically significant class of commercialization strategies, known as “free-
revealing” or “nonproprietary” strategies. By choosing an open source license, a 
licensor demonstrates a credible commitment to allowing his or her technology to be 
treated as a contribution to bazaar-style production, whether on academic/permissive 
or copyleft/reciprocal terms (186). 
 
Moreover, she argues that the primary objective of implementing proprietary IP rights in the 
biotech sector is to protect existing corporate monopolies, while employing strategies to offset the 
value of a competitor’s IP. Hope (2008) focuses largely on the successes of open licensing in the 
context of software development, however she argues these successes may extend to biotech 
development as open IP tools simply articulate the terms of collaboration (p. 156). Moreover, she 
argues the principles and practices of open science can be applied successfully to the development 
of biological derivatives (ibid). This will be discussed further in Chapter Seven, particularly in the 
context of tool and scaffold compounds.  
In the field of biotechnology (and particularly in subfields like computational biology) where 
the sharing of information and data is paramount, open licences have become particularly salient 
tools in R&I. Building off the open source movement, open science “means that data from [a] 
project is released rapidly into the public domain, subject to certain conditions, including that users 
not exercise their intellectual property rights in a way that would preclude other users’ access to 
the basic data” (Gitter, 2013: 623). Releasing reusable scientific data into the public domain 
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encourages methodological transparency and facilitates interdisciplinary collaboration by ensuring 
ease of engagement. Open science initiatives “tend to involve collaborative projects that pool the 
work of many participants and make advances available to a broad community,” ensuring that 
research results are non-proprietary (Feldman and Nelson, 2008: 25). Further, they provide 
researchers from non-profits “who may not have the financial capacity to navigate the maze of 
patent rights and licensing” the opportunity to conduct less commercially appealing research (ibid). 
The SGC, as outlined in Chapter One and discussed in Chapters Five and Six, is an example of an 
incredibly successful open science initiative, in addition to the International HapMap Project and 
the Human Genome Project. Each of these initiatives is an example of openness facilitating 
interdisciplinary, international endeavours wherein participation extends beyond a single lab or 
instititute and participation is not limited by user fees or other proprietary restrictions (Birch et al., 
2018). The voluntary participation and task selection that characterizes open source initiatives is 
made possible by “transparency, exploitation of peer review and feedback loops, low cost and ease 
of engagement, and a mixture of formal and informal governance mechanisms built around a 
shared set of technical goals” (Gitter, 2013: 623). Access to data and information within the open 
science model is advanced by the growing prevalence of open access journals, where traditionally 
costly subscription fees are either non-existent or minimal, offering a solution to the prohibitive 
costs traditionally associated with academic journals (Wellen 2013).  
While open science initiatives undoubtedly offer low entry costs, increased methodological 
transparency, and interdisciplinary research opportunities, they do not necessarily offer a remedy 
for the impediments arising from conventional, proprietary forms of IP management (Birch et al., 
2018), and whether they are viable options in the commercialization of novel pharmaceutical 
products remains debatable. This will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven. In response to the 
growing push for more “open” innovation, Ettlinger (2014) states “…a closer look reveals that, 
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rather than being a strength of American capitalism, the openness paradigm is a symptom of its 
problems: profit gouging without sustained investment and squeezing labour to sap already week, 
and credit-dependent, demand” (89). Indeed, despite its move away from proprietary property 
rights, research in the open science paradigm is nonetheless valued in terms of returns on 
investment and is produced such that it generates assets and serves the market demands of 
corporate and individual customers (Birch et al., 2018). 
There is significant debate within the science and technology studies (STS) and innovation 
studies literature concerning open and proprietary IP devices and their net effect on the processes 
and products of R&I. A study of patent-paper pairs by Murray and Stern (2007) examined the 
citation rate for scientific publications before and after formal IP rights associated with the 
publication were granted. The study found an anti-commons effect that becomes more pronounced 
over time, notably for researchers with public sector affiliations (ibid). More specifically, the 
authors found that citation rates after a patent grant decline by approximately 10 to 20 percent 
(ibid). This suggests intellectual property rights do, in fact, have an impact on the diffusion of 
scientific knowledge. Some scholars argue proprietary IP impedes innovation in the biological 
sciences by limiting avenues of inquiry, excluding certain groups from R&I, and creating 
bottlenecks through patent thickets (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Mirowski, 2011; Caulfield et al., 
2011). Others, such as Lezuan and Montgomery (2015), argue it is necessary for outlining 
collaborative research relationships and provide incentives for investing in research. In both cases, 
however, open and proprietary “devices” are often presented as dichotomous and incompatible. A 
key finding of this research points to the contrary: these devices can, in fact, complement each 
other when employed at particular junctures of the R&I process. Moreover, their respective overall 
effect on the commercialization of research is context-dependent, but when used in tandem may 
potentially streamline the innovation of new pharmaceutical products.  
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2.5. Mediating Devices  
In terms of its theoretical framework, this research builds on the premise that the open and 
proprietary “tools” or mechanisms outlined above enable public and private research groups, 
government regulators and policymakers, and investors from a broad range of organizations to 
interact, collaborate, and bring innovative research forth from the lab to clinical practice. 
Previously, I have theorized these mechanisms as mediating devices (Chiappetta and Birch, 2018). 
This section outlines cognate concepts of mediating instruments and market devices, before 
discussing mediating devices as it will be employed in the remainder of this dissertation. 
Callon (1991) outlines the concept of techno-economic networks as “a coordinated set of 
heterogeneous actors…interact more or less successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse 
methods for generating goods and services” (133). As discussed in section 2.2, the passage of the 
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 (in addition to other notable legal cases and legislative reforms) created a 
new marketplace for the products of scientific research and led to a growth in scientific 
entrepreneurship and a diversification of the practitioners, funders, vendors and consumers of 
science. Techno-economic networks grew to include technology transfer offices, funding agencies, 
policymakers, venture capitalists, and so forth (Popp-Berman, 2012), and have continued to increase 
in complexity given the interdisciplinary and data-accelerated nature of contemporary R&I in the 
biological sciences. Miller (2007) notes that these networks extend beyond simply a heterogeneous 
group of actors: “a whole set of intermediaries circulates among them. These [intermediaries] give 
material content to the links uniting the actors. They may be written documents, technical artefacts, 
human beings, or money” (710). 
The notion of mediating instruments has been discussed at length in the accounting and 
economic sociology literature, largely in the context of the broad range of financial and economic 
models (Morrison and Morgan, 1999), instruments, metrics, and mechanisms related to practices of 
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calculation, valuation, budgeting, and computation (Miller, 1992; Miller and O’Leary, 1987). These 
instruments serve to mediate the interactions between science and economics, shaping the ways in 
which science is governed and regulated, as well as the means by which the products of R&I may 
be exchanged (Miller and O’Leary, 2007: 708; see also Power, 1994). For example, mediating 
instruments such as accounting practices or capital budget models “can help connect science to the 
national economy, by making visible and quantitative the responsibility of individual managers for 
science and technology” (Miller and O’Leary, 2007: 708). These instruments work to establish a 
connection between R&D (as the measure of science and technology) and ways of economic 
calculation located at the firm level, thereby helping to reconcile technoscience with ideals of 
economic growth and financial prosperity (ibid). Others have similarly outlined market devices as 
“the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets,” suggesting 
these objects encompass “analytical techniques to pricing models, …purchase settings to 
merchandising tools, …trading protocols to aggregate indicators” (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, 
2007: 2; see also Muniesa, 2007). Examples of market devices include focus groups in market 
research, consumer tests that help to impact supply and shape market demand, consumer credit 
scoring practices, and financial derivatives that allow for the rapid growth of increasingly complex 
markets (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, 2007). 
I expand this concept of intermediaries to include various forms of open and proprietary 
mechanisms (Chiappetta and Birch, 2018). Building on the premise that particular open and 
proprietary mechanisms enable public and private research groups, government regulators and 
policymakers, and investors to interact, collaborate, and bring innovative research forth from the lab 
to clinical practice, I theorize these mechanisms as mediating devices. I differentiate these from the 
market devices and financial instruments outlined above, largely given that market implies a 
necessarily commercial nature to the device in question. Moreover, the term instrument tends to 
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imply an object distinct from the techno-economic network in which it is situated – Miller and 
O’Leary (2007) point out that “by its nature, an instrument is independent of the thing it operates 
on” (709) – I argue mediating devices are embedded within techno-economic networks. The word 
devices also suggests “a bifurcation of agency: the person on one side and the machine on the other” 
(Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, 2007: 2). For the purposes of this research, mediating devices consist 
of patents, MTAs and RTLAs, copyrights, open licenses (such as copyleft), and open-access 
databases. Essentially, these mediating devices “are the linchpins in contemporary techno-economic 
networks that enable collaboration, commercialization, and knowledge transfer, as well as the 
management of value in the development and commercialization of assets and products in the life 
sciences” (ibid: 67). Situated within complex techno-economic networks, mediating devices play a 
critical role in configuring the organization, governance, and valuation of biological R&I, and 
dictate the ways in which research results are circulated and disparate groups collaborate. Moreover, 
they determine at what point in the R&I process actors within these networks interact, attach value 
to these interactions (e.g. by stipulating potential royalties), and regulate how value may be 
appropriated from the products of these interactions (Birch et al., 2017). 
Mediating devices are particularly salient in the context of pharmaceutical development, as 
will be discussed at length in Chapters Five through Seven. As this chapter has endeavoured to 
highlight, scientific research has become increasingly data-accelerated, internationally 
collaborative, and interdisciplinary in the –omics era. Proprietary IP is a ubiquitous feature of drug 
development, while the push for increased openness has only escalated. This research seeks to 
tease apart the concept of the mediating device as the instruments, situated within the larger context 
of corporate strategy, scientific competition, technology transfer, and academic and government 
policy, that enable (or hinder) interaction and collaboration throughout the process of 
pharmaceutical R&I. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
In its attempt to unpack the notion of science as a social enterprise, this chapter has provided 
an overview of the existing body of literature relating to the properties of scientific knowledge and 
its production, research commercialization and academic capitalism, innovation studies and 
innovation models, intellectual property and open science, and mediating devices. While the works 
discussed form a crucial component of the theoretical skeleton of this research, there is nonetheless 
a significant gap in this literature that has yet to be addressed: despite much discussion of their 
significance as tools of commercialization, scholars in STS and innovation studies have yet 
analyze how proprietary and open devices vary in terms of their efficacy when they are employed 
in academic versus industrial settings. Moreover, there is little nuanced discussion in the existing 
literature regarding why open and proprietary devices operate effectively at different stages in the 
innovation process, or how they can be employed to facilitate collaboration. Existing works have 
yet to analyze how open and proprietary devices may be used together in the context of 
interdisciplinary pharmaceutical research and public/private collaborations, and how researchers 
might navigate through IP gridlocks when potentially competing or conflicting interests are 
guiding knowledge translation. These are gaps that potentially skew our understanding of 
innovation ecosystems and impede sound policy decisions.  
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3. Research Design and Methodology 
 
To recap, this research is focused broadly on pharmaceutical R&D and the development of 
novel clinical products. More specifically, this dissertation endeavours to unpack the innovation 
process and the role played by open and proprietary mediating devices in the pharmaceutical 
sector. As discussed in Chapter One, the issue at stake in this dissertation stems from the fact that 
commercialization threatens to enclose crucial knowledge and information and restrict its access 
behind IP protection, slowing drug development even further. While proprietary IP tools such as 
patents is in theory allow firms recoup the growing costs associated with development, regulatory 
application, and marketing by charging a high cost for the drug based on market exclusivity granted 
via the patent (Barton and Emanuel, 2007), they may also have an anticommons effect (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998; Murray and Stern, 2007). This has the potential to significantly and negatively 
impact innovation in the pharmaceutical sector.  
In unpacking the impact of open and proprietary devices on pharmaceutical innovation, this 
research takes both an inductive and retroductive approach. As Blaikie (2010) notes, “the aim of 
the inductive research strategy is to establish limited generalizations about the distribution of, and 
patterns of association amongst, observed or measured characteristics of…social phenomena” 
(83), while “the aim of the retroductive research strategy is to discover underlying mechanisms 
that, in particular contexts, explain observed regularities” (87). In this case, pharmaceutical 
innovation constitutes the “social phenomena” in question, while the use of particular mediating 
devices constitutes the observed regularities to be explained. The inductive research strategy 
involves collecting data on characteristics or patterns (e.g. patterns of use in the context of 
mediating devices), while the retroductive strategy involves documenting and modeling a 
regularity (e.g. regarding the employment of particular mediating devices) (ibid).  
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Fully dissecting the relationship between innovation and entrepreneurship in the 
pharmaceutical sector and analyzing the role of open and proprietary mediating devices in research 
commercialization therefore requires an empirical study of innovation in action: namely, of the 
social actors involved in pharmaceutical development, the points of interaction between them (e.g. 
the signing of a collaborative research agreement or an NDA), and the devices that shape these 
interactions. Thus, this dissertation is essentially an empirical case study of pharmaceutical 
innovation in Ontario. Given that the average length of time from initial laboratory target discovery 
through regimented clinical trials to U.S. FDA approval is roughly 13 years (Collins, 2011), 
following a single pharmaceutical product from the laboratory bench to late-stage commercial 
applications is simply not feasible for this particular project. As such, I focus on the R&I efforts 
of actors at MaRS Innovations, the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research, JLABS @ Toronto, the 
Structural Genomics Consortium, and the University Health Network. I comparatively analyze the 
use of open and proprietary mediating devices by actors at these organizations and evaluate their 
differing impact on innovation efforts. These organizations were chosen because they employ a 
diverse range of proprietary-to-open arrangements and commercialization strategies, despite 
having similar mandates and operating in close (and in some cases overlapping) proximity. In 
focusing specifically on the role of mediating devices in research commercialization, I collected 
qualitative data by conducting semi-structured interviews. This data set offers a representative and 
nuanced explanation for the use of specific mediating devices in the larger context of corporate 
strategy, scientific competition, technology transfer, and academic and government policy. This 
chapter outlines the design and methodology of this research. I first outline research objectives and 
hypotheses, before discussing case study selection in detail and data collection and analysis. 
  
 
  
75 
3.1. Research Objectives 
This dissertation addresses the following research questions:  
1. How do social actors in the pharmaceutical sector understand innovation? By extension, how 
can we theorize open and proprietary devices ? 
My aim here is to unpack the slippery concept of innovation and provide a conceptual outline of 
mediating devices. I argue they act as the linchpins that enable collaboration, commercialization, 
and knowledge transfer, and/or determine valuation of the products and processes of R&I. In 
analyzing the interview data collected, my goal is to shed light on what it means to innovate, how 
innovation is measured and valuated, the factors drives certain actors to invest in the development 
of innovative new biotechnologies, and the factors that accelerate or inhibit the commercialization 
of these innovations. 
2. Which proprietary and open devices are used in pharmaceutical R&I? For whom, and why? 
To answer this question, I evaluate the ways in which mediating devices such as NDAs, MTAs, 
reach-through license agreements, open licenses, and open libraries and databases are used by 
interview participants. More specifically, I examine the role of MTAs in the process of academic 
technology transfer, as well as their associated costs and impact on drug development. Further, I 
analyze the ways in which mediating devices affect collaboration agreements, particularly in the 
context of contracts and open databases and libraries. Finally, I examine the embeddedness of 
patents in Ontario’s legal and regulatory architecture and how this impacts the commercialization 
of new pharmaceutical products in the province. 
3. How do different devices facilitate or hinder collaboration and knowledge translation in this 
sector? At what stage in the innovation process are they most effective, and why? 
Here I examine the ways in which the impact of open and proprietary mediating devices on 
pharmaceutical innovation are highly context dependent. More specifically, I evaluate the impact 
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of broad versus narrow patent claims and their impact on innovation. I argue that the efficacy of 
open and proprietary devices, both in terms of accelerating the translation of pharmaceutical 
research and encouraging collaboration, is dependent on: firstly, when they are employed in the 
innovation process (i.e. upstream versus downstream); and secondly, what they are applied to (i.e. 
tool compounds used to develop candidate drug products versus the products themselves).   
4. How can they be employed in the development of innovation strategies so as to streamline the 
process of drug development? 
Building off the argument that the efficacy of open and proprietary devices is context dependent, 
I conduct a case study of the open molecule JQ1 to answer this question. The purpose of this case 
study is to demonstrate that open and proprietary devices may be complimentary at particular 
stages of R&I, and, when used together, can accelerate advancements in the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
3.2. Case Study Selection 
This research analyzes and critiques the parameters of open and proprietary devices and their 
respective roles in Ontario’s rapidly changing R&D landscape, specifically addressing the network 
of actors and institutes shaping Canada’s pharmaceutical sector. I extend my focus to intermediary 
organizations established to facilitate the translation of basic research into marketable products, in 
addition to public research institutes, small- to medium-sized private pharmaceutical firms, and 
incubator labs in Toronto.  
Specifically, I focus on MaRS Innovation (MI) and its affiliate firms and public research 
hospitals, the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research (OICR) and the Fight Against Cancer 
Innovation Trust (FACIT), Johnson & Johnson’s incubator space JLABS @ Toronto and its 
affiliate firms, and the Structural Genomics Consortium (SGC). These organizations employ a 
variety of collaborative research arrangements and disclosure practices, ranging from the SGC 
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releasing the entirety of its research products into the public domain to the proprietary 
commercialization tools and non-disclosure agreements favoured by the MI technology transfer 
office. Given that the object of social inquiry is rarely an individual person or enterprise, case 
studies are optimal for testing hypotheses in situations that are both complex and involve a myriad 
of not highly isolated variables (Gomm, Hammersley, Foster, 2009: 23-24). As such, case studies 
such as this offer the opportunity to make general assertions about the role of open and proprietary 
mediating devices in pharmaceutical development broadly, and allow social scientists to predict 
trends in and/or outcomes of their use (ibid). The organizations outlined below provide an 
interesting and salient case study site: together, they represent the range of organizational 
structures in which pharmaceutical research currently occurs, where private firms work alongside 
and often in conjunction with public research institutes, and research parks composed of public 
and private organizations working symbiotically innovate and commercialize new drug candidates. 
Further, they are located in close proximity to one another, have similarly broad mandates (to 
accelerate the development of novel pharmaceuticals), and are all subject to the same provincial 
and federal laws and regulations.  
 
3.2.1. MaRS Innovation, the OICR, and FACIT 
As discussed in Chapter One, MaRS Innovation is a pan-provincial non-profit organization 
created in 2008 as a Centre of Excellence for Commercialization and Research by the Networks 
of Centres of Excellence (NCE). Created in 1989, the NCE program “supports large-scale 
academically led research networks that harness the creativity and inventiveness of Canadian 
health, natural, and social scientists and engineers” by engaging partners from academic 
institutions and public and private sector organizations (NCE, 2018). MI is an intermediary 
organization – defined by Kivimaa et al. (2019) as an organization “found to bridge between actors 
  
78 
involved in situations where direct interaction is difficult due to high transaction costs (e.g. locating 
a suitable partner to collaborate with, disincentives to collaborate) or communication problems 
resulting from…capacity to absorb or exchange knowledge” (1063). As such, the purpose of MI 
is to accelerate the translation of academic discoveries to marketable products and services by 
providing researcher groups with capital, industry networks, and laboratory space (MaRS 
Discovery District, 2016). As Canada’s largest research cluster, MI works in conjunction with 
academia (specifically York University, University of Toronto, and Ryerson University) and 
public research institutes (such as University Health Network and Sunnybrook Research Institute), 
industry partners from a range of sectors (such as Northern Biologics), venture capitalists and angel 
investors, and government agencies. In partnership with six major pharmaceutical companies 
(Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Merck, Baxter and LifeLabs), MI identifies and 
funds early-stage technologies via seed funds, in exchange for which partners “receive a first look 
at data from the project to facilitate further licensing discussions” (NCE, 2017b). The purpose of 
this approach is to avoid funding gaps between early- and market-stage development that 
traditionally slow the commercialization process (ibid). This ensures that emerging firms and 
startups are supported while developing technologies through to maturity, while at the same time 
reducing risk by sharing R&D costs with industry (ibid). By housing academics, banking and legal 
offices, and venture capital (VC), med-tech, and pharmaceutical firms in one building, MI further 
aims to facilitate non-traditional collaborations among residents and promote the cross-pollination 
of information and ideas (MaRS Discovery District, 2016). 
The OICR is a non-profit translational research organization established in 2005 by the 
Government of Ontario, focusing primarily on “the prevention, early detection, diagnosis and 
treatment of cancer” (OICR, 2016). As “receptors” to translational pharmacology research, OICR 
and MI work in partnership, connecting research in fields like genomics and bioinformatics from 
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Ontario’s universities and hospital-based research institutes (e.g. Toronto’s University Health 
Network [UHN] hospitals) with private organizations to facilitate oncology innovation and 
commercialization. Both organizations work together to navigate proprietary systems of IP 
protection by providing in-house licensing of technologies in early stages of clinical development 
and by fostering relationships between the aforementioned public and private research institutes, 
investors, and commercial partners (ibid).  
FACIT, a provincial business trust working in conjunction with MI and OICR (and under 
the auspices of MI), funds and licenses early stage research through its Intellectual Property 
Development and Commercialization (IPDC) fund (FACIT, 2016). The IPDC fund is designed “to 
support early-stage commercialization activities [including] proof-of concept (POC), validation, 
standard operating procedures, market analyses, IP protection and acquisition, expert guidance and 
management” (ibid). FACIT, OICR, and MaRS work together to navigate proprietary systems of 
IP protection by providing in-house licensing of technologies in early stages of clinical 
development and by fostering relationships between the previously discussed public and private 
research institutes, investors, and commercial partners. 
 
3.2.2. JLABS @ Toronto 
Opened in 2012, Johnson and Johnson’s JLABS @ Toronto is an incubator space housed in 
the MaRS Tower. It is the first JLABS site operating outside the United States (JLABS @ Toronto, 
2017). Working in collaboration with J&J Innovation, Janssen Inc., the Government of Ontario, 
and the University of Toronto, JLABS leases wet and dry laboratory space to its residents, the 
majority of which are small, early-stage firms focused on therapeutic or medical device technology 
development (ibid). In addition to lab space, residents have access to J&J’s equipment and 
molecular libraries and platforms, and operational management services. JLABS, like MI, aims to 
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indirectly promote knowledge diffusion by providing open office and conference spaces that 
encourage interaction and collaboration among its residents. As an incubator, the purpose of 
JLABS is to catalyze innovation (JLABS @ Toronto, 2017). It is distinct from MI as it has no 
external partners. JLABS maintains a ‘no-strings-attached’ arrangement, whereby residents are not 
required to disclose IP as a condition of leasing space, and “there is no first look, no first right of 
refusal and no equity assigned to Johnson & Johnson or Janssen” (JLABS, 2017a). Its pseudo-
open model makes JLABS an interesting comparative study, especially when discussed alongside 
the more traditional, proprietary innovation model embraced by MI and the more “radical” open 
model employed by the SGC outlined below. 
 
3.2.3. The Structural Genomics Consortium  
As a non-profit public-private consortium, the SGC undertakes basic scientific research 
“…of relevance to drug discovery. [Its] core mandate…is to determine 3D structures on a large 
scale and cost-effectively – targeting human proteins of biomedical importance and proteins from 
human parasites that represent potential drug targets” (SGC, 2017a). Operating out of the 
University of Oxford in the UK and the University of Toronto in the MaRS Tower, the SGC works 
in collaboration with a network of academic, industry, and government partners, namely AbbVie, 
Boehringer Ingelheim, the Canada Foundation for Innovation, the Canadian Institutes for Health 
Research, Genome Canada, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Janssen, Lilly Canada, the Novartis 
Research Foundation, the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation, Pfizer, 
Takeda, and the Wellcome Trust (ibid). Research at the SGC is focused on determining the crystal 
structures of proteins that act as “targets” for drug therapies for various types of cancer, diabetes, 
and psychiatric disorders. They are thereby developing the tools that enable drug discovery and 
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design rather than the drugs themselves, a significant distinction that will be discussed in Chapter 
Five of this dissertation.  
Of particular importance for this study is the fact that the SGC releases its crystal structures 
into the public domain with no strings (i.e. no proprietary IP rights) attached. More specifically, 
partnerships between the SGC and large for-profit private firms such as GSK, Pfizer, Janssen, and 
Lilly have been made with the understanding that no proprietary IP rights (i.e. patents, NDAs, etc.) 
or publication restrictions will be imposed on any of the structural data researchers produce. 
Crystal structures are deposited into the Protein Data Bank, a repository that can be freely accessed 
by researchers from public or private institutes around the world. The SGC maintains an open 
model under the assumption that “provid[ing] the public with this fundamental knowledge [and] 
allow[ing] commercial efforts and other academics to utilize the data freely and without any delay” 
will bring new drugs to market sooner and more cost-effectively (ibid). 
These organizations were chosen because they represent employ a diverse range of 
proprietary-to-open arrangements and commercialization strategies. Each of these organizations – 
MI and the OICR, JLABS, and the SGC – and their affiliated firms has a unique approach to 
innovating and collaborating. Some, namely a number of affiliate firms of MI and JLABS, have 
embraced Chesbrough’s (2003b) “open” model, in that they have extended R&I efforts beyond 
internal firm boundaries. Others, specifically the SGC, have successfully employed the open 
devices discussed Chapter Two. And finally, many (in fact, the majority) of affiliate firms of MI 
and JLABS have been reluctant to open their innovation and commercialization processes and 
have employed the proprietary devices outlined in the previous chapter. Each of these 
organizations has made use of what, to them, are the most advantageous and cost-effective tools 
for forming collaborative working relationships with outside firms and for navigating through what 
can potentially be a cost-prohibitive web of proprietary IP rights, legal architecture, and personnel 
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issues. As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Five, however, open and proprietary 
devices play markedly differing roles for each group in terms of enabling collaboration, attracting 
investment in early-stage research, and bringing profit-generating innovations to market. 
 
3.3. Data Collection  
Data for this research was collected via secondary literature and policy analyses and semi-
structured qualitative interviews. In light of the objectives outlined above, data collection and 
analysis was divided into three stages: the first stage involved a broad synthesis of the existing 
literature on intellectual property and techno-scientific innovation broadly, as discussed at length 
in Chapter Two. This work provided a theoretical foundation for this dissertation and informed 
both the questions asked of participants and the analysis of the data obtained. This literature was 
drawn from science and technology studies (STS), economics and the political economy of 
science, and innovation studies. It focused broadly on scientific interdisciplinarity and 
collaboration, academic capitalism and commercialization strategies, business and innovation 
models, intellectual property and open science, and mediating instruments and devices.  
The second stage included an analysis and secondary literature review of existing provincial 
and federal policy regarding pharmaceutical innovation and drug pricing. This included the Patent 
Act and the associated Notice of Compliance (NOC) Regulations, the Patented Medicine Prices 
Review Board (PMPRB), the data protection provisions of Canada’s Food and Drug Regulations, 
and the Ontario Formulary. Relevant international legal agreements, such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), are also outlined. As discussed, the objectives of this project 
is to shed light on the means by which pharmaceutical innovation in Ontario is enabled or 
constrained by different mediating devices, and to ultimately provide an outline for improving 
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innovation networks in the pharmaceutical sector. To do so requires first outlining the existing 
domestic and international legal and regulatory architecture. This material is discussed at length 
in Chapter Four of this dissertation.  
 
3.3.1. Primary Data Collection 
Data collection in the third stage incorporated qualitative interview data on pharmaceutical 
R&I, IP, and the use of mediating devices in Ontario and Canada respectively. This research was 
approved in October 2016 by York University's Ethics Review Board, the Human Participants 
Review Sub-Committee, and conformed to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Ethics 
Research Board. Prior to the start of in-person interviews, participants signed an informed consent 
form outlining the aims of this research, potential risks, and the confidential nature of their 
participation. Interviewees who participated via phone provided verbal consent.  
Interviews were conducted with twenty-five participants with five additional follow-up 
interviews, for a total of thirty 45-90 minute interviews conducted either in-person or by phone, 
with interviewees selected from the public and private sectors. Specifically, interviewees were 
drawn from MI and several of its affiliate firms, the OICR, FACIT, JLABS and one of its affiliate 
firms, the SGC, the UHN technology transfer office, the Princess Margaret Cancer Research 
Centre, Sunnybrook Research Institute, two leading law firms in Toronto, and one large 
pharmaceutical firm in the Toronto area. Participants included academic bench scientists, 
executives in the public and private sector, venture capitalists, IP lawyers, IP directors, patent 
agents, tech transfer officers, and innovation managers from these organizations. Table 2 below 
summarizes the details of interview participants: 
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Table 2: Interview Participants 
No. of 
Participants 
Location 
6 MaRS Innovation and affiliate firms 
3 OICR/FACIT 
3 JLABS 
2 Structural Genomics Consortium 
 UHN Hospitals 
5 Toronto area universities 
2 Private law firm 
2 Private pharmaceutical firm 
2 Private Venture Firm 
 
All interviews were recorded audio-recorded using the application Recorder on an iPhone 
and subsequently transcribed. Hand-written notes were taken throughout each interview to record 
follow-up questions and general impressions that could not be captured via audio recording. All 
responses were completely anonymized in transcriptions of interview recordings and subsequently 
in the write-up of this dissertation. Interviews were semi-structured: all participants were asked 
the same initial questions concerning their experiences with open and proprietary mediating 
devices and research commercialization, and their personal views on open access science. 
However, interviews made room for follow-up questions and relevant tangential discussions 
related to the specific expertise and/or experiences of the interviewee (Wengraf, 2001).  
The aim of these interviews was to assess the IP practices of participants and to understand 
their respective views on openness and open devices as they relate to innovation in drug 
development. Interview questions stemmed from the five central research questions outlined above 
and were informed by the theoretical works discussed in Chapter Two. Questions ranged from the 
specific (e.g. have you ever had to delay, significantly change, or abandon a research project due 
to onerous MTA restrictions or reach-through provisions, overly complex licensing negotiations, 
or prohibitively high royalties?), to more open-ended and opinion-based (e.g. based on your 
experiences, would increased openness be a benefit or detriment to pharmaceutical R&I?). In 
either case, participants were not asked to disclose any personal, sensitive or unpublished 
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data/information.  
 
3.3.2. Limitations 
The primary limitation potentially impacting the generalizability of the findings of this 
research stems from the number of interviews conducted. My initial goal was to conduct 50 
interviews, however I ultimately conducted a total of 30, With that said, a saturation point was 
reached midway through qualitative data collection. In the context of data acquisition (versus 
analysis), Grady (1998) argues a saturation point is reached when “data tend to be redundant of 
data already collected. In interviews, when the researcher begins to hear the same comments again 
and again, data saturation is being reached… It is then time to stop collecting information and to 
start analysing what has been collected” (26). Urquhart (2013) defines saturation as “the point in 
coding when you find that no new codes occur in the data. There are mounting instances of the 
same codes, but no new ones” (194). For Given (2016), saturation occurs at the point in which 
“additional data do not lead to any new emergent themes” (135), while Boddy (2016) notes, “once 
saturation is, the results must be capable of some degree of generalization” (428). During 
qualitative data collection and analysis for this research, a saturation point was reached after 
roughly 15-18 interviews were conducted, as new data began to repeat what was expressed in 
previous data and no new thematic concepts emerged during the coding process. Given that this 
saturation point was reached relatively soon into the qualitative data collection process,  the sample 
size of this data set does not significantly hinder my ability to answer the research questions 
outlined in section 3.1, and the empirical findings may be extrapolated to a broader population 
with confidence.  
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3.4. Data Analysis 
Interviews were analyzed in light of particular ontological considerations (Blaikie, 2010): 
firstly, that the acts of interviewing and observing are interpretive processes, that interviewees are, 
of course, subject to particular biases and motivations, and as such a critical attitude must be 
adopted when interpreting data. Secondly, that there exists “an underlying domain of structures 
and mechanisms that may not be readily observed” (ibid: 93) but that influences the process of 
drug development as a whole (i.e. the market-oriented paradigm in which research and innovation 
occurs).  
Following transcription, interview data were coded twice by hand and subsequently using 
NVivo software (Grbich, 2013; Saldaña, 2013). The coding process involved describing, 
classifying, and connecting (Blaikie, 2010). Description, in this case, simply involved identifying 
the context of action (e.g. the conditions precipitating the use of a specific device) and the 
intentions of the social actors involved (ibid). Bearing in mind the ultimate aims, objectives and 
outlined in section 3.1 and the theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter Two respectively, 
classification involved first identifying primary and secondary codes made up of recurring themes, 
theoretical concepts, key words, viewpoints, and strategies (Grbich, 2013). These codes essentially 
form the “bones” of this analysis (Appendix D). Primary codes were descriptive, and included 
innovation, research motivations, commercialization, funding of and investing in R&I, 
collaboration, business models, and open and proprietary mediating devices. Sub-codes were 
analytical, and included definitions, metrics, and strategies (of innovation), barriers to and 
facilitators (of collaboration, funding, commercialization), and so on. As noted by Saldaña (2013), 
the process of coding “is not just labelling, it is linking,” and thus these “bones” later became a 
working skeleton when integrated with the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter Two. 
Classification also entailed an evaluation of the causal and intervening conditions behind the use 
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of each mediating device (Blaikie, 2010). Finally, connection involved an examination and 
assessment of regularities, variations, and singularities of the qualitative data (i.e. of definitions 
and metrics of innovation and the use of particular devices, employed by whom, and in what 
context) (ibid). 
The aim of this research is to unpack the innovation process and the role played by open and 
proprietary mediating devices in the pharmaceutical sector. In this case, qualitative interviews 
offered a detailed account of the particularities of these devices – why some why some institutes 
or firms embrace openness and others do not, why some actors see open devices as facilitating 
innovation in theory but not in practice, why others are able to successfully form commercial 
partnerships on the basis of using open devices and others are not, and why the success of open 
devices is dependent on what is being produced and in what context. Interview data also offered a 
holistic, representative account of mediating devices in the larger context of corporate strategy, 
scientific competition, technology transfer, and academic and government policy, and imparts a 
more nuanced explanation for the variations in innovation strategies between industry and 
academia as well as the varying role and efficacy of open versus proprietary devices in each 
environment (Wengraf, 2001). Linking theoretical concepts to empirical indicators presents the 
opportunity for a thorough analysis of the innovation process, and ultimately will point to areas in 
which revisions can be made to general assumptions regarding innovation strategies in the 
pharmaceutical sector (ibid).  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodological approach taken in this research. 
Through the analysis of the data obtained, this research endeavours to unpack the process of 
pharmaceutical innovation in Ontario and evaluate the devices that mediate the interactions of 
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actors within this process. This dissertation is essentially an empirical case study of pharmaceutical 
innovation in Ontario, focusing specifically on the R&I efforts occurring at MaRS Innovations, 
the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research, JLABS, the Structural Genomics Consortium, and the 
University Health Network. These organizations were chosen because they represent employ a 
diverse range of proprietary-to-open arrangements and commercialization strategies.  
Data collection was organized in three stages: firstly, a theoretical foundation of secondary 
literature was drawn from science and technology studies (STS), economics and the political 
economy of science, and innovation studies, focusing broadly on scientific interdisciplinarity and 
collaboration, academic capitalism and commercialization strategies, business and innovation 
models, intellectual property and open science, and mediating instruments and devices. Secondly, 
provincial and federal policy regarding pharmaceutical development, IP, and drug pricing, as well 
as international legal agreements were assessed at length (Chapter Four). The final stage involved 
collecting qualitative interview data on pharmaceutical R&I, IP, and the use of mediating devices 
in Ontario and Canada respectively (Chapters Five and Six). Qualitative data were coded 
descriptively and analytically according to theoretical concepts found in the secondary literature 
discussed in chapter two as well as themes that repeatedly emerged in the data itself.. Overall, the 
methodological approach employed in this research is intended to offer a thorough evaluation of 
the role and use of open and proprietary mediating devices in pharmaceutical development, how 
they affect (and are affected by) funding sources and collaborative arrangements, and their net 
impact on research and innovation in this sector. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the results 
of this research are generalizable and may be extrapolated to evaluate the state of pharmaceutical 
development in Canada more broadly.  
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4. Global IP Policy 
 
While this research is not focused on government or institutional policy specifically, it is 
necessary to briefly discuss the policy landscape of pharmaceutical research and development. 
Understanding the legal and political architecture in which scientific research and innovation is 
undertaken, and the entrenchment of patents and other proprietary IP tools and practices within 
this architecture in particular, may help to explain why establishing new innovation practices and 
open business models remains such a challenging feat for SMEs, large firms, and public research 
institutes. This chapter focuses on international and national IP policies and innovation strategies, 
paying particular attention to central role played by patents in trade agreements, policies, and 
regulations and the subsequent effect to innovation. I will first discuss the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (1994) and the limits it places on R&D in 
the Global North and South and on countries and firms seeking to establish more open 
commercialization practices. Secondly, I will examine IP legislation in the United States, focusing 
specifically on the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts (1980) and the Supreme Court ruling in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980), and the ways in which these legal and legislative cases have 
dramatically affected biopharmaceutical research. Finally, I will discuss Canada’s existing federal 
IP guidelines, examining the Notice of Compliance Regulations, the Data exclusivity Rules, and 
their effects on generic pharmaceutical development in Canada.  
 
4.1. International Intellectual Property Legislation and Policy 
This section examines international IP legislation and policy, focusing on the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) primary IP agreement and several landmark legal and legislative cases in 
the United States. Though the policy and legal cases discussed in this section do not directly affect 
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the R&I discussed in the following two chapters of this dissertation, they have had a dramatic and 
wide-reaching effect on how scientific research is conducted and who benefits from its products 
(Popp-Berman, 2014). Moreover, they have resulted in the fortification and proliferation of 
proprietary IP devices across all stages of scientific R&I, as well as in the expansion in the number 
of things that may be enclosed behind proprietary IP rights. As Stiglitz et al. (2017) note, 
international agreements such as TRIPS (1994) and legislative acts such as Bayh-Dole (1980) 
perpetuate the notion that the introduction and strengthening of private monopolies – created 
through stringent and strictly enforced patent regimes – is best way to rectify the market 
undersupplying knowledge and inadequately incentivizing scientific research. The direct 
consequence of this has been R&D focused less on innovating and instead directed at “extending, 
broadening, and leveraging the monopoly power extended through the patent” (ibid: 2). As will be 
discussed in this section, despite the fact that knowledge and information play an increasingly 
important role in the global economy, the rules governing who has access to/who can profit from 
these intangible assets currently remain heavily in favour of large private firms in select sectors 
and the dominant capitalist countries that make up the WTO. 
 
4.1.1. TRIPS 
The WTO, a multilateral legal and institutional system (or regime) for the administration and 
development of trade relations, is comprised of 153 member nations and is the successor to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1947). Its mission is “to provide fair and stable 
conditions for the conduct of international trade with a view to encouraging trade and investment 
that raises living standards worldwide” (Taubman et al., 2012: 4). Through several rounds of 
comprehensive trade negotiations, member nations agreed to pursue an agenda of trade 
liberalization, thus forming the WTO at the completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
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negotiations in 1994. In the same year, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) was created as part of the same Uruguay Round (Rhoten and Powell, 
2007). This section focuses specifically on TRIPS and its role in standardizing and fortifying an 
international Americanized IP regime. As Mirowski (2011) notes, while TRIPS “at first might seem 
a highly technical and arcane set of legal provisions [the agreement] can now readily wreak havoc 
with the livelihood of large numbers of citizens of any [WTO member] country seeking to evade 
or otherwise get around [it]” (p. 186). TRIPS has profoundly transformed the way knowledge 
(particularly scientific knowledge) can be and is commercialized. 
Agreed upon by over one hundred signatories, the purpose of TRIPS was to globalize a set 
of IP principles and harmonize IP regulation across WTO member nations. TRIPS establishes 
minimum substantive standards in the governance of “copyright and related rights as well as 
trademarks, industrial designs, patents (including protection of pharmaceutical product, plant 
varieties, and computer programs), and undisclosed information including trade secrets and test 
data” (Rhoten and Powell, 2007: 350). TRIPS is particularly broad in its IP coverage, extending 
from patents and copyrights to source code, trade secrets, and industrial design. The agreement 
considers knowledge as “something discrete and individualized: there is no recognition of possible 
communal aspects of knowledge,” and by extension no explicit room for openness (Mirowski, 
2011: 187). 
TRIPS defines the subject matter eligible for protection, the scope of IP rights (IPRs) that 
are to be conferred, permissible exceptions to those rights, and the minimal duration of protection 
provided. Importantly, the agreement sets comprehensive standards for digital technology and 
biotechnology that have benefited the United States, the European Union, and Japan immensely. 
These standards mirror significant legal and legislative changes passed in the United States in the 
early 1980s, primarily Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) and the Bayh-Dole Act (1980). The U.S. 
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Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty set precedent for genetically modified 
microorganisms to be patented (Mirowski, 2011). The same year, the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act affirmed the right of universities to patent government-funded research (ibid). As will be 
discussed in the ensuing section, both solidified patenting as an essential tool in the 
commercialization of new biotechnologies, created an opportunity for public research institutes to 
attract investments from private industry, and expanded the marketplace for scientific knowledge 
and its byproducts. Further, WTO members must also enforce copyright laws protecting computer 
programs as a literary work, and patent laws that allow microorganisms and other biological 
material to be patented (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2004: 1). More specifically, articles 27 through 
34 relate to intellectual property generated through scientific R&D, establishing what is considered 
patentable material (e.g. genes, organisms, plant varieties, drugs, cell lines, and other 
biotechnological materials), and outlining penalties for noncompliance and infringement 
(Mirowski, 2011).  
Tyfield (2008) argues that TRIPS was largely a product of the (American) university-
industry (U-I) complex that emerged following the rapid growth of the biotech sector: although 
“the political agency behind TRIPS was big pharma, its capacity to take over the state’s agenda 
for international trade diplomacy was built upon…a U-I complex in the life sciences” (p. 3). As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the usually stated purpose of IPRs is to facilitate economic, social, and 
cultural progress by encouraging creative work and technological innovation and rewarding 
ingenuity (Posner, 2002). Moreover, patents and IPRs offer a means of extracting economic value 
and appropriate financial returns from the products of research and therefore provide an incentive 
to finance applied R&D (Taubman et al., 2012: 3). Given the expensive nature of pharmaceutical 
development and its dependence on patenting, large pharmaceutical firms sought to establish a 
global market so as to recoup the costs of R&D via sales and establish cheaper means of production 
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in the Global South (ibid). Further, with the increasing number of U-I partnerships in the biotech 
sector from the 1980’s onwards, it became equally as important for large pharmaceutical firms to 
lobby for patent reform on a global scale. Thus, large pharmaceutical firms also campaigned for 
the harmonization of international patent regulations in an effort to reduce profit losses stemming 
from local competition and weak patent regimes in developing countries, reverse engineering and 
imitations (Tyfield, 2008: 5). Regarding TRIPS specifically, the political leverage of the 
pharmaceutical sector resulted in the United States pursuing “a regime of strong, global patent 
rights that would cover pharmaceuticals and biological materials in particular” during 
international trade negotiations” (ibid: 12).  
The international enforcement of IPRs and regulations through the enactment of TRIPS has 
primarily benefited the dominant capitalist countries that make up the WTO: namely, the United 
States, members of the European Union, and Japan. With respect to the Global South, the 
enforcement of TRIPS has not been particularly advantageous and has brought few gains, 
especially as it applies to pharmaceuticals (Barton, 2004). As Zeller (2008) notes, the integration 
of IPRs into WTO rules is a particularly important means of strengthening national 
competitiveness (of the Global North) and ensuring transnational corporations (such as Pfizer, 
Merck, etc.) profit significantly and principally from the agreement. With the ratification of 
TRIPS, “the dominant capitalist countries also obtained an arbitration mechanism with sanction 
possibilities” (ibid: 95), thus reinforcing the role of the Global North as the primary recipients of 
license fees and rent payments and widening the existing global technological divide (p. 109). The 
brunt of this divide (between the dominant capitalist nations of the WTO and their counterparts) 
is felt especially in the context of pharmaceuticals. Articles 51 through 60 of TRIPS “render 
importation of any ‘pirated’ generic pharmaceuticals illegal,” even in the case of public health 
emergencies (Mirowski, 2011: 187). Further, countries in the Global South are prevented from 
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producing generic versions of essential medicines (e.g. patented antiretroviral and antimalarial 
drugs, treatments for tuberculosis and dengue fever, etc.), given the agreement’s 20-year patent 
term stipulation (Rhoten and Powell, 2007). The costs of patented medicines are often exorbitant 
for patients in developing countries1, and while WTO members have the right to override patents 
to produce generic versions during national emergencies and public health crises, these exemptions 
have become a contentious issue between pharmaceutical companies and countries in the Global 
South (Johnson, 2011: 1). Exemption disputes have largely revolved around what constitutes a 
national health emergency: for instance, chronic and non-communicable diseases have, until 
recently, been considered epidemics only in the Global South, and access to medicine for highly 
prevalent and debilitating diseases such as cancer and diabetes has remained prohibitively costly 
under TRIPS (ibid).  
Today, the IP standards and regulations set forth by TRIPS continue to ensure the transfer 
and dissemination of new (bio)technologies by means of foreign direct investment (FDI), trade 
and licensing, and “define and structure the distinct rights and responsibilities in technology 
partnerships, such as research cooperation or technology sharing or transfer arrangements” 
(Drahos and Braithwaite, 2004: 1). By harmonizing international IP policy, TRIPS has created an 
international legal and regulatory architecture that ostensibly reduces barriers to trade, promotes 
technological innovation, and facilitates the transfer and dissemination of technology (in theory). 
Patents are a keystone of this architecture: having been lobbied for by a number of dominant 
private (American) corporations, patents were crucial in the growing commercial dominance of 
several key sectors in the global economy and ensured “unprecedented corporate control of the life 
sciences” (Williams, 2000: 69). Moreover, as Mirowski (2011) notes, the international fortification 
 
1 d4T, a patented antiretroviral sold by Bristol-Meyers Squib, cost roughly $1600 per patient annually versus the 
annual $55 per patient cost of the generic form – a mark-up of approximately 28-fold per patient (Rhoten and Powell, 
2007: 360). 
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of IPRs through TRIPs has served to maintain and enforce a proprietary structure within 
pharmaceutical R&D, making it especially difficult for openness to penetrate this particular sector. 
Proprietary ownership (of knowledge, data, code and so forth) in the form of a patent constitutes 
the vast majority of monetary assets of most biotech companies and especially those operating on 
a global scale (ibid).  
In the context of pharmaceutical development and commercialization, patents have become 
the standard tools by which products are brought to market and corporations profit from said 
products; they are therefore critically necessary for the advancement of R&D, particularly when 
capital investment is required. The standardization of international IP policy through TRIPS led 
directly to the reorientation of R&D itself. The weakening of antitrust laws and the strengthening 
of intellectual property practice coincided with the passage of TRIPS, resulting in the demise of 
in-house R&D and the growth of outsourcing corporate research in the early 1990s (Mirowski and 
Sent, 2008). The direct result of this was an unfettered corporate sector contracting research to 
external firms (such as research parks and academic start-ups) as a cost-reduction measure. By 
creating a standardized global IP regime, TRIPS established an international legal structure in 
which a small handful of corporate actors could maintain a monopoly in their respective sectors 
while outsourcing R&D efforts as a cost-saving measure. Prior to TRIPS, outsourcing R&D efforts 
– for example to India or China – would require adhering to the potentially weak IP standards of 
those countries (ibid). With its passage, TRIPS ensured that employing CROs outside the Global 
North (for example, in India – see Sunder Rajan, 2017) no longer meant large firms were 
constrained by weak IP standards (Mirowski and Sent, 2008). The lobbying efforts of 
pharmaceutical firms prior to TRIPS essentially resulted in the exportation of a US-style 
intellectual property regime around the world (benefiting the United States and the European 
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2016). As Stiglitz et al. (2017) note, these IP standards are designed not to maximize innovation 
and scientific progress, but rather to maximize the profits of large pharmaceutical firms (and 
others) and optimize their ability to sway trade negotiations. 
While this dissertation and the case study at hand do not focus immediately on TRIPS or the 
sale of domestic pharmaceutical products across international borders, it is important to understand 
the broader policy background and legal context in which R&D takes place. TRIPS has essentially 
dictated the terms by which pharmaceutical products are developed and commercialized; it has 
extended the commercial market further upstream, and the requirement that WTO member nations 
adopt a US-style patenting regime has profoundly affected the way knowledge is commercialized 
and organized (Mirowski, 2011). As discussed in Chapter Two, pharmaceutical R&D is 
interdisciplinary by nature, and is a product of collaborative efforts both within and across 
institutional boundaries and international borders. The production of pharmaceutical products 
relies heavily on international supply chains (McKenna, 2018), and as such, research in this sector 
and the products it yields are subject to the conditions laid out in TRIPS. This, by extension, means 
protecting and commercializing research via proprietary devices is standard practice. Research 
(both corporate and academic) has thus been reoriented toward commercial priorities by “a small 
cabal of neoliberal economists and corporate representatives” (Mirowski, 2011: 186), making the 
implementation of open devices into this sphere particularly difficult. As will be discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six, while the participants of this study (e.g. researchers, investors, lawyers, IP 
agents, etc. in this sector) recognize the potential benefits of openness on pharmaceutical R&I, 
they also acknowledge the legal architecture established by TRIPS and the entrenchment of patents 
and other proprietary IP tools and practices within this architecture that makes establishing new 
innovation practices and open business models challenging. 
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4.2. Intellectual Property Policy in the United States 
Following the birth of the biotech industry in the late 1970s, the gap between upstream, 
fundamental research and its commercial applications became progressively narrower (Rai and 
Eisenberg, 2003; Pisano, 2006). As universities began focusing on the commercial impact of 
science at this time, government funding for academic science stagnated in the 1970s and in-house 
corporate R&D declined precipitously, leading industry to rely on universities to conduct a 
significant portion of basic scientific research (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1996). University 
technology transfer offices opened as a means of liaising between academia and industry and 
transferring “university breakthroughs into the hands of the public” by way of patenting (Popp-
Berman, 2012: 6; see also Geiger and Sá, 2008). Prior to the emergence and rapid growth of the 
biotech industry, the boundary between academia and industry was, for the most part, distinct: 
while university faculty served as advisors and consultants to industry, academic entrepreneurship 
was relatively limited – a result of a dearth of capital for early-stage industry developing academic 
inventions (ibid). However, a series of legal and legislative changes in the United States in the 
early 1980s helped in part to launch and sustain the practice of academic entrepreneurship in the 
biological sciences during this time and promoted the practice of intellectual property claims in 
fundamental R&D. This section will focus on three of these changes in particular – the Supreme 
Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980), as well as the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler 
Acts (1980), each of which helped to reshape the economic structure of scientific research and 
have ensured the primacy of patenting in today’s drug discovery landscape.  
With the growing entanglement of capitalism and science following the end of the Second 
World War, the scientific enterprise came to be seen as a potential economic engine (Weinberg, 
1967). To ensure a means of return on public capital investment in scientific research, universities 
– the primary locus for scientific inquiry and knowledge production to this point – needed to 
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“harness the power of the market” (ibid: 95). This was made possible through the fortification of a 
national patent regime and the enactment of patent policies and research regulations founded on 
the bedrock principles of ownership and profiting from one’s ownership (Kraemer, 2006). While 
the first piece of IP legislation in United States – the 1793 Patent Act – stipulated that nature, in 
any form, could not be patented, by 1930 the Plant Patent Act permitted the patenting of asexually 
reproduced plants (ibid). Following the loosening of recombinant DNA research regulations in 
1977, the landmark Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) broadened the notion 
of patentability further by allowing microorganisms to be patented. The significance of Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty lies in the Court’s distinction not between living and inanimate things, but rather 
“between products of nature, whether living or not, and human made inventions…[such as 
Chakrabarty’s] microorganisms” (ibid: 83). The conclusion drawn was, essentially, that living 
things resulting from human ingenuity and research could be owned and turned into both private 
property and marketable commodities – a verdict that had far-reaching implications for biomedical 
R&D specifically, and for academic capitalism more broadly. 
The same year, the United States Congress passed both the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-
Wydler Act; the former affirming the right of universities to patent government-funded inventions, 
and the latter permitting federal laboratories to actively pursue technology transfer (Hacket, 2014). 
These acts of Congress, inherently market-oriented by nature, were “strongly motivated by concern 
with the economy, and by a belief that [science and technology] could be used to improve it” (Popp-
Berman, 2014: 415). The purpose of these initiatives (particularly the Bayh-Dole Act) was to 
encourage public-private partnerships by making federally sponsored research more readily usable. 
More broadly, improving incentives for inventors was seen as a means of increasing techno-
scientific productivity and improving American economic competitiveness. Granting ownership of 
exclusive patent rights allowed grantees (i.e. scientists, academic researchers, etc.) to license their 
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inventions to private firms – a move that was deemed “necessary to motivate private investors to 
pick up where government left off and transform new discoveries into commercial products” (Rai 
and Eisenberg, 2003: 290).  
However, while the intent of both the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts was to 
accelerate techno-scientific innovation, facilitate technology transfer, and encourage public-private 
partnerships, neither piece of legislation drew a distinction “between downstream inventions that 
lead directly to commercial products and fundamental research discoveries that broadly enable 
further scientific investigation” (ibid). As discussed in section 2.4.3, Murray and Stern (2007) have 
illustrated the anti-commons effect associated with the granting of upstream patent rights, 
suggesting that intellectual property rights do, in fact, have a potentially negative impact on the 
diffusion of scientific knowledge. By extension, proprietary IP (particularly upstream) may impede 
innovation in the biological sciences by limiting avenues of inquiry, excluding certain groups from 
R&I, and creating bottlenecks through patent thickets (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Mirowski, 
2011; Caulfield et al., 2011). Following the passage of Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler, public 
research institutes saw a flurry of new patent applications and an increase in MTA filings as private 
investment in public research institutions and public-private research collaborations grew 
(Mirowski, 2011). Granted broader patenting freedom with the Supreme Court ruling in Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, universities in particular began to file patent claims on basic research discoveries, 
such as novel DNA sequences, cell lines, and protein structures, thereby extending the reach of 
proprietary tools into what was formerly the public domain (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003). Moreover, 
newly emerging university technology transfer offices sought to establish proprietary restrictions 
on research with commercial potential even when patents were not sought, specifically by requiring 
material transfer, reach-through or non-disclosure agreements that dictate or limit the use of 
research products and materials (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003; Rodriguez, 2005). 
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Some scholars have argued the passage of the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts has had 
a minimal impact (either positive or negative) on biomedical research and innovation activity, and 
further, that patents issued to universities following 1980 were, in fact, less significant and less 
general than those issued to applicants in academia prior to 1980 (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002). 
Moreover, these scholars have argued that the increase in university patenting and technology 
transfer activity after 1980 was simply following along a natural trajectory, unaffected by the 
external legislative environment (Mowery et al., 2004). However, as Mirowski (2011) notes, Bayh-
Dole and Stevenson-Wydler, as well as the Chakrabarty decision, were neither the sole nor the 
primary reasons behind the increasingly commercialized nature of academic science; rather, they 
encouraged the commercialization of research further upstream and “brought universities closer in 
line with IP law for corporations” by “…mandat[ing] the neoliberal restructuring of the university” 
(p. 149). These legal and legislative changes were, therefore, catalysts for what has been described 
as the creep of market-oriented neoliberal strategies into the academic sphere and ensured that 
universities played a more active role in reconfiguring research agendas toward more commercial 
interests (Lave et al., 2010).  
Finally, the expansion in the number of things that could be patented (via the decision in 
Chakrabarty) and the consequent push to patent and commercialize academic research has led to 
an erosion of the norms traditionally associated with fundamental science: while the relevance of 
Merton’s norms are debatable today, the impact of the fortification and proliferation of IPRs into 
academic science has extended beyond financial considerations and has enclosed what had 
previously been open. As Ziman (2012a) and others have argued repeatedly, the internal structure 
of science is a social formation, based on interdisciplinary knowledge flows and collaborative 
efforts. As will be discussed in ensuing chapters, patents (in addition to numerous other proprietary 
IP tools) constitute a barrier to these knowledge flows and collaborative endeavours. The ability to 
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make broad upstream patents claims, for instance, limits access to knowledge that extends far 
beyond the scope of the original invention, such as in the case of the OncoMouse patent which was 
“not limited to the mice actually modified, but claim[ed] all exploitation of the invention for all 
transgenic, nonhuman, mammalian onco-animals” (Radder, 2010: 247). Moreover, while the 
debate regarding whether scientific knowledge is a public good (see Callon, 1994) far exceeds the 
scope of this dissertation, conferring monopoly rights over upstream research and fundamental 
scientific knowledge prevents scientists from accessing the “communal stock” of scientific 
knowledge. As Jones (2009) notes, knowledge begets new knowledge, and R&I is therefore an 
aggregate process of producing new knowledge. Advancements in biotechnology or 
pharmaceutical sciences, then, require a collective pool of skills and expertise (Freeman et al., 
2015; Raasch et al., 2013) – a process limited by the increasingly common practice of privatizing 
and commercializing academic research.  
 
4.3. Intellectual Property Policy in Canada 
The Canadian Patent Act (1985) governs pharmaceutical patents in Canada, and further 
outlines patentability criteria, establishes standards of patent enforcement, and provides a minimum 
period of market exclusivity for disclosures of inventions (Hore, 2004). The Patent Act originally 
conferred an eighteen-year period of exclusivity on new disclosures, though litigation on behalf of 
the United States through the World Trade Organization established Canada was in violation of 
TRIPS (WTO, 2001). Canada has since adopted a fixed twenty-year patent term. This section 
focuses primarily on Canada’s Notice of Compliance Regulations and the Data Exclusivity Rules, 
both of which form the guiding federal principles of intellectual property disclosure and 
compliance and significantly favour the rights of brand-name drug manufacturers over generic 
competitors.   
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Prior to 1993, Canadian law established a “license of right” for 50 years on pharmaceutical 
products marketed in the country, whereby potential distributors of generic drug products “could 
apply for such a license and, if granted, could produce and market the patented medicine at 
competitive prices in return for a four percent royalty” (Reichman, 2009: 251). While Canada’s 
use of the license of right was central to establishing a profitable environment for generic 
pharmaceutical development, by extension it deterred the growth of a robust research-based 
pharmaceutical sector (ibid). Given the less stringent regulatory and intellectual property market 
in the United States, brand-name firms have flourished outside of Canada, while their presence in 
Canada remains limited (namely because generic pharmaceutical development involves 
formulation research but no discovery, and thus is unaffected by lax IP laws). As Lexchin (2011) 
notes, efforts to expand the generic market poses a challenge to governments, whereby generics 
are needed to manage the cost of drugs, yet brand-name company investment often depends on the 
restriction of generic products.  
In 1993, following pressure from the United States, Canada abandoned the license of right 
program and Canadian compulsory licensing was formally prohibited under the IP conditions laid 
out in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (ibid). Further, following the TRIPS 
negotiations in the early 1990s and a subsequent WTO court ruling on behalf of the United States 
against Canada, Canada’s compulsory licensing system was deemed to be in noncompliance with 
the treaty (World Trade Organization, 2001). A latter provision of TRIPS stipulated “a WTO 
Member government cannot subject whole classes of pharmaceuticals – such as ‘essential 
medicines’ – to a pre-established compulsory licensing scheme. It must, instead, adopt a case-by-
case approach and shape the compulsory license to meet the purpose for which each license was 
authorized” (Reichman, 2009: 252). This saw the consequent enactment of the Notice of 
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Compliance (NOC) Regulations and the establishment of a 20-year patent term for brand-name 
products.  
The NOC Regulations stem from the Patent Act, enacted under Section 55.2, and have since 
been amended in 1998, 1999, 2006, and 2008 (Hore, 2004; Lexchin, 2011). Their purpose is to 
provide effective patent enforcement for new brand-name pharmaceutical medicines by tying the 
regulatory approval of generic products by Health Canada to the patent status of the original 
branded product (Lexchin, 2011). Following a successful review of a new drug submission to 
Health Canada, a Notice of Compliance is issued to the manufacturer. The process of new drug 
submission and approval in Canada is as follows: 
1. When a sponsor decides that it would like to market a drug in Canada, it files a 
"New Drug Submission" with the Health Products and Food Branch (HPFB). 
This contains information and data about the drug's safety, effectiveness and 
quality. It includes the results of the preclinical and clinical studies, whether 
done in Canada or elsewhere, details regarding the production of the drug, 
packaging and labelling details, and information regarding therapeutic claims 
and side effects. 
2. HPFB performs a thorough review of the submitted information, sometimes 
using external consultants and advisory committees. 
3. HPFB evaluates the safety, efficacy and quality data to assess the potential 
benefits and risks of the drug. 
4. HPFB reviews the information that the sponsor proposes to provide to health 
care practitioners and consumers about the drug (e.g. the label, product 
brochure). 
5. If, at the completion of the review, the conclusion is that the benefits outweigh 
the risks and that the risks can be mitigated, the drug is issued a Notice of 
Compliance (NOC), as well as a Drug Identification Number (DIN) which 
permits the sponsor to market the drug in Canada and indicates the drug's official 
approval in Canada. (Health Canada, 2019b). 
 
Essentially, through the NOC Regulations, the drug approval process is inherently linked to patent 
status as Health Canada is barred from permitting a generic market entry until the 20-year patent 
term of the branded medicine has expired. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Branded 
drug products that have received regulatory approval by Health Canada are also required to be 
listed on the Patent Register. In contrast to the United States and other jurisdictions where litigation 
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between patentees and generic producers is commonplace, generic producers seeking approval 
from Health Canada are required to address specific patents listed on the Register – by arguing the 
patent in question is either invalid or will not be infringed by the approval (ibid). This measure was 
intended to minimize wasteful post-approval litigation.2 Following the 2006 revisions, the Patent 
Register required that a link be made explicit between patent subject matter and the underlying 
drug product – a means of minimizing abuse of the Register. Importantly, the NOC Regulations 
facilitate the ability of brand-name firms to prevent generic market entry by listing patents on the 
Register – should the patentee challenge a generic’s application for approval, there is an automatic 
24 month stay of regulatory approval placed on the generic (ibid).  
Separate and distinct from patent protection are the Data Exclusivity Rules, enacted through 
the Canadian Food and Drug Act. Importantly, TRIPS specifies that WTO members should 
implement measures that protect intellectual property (e.g. pre-clinical, clinical, toxicological, or 
clinical trial data that support a branded new drug application) from unfair commercial use (Kendall 
and Hamill, 2016). Similar to other forms of proprietary IP protection, the Data Exclusivity Rules 
provide branded pharmaceutical manufacturers a limited period of protection in which to obtain 
regulatory/market approval for a given product. In Canada, where data exclusivity applies, generic 
manufacturers seeking to rely on a pharmaceutical patentee’s data are prohibited from applying for 
a period of eight years following the approval of a branded drug product (ibid).  
Both the NOC Regulations and the Data Exclusivity Rules have been widely criticized by 
generic manufacturers as having a significant delaying effect on generic market entry by allowing 
brand-name manufacturers to extend their market monopoly, in some cases for years after the 
 
2 Biologics – drug products that are synthesized from or manufactured in biological sources, such as viral and bacterial 
vaccines, radiopharmaceuticals, cell therapies, or gene therapies – are required to submit extensive evidence 
demonstrating safety and efficacy in addition to chemistry and manufacturing information beyond what is typically 
expected from patented new drug submissions (Health Canada, 2019a). They are then monitored by Health Canada 
according to their potential risk. Biologics are approved by the Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate of the 
Health Products and Food Branch of Health Canada (GaBI, 2014). 
  
105 
expiry of the patent in question (Hore, 2004). Notably, the NOC Regulations allow brand-name 
manufacturers to obtain automatic 24-month stays of approval by asserting a patent would be 
infringed by the generic product. Loopholes in the Regulations allow for brand-name 
manufacturers to obtain several continuous 24-month stays of approval, which has led to brand 
name patentees prolonging their market monopolies by engaging in lengthy litigations with generic 
manufacturers and significantly delaying generic market entry (often for years following the 
expiration of the original patent) (ibid). Additionally, the Data Exclusivity Rules grant a period of 
IP protection for eight years following approval of a branded product: during the first six years of 
this period, a generic manufacturer may not file for approval with Health Canada, and while they 
may file for approval during the final two years, it cannot be granted until the end of the eight years 
(Kendall and Hamill, 2016). 
The purpose of this section is, again, to highlight the centrality of patents in Canada’s 
pharmaceutical landscape, and to emphasize the privileged position given to proprietary forms of 
intellectual property. The legal and regulatory architecture of pharmaceutical development in 
Ontario will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Six. A recent report by Action Canada on the 
status of open innovation as a national innovation strategy found that among OECD countries, 
Canada has fallen significantly behind industrialized nations in establishing a robust, collaborative 
and open innovation S&T policy (see Gamache et al., 2016). Moreover, the report noted that while 
the current federal government has identified innovation as a priority by appointing a Minister of 
Innovation, Science and Economic Development and has recognized the importance of openness 
and collaboration in the context of scientific innovation specifically, the government has done little 
to encourage or foster working relationships between private firms, government, and public 
research institutes (ibid). Even excluding the consideration given to openness in the report 
mentioned above, pharmaceutical innovation – as measured by annual patent filing rates – has 
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fallen, according to the Canadian Intellectual Property Office’s most recent Annual Report (CIPO, 
2018). While in 2017, CIPO received 35,022 patent applications (an increase of 1% from 2016), 
the number of patent applications for pharmaceutical products has continued to drop since 2008 
(ibid).  
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, establishing increasingly open business models and 
creating collaborative networks of actors and institutions – actions that do not necessarily require 
firms to abandon contracts or other tools used to create market value – may offer a solution to the 
issues of bottlenecks and patent thickets associated with traditional proprietary and linear models 
of innovation. As it stands, however, Canada’s established open innovation policy exists in name 
only, and is has failed to expand beyond policy discussions to practice (Gamache et al., 2016). 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Patents form the backbone of the international legal and policy architecture that in large part 
determines the path of scientific innovation, particularly in the context of pharmaceuticals. 
Numerous national and international agencies have explicitly called for the adoption of full and 
open access to scientific data as an international norm associated with publicly funded research 
(International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, 2003; OECD, 2007), or have declared a 
commitment to making research data available to the widest possible audience as soon as possible 
to expedite the translation of research results downstream (NIH, 2003; CIHR, 2007; UK Medical 
Research Council, 2011). However, the fact remains that patents, MTAs, and other proprietary IP 
devices remain hallmark features of commercialization strategies across the globe. Though open 
innovation has become an increasingly appealing solution for a sustainable international IP regime 
(particularly as the economy of ideas, knowledge, and information continues to account for a 
growing share of output in both the Global North and South), the prevailing twenty-first century 
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IP regime continues to “[erect] more barriers to the use of knowledge, often casing the gap between 
social returns to innovation and the private returns to widen” (Stiglitz et al., 2017: 3). Even as 
private firms (such as GE, Samsung, and Johnson & Johnson) extend innovation efforts beyond 
traditional firm boundaries and university researchers continue building collaborative ties with 
industry, these relationships (and the process of commercialization itself) still hinge largely on 
NDAs, MTAs, and patents, and proprietary devices remain central to international IP policy 
(Caulfield et al., 2012). Moreover, patents and other proprietary devices continue to be used further 
upstream in the process of academic R&I, significantly impacting the dissemination of research 
results and hindering the commercialization process itself.  
As will be discussed in the Chapters Five and Six, as firms and governments continually 
evaluate and update their business models and innovation strategies and policies, it is important to 
assess their efficacy in terms of accelerating the translation of pharmaceutical research and 
encouraging collaboration. Streamlining the innovation process will necessarily involve unpacking 
when open and proprietary devices are employed in the innovation process (e.g. upstream versus 
downstream) and the context in which they are employed (e.g. in a consortium versus a small- to 
medium-sized firm versus an academic lab). As Rai and Eisenberg (2003) note, the challenge to 
policymakers moving forward “lies in distinguishing discoveries that are better developed and 
disseminated through open access from discoveries that are better developed and disseminated 
under the protection of intellectual property rights” (291). 
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5. The Innovation Ecosystem in Ontario’s Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
This chapter addresses research question 1: How do social actors in the pharmaceutical 
sector understand innovation? By extension, how can we theorize open and proprietary devices? 
Specifically, it focuses on the concept of innovation itself – what does it mean to innovate? How 
do we measure and valuate innovation? What factors drives certain actors to invest in the 
development of innovative new biotechnologies? What factors accelerate or inhibit the 
commercialization of these innovations? Innovation is a particularly slippery concept, meaning 
different things and producing different end results to different actors within techno-economic 
networks. The ways in which innovation is measured also vary, and the metrics used to determine 
innovativeness at the firm- or country-level are inherently linked to the motivations behind R&I. 
By extension, these motivations are shaped largely by monetary considerations (i.e. public research 
funding, sponsored research agreements, etc.). Moreover, analyzing the concept of innovation and 
how it is measured sheds light on funding and investment decisions, largely by highlighting 
financial motivations that drive R&I. Unpacking these questions allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of the role played by open and proprietary mediating devices on innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Understanding how the definition of innovation changes from the 
perspective of research scientists, executives, IP managers and so forth is critical in this particular 
study. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, what may hinder innovation for the research scientist 
who sees innovation as a process may conversely facilitate it for the CEO who sees innovation as 
a usable outcome. For example, a patent or MTA may inhibit collaboration and the aggregate 
process of knowledge production upstream but facilitate the market introduction of a new product 
downstream. This distinction is necessary for understanding the effect of mediating devices on 
innovation itself. 
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As previously discussed in Chapter Three, this research focuses on intermediary 
organizations established to facilitate the translation of basic research into marketable products, in 
addition to public research institutes, small- to medium-sized private pharmaceutical firms, and 
incubator labs in Toronto. Specifically, I focus on MaRS Innovations (MI) and its affiliate firms 
and public research hospitals, the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research (OICR) and the Fight 
Against Cancer Innovation Trust (FACIT), Johnson & Johnson’s incubator space JLABS @ 
Toronto and its affiliate firms, and the Structural Genomics Consortium (SGC). These 
organizations employ a variety of collaborative research arrangements and disclosure practices, 
ranging from the entirely open model of the SGC to the more proprietary commercialization tools 
and non-disclosure agreements favoured by the MaRs Innovations technology transfer office. This 
chapter incorporates interview data collected from interviewees from both the public and private 
sectors. Specifically, interviewees were drawn from MI and several of its affiliate firms, the OICR, 
FACIT, JLABS and one of its affiliate firms, the SGC, the University Health Network technology 
transfer office, the Princess Margaret Cancer Research Centre, Sunnybrook Research Institute, two 
leading law firms in Toronto, and one large pharmaceutical firm in the Toronto area. Participants 
included academic bench scientists, executives in the public and private sector, venture capitalists, 
IP lawyers, IP directors, patent agents, tech transfer officers, and innovation managers from these 
organizations. These interviews have been anonymized and participants are identified by their title 
only. 
This chapter begins by unpacking and analyzing the various framings of innovation 
encountered in both the literature and interviews conducted as part of this research. Here I 
endeavour to unpack the numerous and varying definitions provided in both the innovations studies 
literature and by interviewees, and evaluate how these definitions are shaped and change 
depending on the location of the actor within a particular techno-economic network. Following 
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that, I discuss the ways in which innovation is (mis)measured, focusing on the use of patent 
statistics and other macro-level means of quantifying innovativeness. Subsequently, I briefly 
discuss the drivers of pharmaceutical R&I in Toronto’s pharmaceutical innovation ecosystem, 
assessing the relationship between the lack of public funding for research in Canada and the 
consequent profit-driven nature of research. Finally, I discuss at length the funding and 
commercialization of R&I in this sector. This section focuses on the role of mediating devices in 
attracting external investment as well as the ways in which these devices affect the 
commercialization of new technologies. 
 
5.1. Defining Innovation 
As discussed in Chapter Two, a major factor contributing to the disjointedness of innovation 
studies as a standalone field is the conflicting definitions of innovation offered by its scholars 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2009).  The term itself has become essentially a “hairball that sticks to 
everything,” as a senior administrator of a large research hospital in Toronto noted (VP Research, 
2017). The ambiguity of the term, its ubiquity and frequent use as a catchall meaning nothing and 
everything, pose significant problems for both policymakers attempting to guide the innovation 
process and firms seeking clarity of purpose. Collaboration may also be hindered by vague or 
discordant understandings of innovation, particularly in terms of clarifying mission orientation 
(Ziman, 2002) and differentiating between products and processes. Moreover, having a clear 
understanding of what innovation represents is necessary in assessing the innovativeness of a 
particular firm, research group, or collaborative arrangement. This section will unpack the varying 
definitions of innovation found in the innovation studies literature as well as those offered by 
interviewees. 
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In a broad review of the innovation studies literature, Quintane et al. (2011) have divided 
common definitions of innovation into two primary categories, wherein innovation is determined 
to be either a process or an outcome. Innovation as a process essentially involves bringing new 
modes of problem solving into practice (ibid). In the innovation studies literature, the notion of 
innovation as a process entails “the development and implementation of new ideas by people who 
over time engage in transactions with others within an institutional order” (Van de Ven, 1986: 
590). It is “a highly uncertain process in which entrepreneurs, with financial support from 
investors, undertake a sequence of events over an extended period of time to transform a novel 
idea into an implemented reality” (Van de Ven and Polley, 1992: 92). Birkinshaw et al. (2008) 
define the process of innovation as “the invention and implementation of a management practice, 
process, structure, or technique that is new to the state of the art and is intended to further 
organizational goals” (p. 825).  
Conversely, innovation as an outcome generally results in the development of an asset with 
some commercial value. It has been articulated as “an invention which has reached market 
introduction in the case of a new product, or first use in a production process, in the case of a 
process innovation” (Utterback, 1971: 77). Traditional definitions of innovation tend to vacillate 
between these two conceptualizations of innovation as either a process or an outcome, constituted 
by differing social processes that lead to the generation and implementation of an idea, or gauged 
by inherent features (e.g. novelty, technical versus administrative, incremental versus radical) 
(Quintane et al., 2011). As discussed below, the Quintane et al. (2011) propose a third definition 
of innovation as a knowledge-based conceptualization, arguing that innovation is essentially the 
production of new knowledge (ibid: 938). 
One of the primary criticisms of innovation studies as a discipline, and the study of 
technological innovation more specifically, is the dominant (quantitative) framework of 
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neoclassical economics. Godin (2015) is particularly critical of Schumpterian innovation studies, 
arguing that the field has constructed a tradition of understanding innovation as the 
commercialization of technical inventions, focusing almost exclusively on firms, rather than 
examining innovation as a cultural force affecting social, political, and economic thought. Recall, 
Schumpeter (1942) argued that innovation extended beyond simply creating a new business to 
creating a new product or process or a new market for an existing product or process. Old or 
inferior products and services across markets and industries were subsequently replaced through 
“the “gale of creative destruction” (ibid). This understanding of innovation as a profit-building 
means to a technological end is evident in the interview data gathered in this research. One 
interviewee, the VP of Research and Innovation at a large research hospital in Toronto, defined 
innovation as “discovery to clinical impact through the medical marketplace” (VP Research, 
2017). Similarly, another participant, the President and CEO of a small biologics firm, stated 
“innovation is basically taking an idea and turning it into a useful entity, a useful thing” (President 
and CEO, 2017). Likewise, the CEO of second small biologics firm argued innovation should be 
defined by its outcome, specifically as it relates to patent filings. He noted, 
In many ways innovation is not distinguishable from applied research, and I also 
would make the point that in many cases, maybe not every time, but in many cases, 
filing a patent application could be defined as the fruit of innovation… It’s got to be 
useful, I mean, that’s core of the definition of innovation. It has to be useful for a real 
world problem, and I don’t think you can parse that from the definition of innovation, 
that is at its core. That you’ve innovated when you’ve created something that’s useful 
to somebody… And the reason I think patenting links so well [to that definition of 
innovation] is that…it has to have utility, it has to have usefulness, it has to have 
industrial applicability. You can’t patent something if it doesn’t meet those criteria. 
And that’s why I think the two are actually quite way more closely linked than people 
say. But you cannot remove the usefulness from either the patent process or the 
definition of innovation (CEO, 2017).  
 
These definitions suggest that at the end of the innovation process there is necessarily something 
usable, whether that is a marketable product or a new technology. Understanding innovation as a 
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process leading to a product is logical in the context of private industry, where tangible deliverables 
are often a benchmark of productivity and growth.  
However, moving beyond the fold of industry, the term becomes more abstract and fluid. In 
highlighting the link between the processes and outcomes of innovation, Quintaine et al. (2011) 
assert that both fall under the umbrella of knowledge production. Stemming from this, they define 
innovation simply as new knowledge, characterised by its duplicability, its demonstrated 
usefulness, and the novelty of its introduction (ibid). It is in the same way that Dosi (1988) defines 
innovation as a process of discovery and creation occurring via continuous change (e.g. progress 
along a technological trajectory) and radical change (e.g. with the emergence of a new 
technological paradigm). When asked, a senior research scientist working at a large incubator lab 
in Toronto stated: 
Innovation means something new, something out of nothing. It has something that's 
creating new knowledge, answering previously unanswered questions… To 
immediately skip to the end of the process and look for the marketability or the 
exploitability of the idea, I don't think, personally, that's what the word means. I'm 
willing to take a more broad definition that something can be innovative and have 
absolutely no application. Something can be completely academic and still be 
innovative. Who's to say that it has to have utility? (Senior Research Scientist, 2017).  
 
Similarly, another research scientist working in the same incubator lab recalled a colleague 
discussing a biotech firm he had owned in the late 1990s. The company: 
…used to be very research intensive and decided to cut all of its in-house R&D, and 
instead said that they were going to focus more on innovation and less on research. 
And this is a discussion that he had had a number of times where he told me that he 
fundamentally thought that was the death of his company, because they stopped 
generating new knowledge and they thought that innovation was something that they 
could enlist, something that they could buy. And the point being that for a company 
that used to be known for its R&D, that was the nail in the coffin (Research Scientist, 
2017). 
 
Likewise, a research scientist and executive of one of Toronto’s research hospitals defined 
innovation as: 
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Taking what we know and organizing it to do something that we have never done 
before or never done in that way before… I think that it’s a continuum, that you can’t 
have innovation without discovery or insight; [innovation] is eventually downstream 
of all discovery (Research Scientist, 2017) 
 
In arguing against the notion of innovation as necessarily resulting in a usable asset, the Director 
of Intellectual Property at a large non-profit organization highlighted the need for pharmaceutical 
innovations to be paradigm shifting, pointing out that: 
Much of what is considered innovative now, in terms of FDA approval, isn’t really 
game changing… I think to be truly innovative, you [must] have a discovery that gets 
to the clinic that is actually game changing, it isn’t this incremental extra month of 
life with no increase in quality of life, which is what a lot of these approved drugs 
are doing. So those who are making money from [the product] might see that as 
innovative, because they get some capture of market share. But to be truly innovative, 
you’re doing something different and I think it should be game-changing (Director 
of Intellectual Property, 2017). 
 
Further, they noted that innovation tends to happen incrementally, and conceptualizing innovation 
in biotech from an outcome- or product-based perspective ignores the incremental but impactful 
steps that lead to paradigm-shifting discoveries. Often, building upon each step is collaborative 
effort, they noted, “because science is difficult, biology is tricky, and we have to figure out all 
these other smaller pieces first, so those incremental pieces are actually what make [the end result] 
work, and those are going to be huge but they might not seem as big as that final product” (2017). 
Similarly, Obstfeld (2005) defines innovation as “a process of creating new social connections 
between people and resources they carry, so as to produce novel combinations” (p.100). These 
definitions suggest innovation stems from new ways of thinking and collaborating, rather than just 
producing. Here, if scientific R&I is an aggregate process of producing new knowledge (Jones, 
2009), it is logical that innovation would involve a process of collaboration, and knowledge 
production and accumulation from the perspective of the research scientist working upstream. 
The purpose of this section is not to define innovation as an immutable concept but rather to 
highlight the ambiguity of the term in practice. It is frequently used in distinct contexts, meant to 
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describe both tangible and intangible things. Distinguishing between definitions of the term – what 
it means, to whom, and why – is critical for understanding the effects of mediating devices on 
innovation itself. 
 
5.2. Measuring the Value of Innovation 
Given that the concept of innovation itself has proven to be ambiguous and context-
dependent, by extension measuring and valuating innovation has also proven to be difficult. What 
qualitative and/or quantitative metrics indicate innovation has occurred or that an innovative 
process has had a positive effect on firm performance or maximized competitive advantage? If a 
novel pharmaceutical compound has been patented and becomes the knowledge base for a start-
up company, but the start-up has not grown over a given period of time, is it less innovative than 
one that has? This section focuses on the valuation of R&I, focusing particularly on the role of IP 
tools in determining whether or not a new innovation holds (financial) value. A recurring point of 
discussion in both the innovation studies literature as well as the interview data collected here is 
the mismeasurement of innovation via patent statistics, and the conflation of patents and 
innovation. As will be discussed, the majority of interviewees cited innovation metrics that 
extended beyond the quantitative scope of patent statistics to a more complex process of worth 
attribution that incorporates labour, market growth, monetary inflow, and consumer base. 
As discussed above, there is a tendency to understand innovation as the development of an 
asset with some commercial value. Stemming from this, patent counts at the firm, industry, or 
country level are often cited as a reliable measure of innovative output (Hall, 2013). Even in 
discussions of innovation as an intangible process, patents are used as proxy measures. As 
Griliches (1990) notes, considering the lack of consensus surrounding the concept of innovation, 
patent statistics “loom up as a mirage of wonderful plenitude and objectivity. They are available, 
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they are by definition related to inventiveness, and they are based on what appears to be an 
objective and only slowly changing standard” (p. 1661). The OECD cites patent statistics as a 
quantitative means of capturing a firm or country’s contributions to innovation and growth, in 
addition to “innovation strategies and performance; enterprise dynamics, including the drivers of 
enterprise creation and of mergers and acquisitions; the determinants of productivity; financing 
innovative enterprises; the output of R&D activities and the returns to R&D investments; R&D 
depreciation; and the output of universities and public research organizations” (OECD, 2015: 87). 
Stemming from this, the Director of a Toronto-based international research consortium argued that 
patent statistics do not necessarily correlate with innovation at the firm- or country-level, and that 
connection presumes that a requirement to innovate is to be able to exclude others from using that 
innovation (Director, 2017). Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have also argued that patents may 
actually hinder innovation, while Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) found that patent quality is 
inversely proportional to research productivity. Moreover, Pravitt (1988), highlights three sources 
of bias inherent in patent statistics: firstly, the differences across countries in the economic costs 
and benefits of patents, as well as the rigor of patent application reviews, size of market, and 
varying subject matter coverage; secondly, the differences among technologies and sectors in the 
importance of patents as protection against imitation; and finally, the differences among firms in 
their propensity to patent, particularly unimportant innovations.  
Unsurprisingly, then, few interview participants listed patents as their primary metric of 
innovation, and several noted the common mismeasurement of innovation via biotech patents 
specifically. As one CEO of a small biologics firm pointed out, while patents do not necessarily 
indicate that a tangible innovative outcome has occurred, “in drug discovery, in the context of 
pharmacotherapy, they’re not meant to... [Patents are] basically a signpost, a milestone toward 
achieving that goal. There’s no direct link, nor is there meant to be a direct link, between a patent 
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and actually generating revenue” (CEO, 2017). The Director of Intellectual Property at a large 
non-profit organization highlighted the misleading nature of using patents to measure innovation, 
noting: 
We could file [for a patent] on everything we see and show a pretty nice number, but 
what is that translating into? …How many of those patents are turning into licensable 
products or company creation opportunities with some sustainability? What is the 
average value of each license transaction and have you followed those licenses to 
product development? So what – when you’ve followed five years out, how many of 
those licenses are becoming products? I can tell you we’ve had to terminate a couple 
licenses recently because they’ve just been sitting on shelves at companies (Director 
of Intellectual Property, 2017). 
 
What, then, constitutes a suitable metric of innovation in the biotech sector? Most participants 
argued practical determinants of innovation would demonstrate long-term growth (of a start-up, 
for instance) and/or efficacy of a new technology or process. The Director of a tech transfer office 
at a university in Toronto argued: 
The best way to define [innovation] is by who’s using the technology, like the end 
customers, how many of them are using it, how pervasive is the technology within that 
industry and obviously from a monetary perspective is it generating revenue, so are people 
willing to pay for it. If the innovation is being used by a lot of customers or a lot of end 
users and it’s generating money, to me that’s an impactful innovation right there. All the 
other numbers don’t matter (Director, 2017). 
 
Several participants also cited the number of start-up companies stemming from an innovative 
product or process as a more appropriate measure of innovation. A Business Development Director 
of a large incubator lab in Toronto emphasized the importance of focusing on longitudinal metrics: 
Start-ups should also be something of a weighted number, so you should be looking at 
the number of companies you create per annum and the number of people who are 
employed by those companies. You should be looking for a change over time, right? 
If you create a one- or two-person company and ten years later you still have a one- or 
two-person company, you've failed to innovate. That’s absolutely the worst thing. It 
shows that you didn’t have enough momentum to actually do anything. But if you start 
out this year and create a one- or two-person company and next year when you checked 
in again, you’ve got a ten-person company, and the next year a 50-person company 
then you did something significant (Director of Business Development, 2017). 
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Similarly, the Director of a technology transfer office at a large non-profit organization argued in 
favour of measuring innovation by: 
The number of start-up companies created around all this technology… And then we 
ideally want to take it one-step further, which is the companies that are created, are 
they selling [their] product, …does the technology get integrated into the receptor’s 
business, are they making money, are they growing their business and are they hiring 
people (Director, 2017). 
 
In terms of bringing innovative technologies or processes to the market or growing new 
businesses, innovation may also be measured monetarily or by the contribution of an innovation 
to an ecosystem (e.g. via either human or financial capital). The Director of Intellectual Property 
and Commercialization at a provincial business trust noted that money brought in from the private 
sector to support research commercialization was used as an important indicator that innovative 
R&D was occurring at its partner organization. They explained: 
The model has been that technologies here [in Toronto] get licensed off to U.S. 
multinationals, or start-up companies get going in Ontario and then they’re sold and 
they move to the U.S. or occasionally Europe. One of the purposes of [this trust] 
actually is to try to help grow the local ecosystem for innovation in biotechnology. 
And in our group, one of the metrics we look at is how much cash comes in but also 
how many jobs are created at biotech and biomedical start-ups, there’s several hundred 
right now that are directly attributable to our investment... When we deal with an 
investor like a venture capitalist or a potential partner like a farm company…they want 
to know you know, when did you apply for patent protection? We want to see your 
patent applications. We want to know about any public disclosures (Director of 
Intellectual Property and Commercialization, 2017). 
 
These quotes suggest firstly that prior to measuring innovativeness, innovations are understood in 
the context of networks and ecosystems as a tangible thing – an innovative new technology that 
attracts investment from external stakeholders, or a technology around which a start-up is created, 
and jobs are grown. Secondly, they suggest that measuring innovativeness of a new product or 
process extends beyond the use of fundamental quantitative metrics (namely patent statistics) and 
involves a more complex process of worth attribution that incorporates labour, market growth, 
monetary inflow, consumer base and so on. Measuring the worth of innovativeness also means 
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examining the pervasiveness of a new technology (or process), its tendency to improve over time 
(lowering user costs, for instance), and its capacity to make it easier to invent new products and 
processes (Mazzucato, 2013). 
As Chiapello (2015) notes, the process of worth attribution is increasingly financialized, and 
value is often qualified in terms of returns on investment. More specifically, Chiappetta and Birch 
(2018) note that unpacking how value is understood and managed, and by whom, is critical when 
attempting to conceptualize and measure innovation in the bio-economy. Evaluating non-
proprietary innovations and demonstrating the concrete value of upstream research, such as in the 
case of the Structural Genomics Consortium, becomes especially difficult for researchers seeking 
external investment. How does the SGC convince investors of the value of its unpatented, publicly 
available research byproducts? While this will be addressed in Chapter Six, of relevance here is 
the question of whether open innovation (especially non-proprietary innovations) can be evaluated 
using the same criteria as patented innovations. Using the OECD’s (2015) logic that patented 
innovations translate to greater technological and economic value, does open innovation generate 
less value by extension? Patents provide what is typically seen as an objective metric of 
inventiveness (Griliches, 1990). For investors or potential partners, then, research across all stages 
of the innovation process (including non-proprietary and intangible assets) is increasingly 
evaluated in terms of financialized or monetary reasoning (Birch et al., 2017). Here, Birch (2017) 
highlights the key role played by investors, business development managers, venture capitalists 
and others determining the value of new biotechnologies. As will be discussed in section 5.4. of 
this chapter, given that value is so frequently qualified in terms of returns on investment, mediating 
devices play a singularly critical role in constituting the value of R&I. 
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5.3. Drivers of Research and Innovation 
Understanding the factors that determine how innovation is (e)valuated goes hand-in-hand 
with understanding the drivers of R&I. Stemming from that, unpacking the values that drive 
scientific innovation offers (in part) an explanatory basis for understanding the roles of different 
mediating devices employed in pharmaceutical development. This section seeks to briefly discuss 
the drivers behind R&I in Toronto’s innovation ecosystem, focusing particularly on the profit 
motives behind industry engagement with academic endeavours. 
Numerous governmental policy reports have cited a range of drivers for R&I, from 
increasing the communal stock of knowledge to developing novel biotechnologies for social and 
economic gains to creating competitive innovation hubs that attract capital. These reports tend to 
vaguely highlight the importance of innovation as a catalyst for “a thriving middle class and 
open[ing] the country to new economic, social and environmental possibilities” (Government of 
Canada, 2016). By extension, supporting R&I is generally seen as a means of engendering national 
economic growth. For example, the US National Science Foundation’s (NSF) strategic plan for 
fiscal years 2018–2022 explicitly cites funding scientific R&I as a means of harnessing knowledge 
to enhance economic competitiveness (NSF, 2018). Likewise, the UK Research and Innovation 
Council unambiguously states that economic growth and competitive advantage is increasingly 
dependent on the production of new scientific knowledge (UKRI, 2018).  
While Canada may have a robust research environment, its ability to transform ideas into 
novel marketable products and business models lags significantly behind its counterparts – to the 
extent that Canada ranks 22nd among the OECD’s 34 member nations (Innovation Canada, 2018). 
Calls for strengthening Canada’s basic and applied research capabilities by increasing funding for 
public research institutes also simultaneously stress the importance of promoting partnerships 
between these research institutes and industry as a means of attracting “…global talent, investors 
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and leading companies. These partnerships will strengthen value chains by connecting Canadian 
suppliers to large anchor firms, accelerating the commercialization of ideas and expanding market 
access” (ibid: 5). The emphasis on scientific R&D as a driver of economic growth is evident from 
this policy perspective.  
From an industry perspective, prospective return on investment (ROI) is a primary motivator 
for investing in R&I and partnering with public research groups. Mediating devices play an 
important role here. Naturally, for organizations seeking to profit from R&I’s downstream 
products, ownership of intellectual property is critical. This tends to affect how collaborative 
partnerships are formed and what types of research agreements are created (i.e. as consortia, 
traditional arrangements with strict NDAs, through the use of stringent MTAs, etc.), particularly 
in the context of public-private arrangements. A research scientist and senior administrator of a 
large research hospital in Toronto acknowledged, “we’re coveting intellectual properties’ currency 
in interacting with the private sector, because that’s how the private sector makes money too” 
(Research Scientist, 2017). At the same time, interviewees working primarily in laboratory settings 
reiterated that profiting from R&I was not, in fact, a primary motivator for them. The same 
administrator also pointed out that “we do not do research with a view of commercializing it; we 
do research with a view to discovery, that’s the driver. So, it’s not money and commercialization. 
The motivation is not to make money, the motivation is to understand nature to help sick people” 
(Research Scientist, 2017).  
Likewise, for the Chief Scientist of a Toronto-based international research consortium “the 
motivation [behind research] is not to gain IP for the sake of IP. That's not the major motivator of 
most academics. It's discovery: biological and biomedical inquiry, trying to make advances in 
science and human health” (Chief Scientist, 2017). While that consortium operates under a 
completely open business model, using only open IP tools and releasing all research biproducts 
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into the public domain, it is able to effectively partner with private industry as the fruits of that 
research facilitate new product development (and thus create an ROI for industry). The same 
scientist noted, “partner pharmaceutical companies don't make any money from [our research]. 
They just want to get the molecule out there for researchers to use down the line” (Chief Scientist, 
2017).  
From an industry perspective, ROI is an obvious motivator for helping to facilitate research 
at all stages of the innovation process, by providing seed funding, physical space, consulting and 
insight, and so on. As a tech transfer officer at a non-profit research institute in Toronto pointed 
out: 
If a researcher’s motivation is really to impact patients worldwide, then to a great 
extent the best way of doing that, as long as they’ve developed something that’s 
commercializable, is actually make it into a product. The only way to do that is to 
license it to either a start up company or an existing company and for them to then 
invest…more than what was done originally in the research side to turn it into a real 
product (Tech Transfer Officer, 2017). 
 
Moreover, the President and CEO of a small biologics firm stated, “it’s really for-profit entities 
that generate the vast majority of drugs and a lot of people don’t understand that. And …there 
needs to be a profit motive there for entrepreneurs and industry to…spend the huge amount of 
money required to develop new drugs” (President and CEO, 2017). What can be inferred from this 
is that ROI remains a motivator for industry support of R&I of the innovation process, even further 
upstream where application value is less certain. Public/private partnerships, such as in the case of 
many of the collaborative partnerships between academic researchers and industry at MaRS 
Innovations or the OICR, are formed on a contingency basis where funding is provided with the 
understanding that industry will have an option or first right of refusal on the IP produced. By 
extension, the option to commercialize (and profit) from R&I remains the primary motivator for 
industry R&I (Lezuan and Montgomery, 2015). As the CEO of one of Toronto’s largest non-profit 
research organizations noted, “We cannot expect any company driven by financial returns to be 
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overly altruistic” (CEO, 2017). As will be discussed in the following section, profit motive also 
explains (in part) the reluctance of industry to employ open devices in R&D where IP ownership 
is key to competitive advantage.  
 
5.4. Funding and Commercializing Research and Innovation 
As discussed at length in Chapter Two, scientific R&D has been affected significantly by 
the spread of neoliberal principles, and characterized by a growing entanglement of science and 
capitalism. This entanglement has resulted in R&D becoming progressively more commodified, 
commercialized, and privatized (Lave et al., 2010). Science has become inherently linked to 
national prosperity, and the value of research and its byproducts is qualified in terms of returns on 
investment (Chiapello, 2015). The extension of neoliberal values further upstream has coincided 
with a decrease of public funding for scientific research and a growing alignment of research 
agendas with commercial interests (Lave et al., 2010). This section focuses on the ways in which 
mediating devices affect funding and investment decisions, and by extension the commercial 
viability of R&I. As will be discussed, the ability to extract value from new innovations is a 
primary factor affecting funding decisions, and is affected largely by the mediating devices 
employed in contract negotiations, research agreements, and other financial transactions. 
Stephan (2012) notes that while economic growth is fuelled by upstream research, this 
research is generally years away from leading to new products. Given its high level of risk and 
uncertainty and potentially low level of appropriability, as well as the high costs and time 
associated with commercializing upstream discoveries, attracting (private) funding for early-stage 
research is particularly difficult. Recall, it costs roughly USD$1-1.5 billion per NCE, from initial 
laboratory target discovery through clinical trials and including all other ancillary costs such as 
advertising and salaries (Collins, 2011). In terms of opportunity costs, diseases with large target 
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populations (such as diabetes or chronic hypertension) offer investors and manufacturers a greater 
opportunity to earn a higher return on their investment. Conversely, rare diseases with smaller 
target populations are extremely costly and have significantly longer ROI rates (Gassmann and 
Reepmeyer, 2005). As will be discussed, industry and private investors are thus less likely to 
provide risk capital for early stage sponsored research agreements, particularly in the case of R&D 
targeting rare diseases.  
One way to attract private investment is to employ proprietary IP tools that guarantee the 
byproducts of research have a period of market exclusivity – in essence, “a legal owner empowered 
to demand payment for [their] use” (Ziman, 2002: 335). Moreover, in the current neoliberal 
research paradigm, even the results of fundamental research can be a commodity, the value of 
which “depends entirely on the context in which it is transferred from the vendor to the customer” 
(ibid). By ensuring exclusionary rights, impeding competitors, and monopolizing specific markets 
for a period of time, patents help to realize profits that will repay (and hopefully surpass) the high 
costs of drug development, marketing, and distribution (Scherer, 2002). In addition to patents, 
proprietary licensing structures such as material transfer agreements (MTA) or reach-through 
license agreements (RTLA) allow the licensee to seek rents from new research tools that are used 
to create products further downstream, often extending for periods well beyond patent terms and 
netting rents that far exceed the initial cost of development (Jones et al., 2007). Like patents, the 
use of MTAs and RTLAs guarantees an ROI particularly in cases where tools (versus products) 
are being developed, such as in the case of high throughput screening technologies, cell lines, and 
reagents (ibid). 
Interview data suggests that an ROI was the primary motivator for investors, and those 
seeking sponsored research agreements articulated the importance of proprietary IP tools in 
securing that investment. The need to seek out these sponsored research agreements (and by 
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extension, to create proprietary barriers around new R&I) stems from the lack of public funding 
for translational R&I in Canada.3 The President and CEO of a small biologics firm articulated this 
dilemma as such: 
 
I think there should be more taxpayer dollars available for for-profit entities that do 
that exclusivity. You know what do taxpayers want, they want cures for cancer. Well 
those don’t come out of universities so what are you going to do? I think the 
[Canadian Institutes for Health Research] should be putting more money into small 
for-profit entities that do have exclusivity. But the reality is that if you actually look 
at applied research or innovation in this country, there’s very little government 
money available for that – there’s none actually which is a problem, and that’s what 
I believe is one of the major problems we have in Canada and that’s why there’s so 
little innovation in this sector. It’s because there’s just no money to fund them. 
There’s an imbalance between the amount of funding that goes to basic research 
versus innovation… The only way you’re really going to stimulate innovation, at 
least in biotech and drug discovery, is…there needs to be more public dollars brought 
to there to get firms off the ground, and until then we need private funding (President 
and CEO, 2017).  
 
Similarly, the VP of Research and Innovation at one of Toronto’s research hospitals highlighted 
the detrimental effect of both the lack of public funding for R&I in Canada and the consequent 
reliance of researchers on private funds, stating: 
The public purse has to make a more material investment in early stage technologies 
than we currently are full stop, otherwise when we’re brokering our licensing 
agreements or our start-ups to the private sector. And that money, once the asset has 
been sufficiently de-risked, will disappear from the Canadian landscape. And all of 
the monies invested in it until that point have been, I don’t want to say wasted because 
at the end of the day [a new drug] ultimately will benefit humanity, but it sure won’t 
benefit Canada’s GDP (VP Research and Innovation, 2017). 
 
In the case of these sponsored research agreements or collaborative public-private 
partnerships, the investor secures their ROI either from royalties from patents or other proprietary 
licensing structures (or both, in the case of products with stacked royalties), or from investors 
 
3 For reference, the Canadian Government’s 2018 R&D budget allocated $9.8 billion over five years for scientific R&I 
(translating to roughly $1.96 billion per year) (Science and Economic Development Canada, 2018). It costs roughly 
$55 million annually to run technology transfer offices across the country with a return of $62 million, for a net 
revenue of $7 million on a $1.96 billion annual budget (De Baere and Maine, 2018). 
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obtaining equity in a start-up. The CEO of a small biologics start-up noted most of the relationships 
his firm had formed with larger industry players “[were] done on a contingency basis. So the idea 
is they give us money and they have an option or a first right refusal on any intellectual property 
that is created” (CEO, 2017). Profit motive also appears to be inherently linked to proprietary IP 
devices, namely in that they grant market exclusivity and by extension the ability to extract value 
(Lezuan and Montgomery, 2015). The Director of an industry liaison office at a university in 
Toronto noted potential industry partners are almost entirely profit driven:  
Their mandate is coming from a board of directors that's saying we need to compete 
so we can make as much money as possible. That proprietary IP allows them to create 
a barrier [between them and competitors]. So, the big companies on one side are 
saying we need to be competitive. The researchers on the other side are saying we 
just want to get this technology out into the real world. They're happy following the 
process of patenting or whatever it may be (Director, 2017). 
 
Likewise, the Director of a technology transfer at one of Toronto’s research hospitals stated 
explicitly that “all the industry money that is coming to the hospital through licenses or sponsored 
research agreements would likely disappear…if the companies that are providing that money don’t 
have some level of proprietary right” (Director, 2017). In this context, proprietary IP offers the 
promise of competitive advantage that incentivizes investment and collaboration. Highlighting the 
lack of public funding for R&I in Canada and the consequent necessity of seeking private 
investment for new research ventures, the CEO of a small biologics start-up pointed out the 
increasing difficulty in distinguishing entrepreneurship from innovation. He argued the profit 
motive that currently drives a significant portion of R&I in Canada means there’s an added 
commercial rationale to research. Moreover, they noted:  
 
It’s become difficult to parse entrepreneurship from innovation. There’s a reason that 
so few drugs come out of universities, and that’s …90% 95%, whatever of drugs that 
are launched come from industry and not universities. And it’s because you need to 
have that profit motive, you need to have entrepreneurship at the core of that work. 
But to the extent that this needs to be supported by investment, you can’t get away 
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from that profit now; you can’t get away from the need to have the competitive 
advantage over other third parties (CEO, 2017). 
 
The dearth of public funding for R&I in Canada has certainly made room for profit motives to 
become a primary driver of pharmaceutical development, despite public research institutes actively 
participating in the commercialization process. Sponsored research agreements have become 
imperative to moving upstream research towards commercialization, and by extension proprietary 
IP devices have become increasingly prevalent further upstream. 
From the perspective of investors, profit motives are a given, and non-proprietary IP devices 
are a nonstarter in terms of incentivizing investment and collaboration. Confirming this, the CEO 
of one of Toronto’s largest non-profit research organizations stated: “I can tell you beyond any 
doubt, no matter what people tell you – that they can take a idea and run with it all the way to the 
finish line, which is launching a product to the market – we will not invest unless it is well protected 
and we have a proprietary position on it” (CEO, 2017). Similarly, and perhaps more explicitly, the 
CEO of a medium-sized pharmaceutical firm headquartered in Toronto stated: “I don't really care 
that people think that it's stupid to be money-driven. That's the way the world works. You have 
money that drives decision-making and if we wanted to help people in Africa we need the money 
to do that. Good thoughts don't get you anywhere” (CEO, 2017). These quotes suggest not only 
that non-proprietary IP devices are a deterrent in terms of investing in R&D, but also confirm that, 
as per Abboud et al. (2013), the motivation to fund research for drugs with small target populations 
is low, as the financial incentives to do so are negligible.4  
 
4 Rare diseases present an interesting case here. As discussed in Chapter Two, small drug target populations make 
recouping the cost of development more difficult for firms (Abboud et al., 2013). A study by Sarpatwari et al. (2018) 
found that the upward trend in approvals for drugs targeting rare diseases in recent years has less to do with the market 
exclusivity granted by patents (aided in large part by the US Orphan Drug Act of 1983), and instead found that firms 
are incentivized to target rare diseases due in large part to the opportunity to charge higher prices for new products 
that tackle unmet patient needs. Moreover, firms were also found to be incentivized by tax credits for development 
costs (ibid).  
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While proprietary IP tools offer the opportunity for investors to earn royalties, acquiring an 
equity stake in a startup “may afford more latitude for risk taking and deferred exits” (Fernandez 
et al., 2012: 965). As investments in early stage technologies are difficult to valuate due to their 
“inherent, high level of both technical and market uncertainty,” equity investments are a safer, 
timelier option for recouping ROI (Baldi et al., 2015: 226). More simply, taking an equity stake in 
a company provides a less risky path to earning their ROI than does the opportunity to earn 
royalties from a patent (for instance), as a large percentage of patented technologies do not make 
it to market (Pisano, 2006). The Director of Intellectual Property and Commercialization at a 
provincial business trust summarized this logic as such: 
 
If we’re putting money into a researcher’s lab at a university or hospital, …if it’s a 
large amount of money, we usually ask for a small percentage royalty. If that IP ever 
goes on to become a product, a small amount comes back to us. That’s a very long 
process, of course. More often, especially with the larger amounts of money, we’re 
investing in start-up companies, so we’re either taking equity and we own 20% of the 
company or 10% of the company with a bunch of other people, or we’ll put in some 
debt which converts. So basically we loan you a million dollars, and when you get 
financed, that loan turns into shares. Or you can pay us back, but people don’t like to 
pay back, they just convert to shares. That way, the end result is the same. We own a 
chunk of the company. And that works out well for us, because you don’t have to 
wait until you get a product at the end. That product may raise some money, it may 
raise some more money, it will get diluted down, but at some point the company’s 
going to be bought out or go public. Usually these days it’s bought out. And the 
outside investor comes in with a premium, buys up all the shares, and you get a return 
on your investment. So if we were buying our shares at a dollar a share and then an 
investor offers $4 a share, everyone sells and everyone makes money. And then we 
take that money and put it into our next investment. Having a piece of start-ups works 
out much better. It’s a much shorter timeline than getting a royalty… And as you 
know, a lot of drugs and devices never make it to market, so that royalty is always in 
jeopardy until the thing’s actually on the market, whereas if you can get in and out 
of a start-up company in a few years, you can make money even if at the very end 
the product fails. You just don’t want to be the last one holding the bag (Director of 
Intellectual Property and Commercialization, 2017). 
 
This suggests that the option to take an equity stake in a startup as a means of maximizing ROI 
from new business transactions is another incentive for established firms to invest in R&I. Even 
in the context of this non-profit provincial trust, where funds are being funnelled directly into 
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university labs and academic spinoffs, investment decisions hinge largely on financial incentives. 
The same Director also noted mitigating risk was a central component of these considerations: 
 
I’m putting in all this money, I want to know what are the risks that I’m not going to 
get it back. One of the risks is that your invention, your technology, is going to get 
stolen, copied, somehow ripped off. And that’s a real risk. So, we consider that along 
with all the other risks, like the risk of bad management, the risk of capital markets, 
debt crises, the risk of a technology failure, things just don’t work out, government 
risk, the FDA comes up with new rules that cost a fortune – there’s all these risks that 
we’re looking at and trying to manage and reduce (Director of Intellectual Property 
and Commercialization, 2017). 
 
This implies, as Fernandez et al. (2012) suggest, that funding decisions are often motivated less by 
the desire to accelerate breakthrough discoveries or foster a more innovative ecosystem, than they 
are by business cycles and windows for conducting initial public-equity offerings (see also Birch, 
2016; Hopkins et al., 2013). This again raises questions previously discussed in this chapter 
regarding open mediating devices – how can they be employed as a means of facilitating 
innovation when external investment hinges so frequently on the opportunity to extract value from 
proprietary IP? How have consortiums such as the SGC been able to attract significant amounts of 
external private investment given its completely open business model and unpatented, publicly 
available research byproducts? Though proprietary devices may incentivize investment in R&I, do 
they truly facilitate innovation in the pharmaceutical sector? Understanding the motivations (and 
deterrents) behind R&I funding is necessary to understanding why particular mediating devices 
are used, by whom, and when.  
Significantly, what this interview data shows is that factors affecting the use of mediating 
devices such as patents, MTAs, or open licenses, extend beyond a research group’s immediate 
circumstances to the broader techno-economic network of which they are a part. More specifically, 
macro-level policy decisions regarding federal R&I budgets affect the mediating devices used in 
public-private research agreements and in academic tech transfer offices. Recall, Callon (1991) 
  
130 
defines the techno-economic network as “a coordinated set of heterogeneous actors…interact more 
or less successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse methods for generating goods and 
services” (133). Miller (2007) notes that these networks extend beyond simply a heterogeneous 
group of actors: “a whole set of intermediaries circulates among them. These [intermediaries] give 
material content to the links uniting the actors. They may be written documents, technical artefacts, 
human beings, or money” (710). Techno-economic networks have grown to include technology 
transfer offices, funding agencies, policymakers, venture capitalists, and so forth (Popp-Berman, 
2012), and have continued to increase in complexity given the interdisciplinary and data-
accelerated nature of contemporary R&I in the biological sciences.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the concept of a mediating instruments has been discussed at 
length in the accounting and economic sociology literature, largely in the context of the broad 
range of financial and economic models (Morrison and Morgan, 1999), instruments, metrics, and 
mechanisms related to practices of calculation, valuation, budgeting, and computation (Miller, 
1992; Miller and O’Leary, 1987). These instruments serve to mediate the interactions between 
science and economics, shaping the ways in which science is governed and regulated, as well as 
the means by which the products of R&I may be exchanged (Miller, 2007: 708; see also Power, 
1994). Others have similarly defined market devices as “the material and discursive assemblages 
that intervene in the construction of markets,” encompassing “analytical techniques to pricing 
models, …purchase settings to merchandising tools, …trading protocols to aggregate indicators” 
(Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, 2007: 2; see also Muniesa, 2007).  
As previously outlined, I expand the concept of intermediaries to include various forms of 
open and proprietary mechanisms (Chiappetta and Birch, 2018). I theorize these mechanisms as 
mediating devices, building on the premise that particular open and proprietary devices enable 
public and private research groups, government regulators and policymakers, and investors to 
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interact, collaborate, and bring commercialize innovative research. The interview data discussed 
above suggest that certain mediating devices – particularly patents, MTAs and RTLAs, and open 
licenses – are the linchpins in these techno-economic networks that enable collaboration, 
commercialization, and knowledge transfer, as well as the management of value in the 
development and commercialization of assets and products in the life sciences (ibid: 67). They 
play a critical role in configuring the organization and governance of R&I as well as in the 
valuation of its byproducts, and further dictate the ways in which research results are circulated 
and disparate groups collaborate. Moreover, they attach value to the interactions between actors in 
this particular techno-economic network (e.g. by stipulating potential royalties) (Birch et al., 
2017). The role of mediating devices is equally important in discussions of commercializing new 
technologies, particularly as academia excels at discovery but not development and public-private 
partnerships become increasingly important as research is translated (Stephan, 2012). This will be 
discussed further in Chapter Seven in the context of broad upstream patents and the use of open 
devices downstream. 
This, then, leads to a discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions required to 
commercialize new pharmaceutical research. Based on the interview data discussed above, 
external investment hinges on the ability to recoup the costs of development and marketing, which 
is in turn determined by the proprietary nature of the mediating devices used in sponsored research 
agreements or public-private partnerships. Reiterating the importance of proprietary devices in the 
commercialization process, the VP of Research and Innovation at one of Toronto’s research 
hospitals stated: 
 
The most commonly used commercialization vehicle is licensing. So open [science] 
is nonsense, [R&D] becomes open as soon as we file the patent application, and in 
many cases we don’t file patent applications so it remains trade secret. Our goal is 
actually to commercialize – I want to commercialize for the betterment of patients 
but oh by the way, I’m not shy about making money, because that feeds back…into 
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the discovery engine. So, licensing agreements and material transfer agreements are 
currency (VP Research and Innovation, 2017). 
 
Beyond emphasizing the necessity of proprietary devices, interview participants also highlighted 
the detrimental effect of open devices on the commercialization of new products. A tech transfer 
officer at a large non-profit institute in Toronto articulated the issues associated with open devices 
when translating new assets from the lab to the market. They stated:  
 
Intellectual property is like the first [check] that we need to see before we even think 
of commercialisation. So we work heavily based on intellectual property and 
intellectual property alone primarily because the state at which we vet technologies 
is so early that it's considered actually pre-pre-seed. If there's any Copyleft in [a 
negotiation], it really screws things up our ability to market the product or even to 
commercialise it, because now we have to offer it as Copyleft too. So, that's 
problematic when we incorporate third party Copyleft into our [transactions]. I can't 
go to [a large biotech firm], offer them a piece of software to incorporate if that 
software is based on Copyleft work, because that means it's going to contaminate 
their whole platform and now they no longer can sell their platform. They have to 
offer it for free, too. It’s just not feasible commercially (Tech Transfer Officer, 2017).  
 
What can be extrapolated from this is that proprietary devices are considered the best vehicle for 
commercializing new assets. Miller and O’Leary (2007) have previously highlighted the means by 
which certain mediating instruments “…link science and the economy through acting on capital 
budgeting decisions, and in doing so how they contribute to the process of making markets,” where 
mediating instruments “refer to those practices that frame the capital spending decisions of 
individual firms and agencies, and that help to align them with investments made by other firms 
and agencies in the same or related industries” (p. 702). Stemming from this, I argue these 
mediating devices, as articulated above, similarly link science and the economy by constituting the 
ways in which knowledge and information are circulated and in which disparate groups 
collaborate. Moreover, by attaching value to the interactions between actors within techno-
economic networks and regulating how value may be appropriated from the products of these 
interactions, these devices are fundamental to either accelerating or hindering innovation and the 
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commercialization of new technologies (Lezuan and Montgomery, 2015). As will be discussed 
further in the next chapter, distinguishing between the development and commercialization of tools 
versus products is critical to understanding in which contexts and at which points in the innovation 
process open devices may in fact be the best vehicles for developing new assets, in contrast to the 
proprietary devices discussed above. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the concept of innovation – how it is defined, how it is measured, 
what motivates actors in Toronto’s R&I ecosystem to innovate, and what factors affect its funding 
and commercialization. Section 5.1. endeavoured to evaluate the numerous and varying definitions 
provided in both the innovations studies literature and by interviewees, and evaluate how these 
definitions are shaped and change depending on the location of the actor within a particular techno-
economic network. The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the ambiguity of the concept of 
innovation, and discuss the ways in which the definition of the term changes from the perspective 
of research scientists, executives, IP managers and so forth. As outlined by Quintane et al. (2011), 
understandings of innovation in both the innovation studies literature and amongst interview 
participants fell into three categories of processes, outcomes, and new knowledge. 
Section 5.2. evaluated the ways in which innovation is (mis)measured, focusing on the use 
of patent statistics and other macro-level means of quantifying innovativeness. Interview data 
suggested that patent statistics are a misleading but easy quantitative metric of productivity, and 
further that measuring the innovativeness of a new product or process extends beyond the use of 
quantitative metrics (namely patent statistics) and involves a more complex process of technology 
pervasiveness and worth attribution that incorporates labour, market growth, monetary inflow, 
consumer base and so on. 
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Section 5.3. briefly discuss the drivers of pharmaceutical R&I in Toronto’s innovation 
ecosystem, and in particular the relationship between the lack of public funding for research in 
Canada and the consequent profit-driven nature of research. What can be inferred from the 
interview data discussed is that ROI remains a motivator for industry support of R&I along the 
innovation spectrum, even further upstream where application value is less certain and commercial 
relevance is unclear. Public-private partnerships and research agreements are formed on a 
contingency basis where funding is provided with the understanding that industry will have an 
option or first right of refusal on the IP produced. Simply, the option to commercialize (and profit) 
from R&I remains the primary motivator for industry-funded R&I. 
Finally, section 5.4. discussed at length the funding and commercialization of R&I in this 
sector, focusing specifically on the role of mediating devices in attracting external investment as 
well as the ways in which these devices affect the commercialization of new technologies. The 
data discussed in this section suggests that funding decisions are often motivated less by the desire 
to accelerate breakthrough discoveries or foster a more innovative ecosystem, than they are by 
business cycles and windows for conducting initial public-equity offerings. Moreover, what is 
clear from this data is that proprietary devices are the best vehicle for commercializing new assets, 
though as will be discussed they may hinder innovation in large collaborative arrangements. 
Additionally, factors affecting the use of mediating devices such as patents, MTAs, or open 
licenses, extend beyond a researcher group’s immediate circumstances to the broader techno-
economic network of which they are a part. More specifically, macro-level comprehensive policy 
decisions regarding federal R&I budgets affect the mediating devices used in public-private 
research agreements and in academic tech transfer offices. 
The chapter will focus on the architecture of pharmaceutical R&I in Canada, specifically as 
it relates to the use of open and proprietary mediating devices. Further, it will discuss the role of 
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these mediating devices in shaping collaborative efforts within and between the intermediaries at 
hand. 
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6. Mediating Devices and the Architecture of Research and Innovation 
 
A central feature of the techno-networks outlined by Callon (1993) are intermediaries, which 
referred to “anything passing between actors that defines the relationship between them” (Miller 
and O’Leary, 2007: 709-710). These intermediaries, referred to in this dissertation as mediating 
devices, form a central component of research and innovation in the pharmaceutical sector; I argue 
that they are inherently embedded in the architecture of R&I. Elsewhere, Miller and O’Leary 
(2007) have outlined the means by which certain devices “link science and the economy through 
acting on capital budgeting decisions, and in doing so how they contribute to the process of making 
markets” (p. 702). In this context, they are referring to “those practices that frame the capital 
spending decisions of individual firms and agencies, and that help to align them with investments 
made by other firms and agencies in the same or related industries” (ibid). Here, I argue that 
mediating devices similarly act on techno-economic networks by constituting the ways through 
which knowledge and information are circulated and in which disparate groups collaborate. More 
specifically, I argue that mediating devices configure the ways in which actors within these 
networks collaborate and transfer knowledge across institutional boundaries, for instance by 
subjecting collaborative agreements to lengthy and onerous legal conditions or by hindering 
knowledge transfer via significant administrative bottlenecks at university technology transfer 
offices (TTOs).  
This chapter addresses research question 2: Which proprietary and open devices are used in 
pharmaceutical R&I? For whom, and why? Specifically, I focus on specific mediating devices in 
the context of the broader architecture of research and innovation. I first discuss material transfer 
agreements (MTAs) as they relate to academic TTOs, emphasizing the difficulties and costs 
associated with executing MTAs and the impact of these costs on pharmaceutical research and 
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innovation. Secondly, I discuss how mediating devices configure collaboration agreements, 
focusing specifically on the effects of proprietary contracts and open databases and libraries on 
research and innovation. Finally, I discuss patents and their role in the legal architecture of research 
and innovation, highlighting how they (re)configure the commercialization of new pharmaceutical 
products in Ontario and the implications this has for the use of open devices. The primary argument 
in this chapter is that mediating devices – primarily proprietary devices – are inherently embedded 
in the current architecture of research and innovation. The embeddedness of proprietary devices 
has resulted in an additional layer of in/tangible administrative costs and onerous legal negotiations 
being added to the R&I process that, more often than not, makes the use of open devices especially 
difficult and impedes innovation in this sector.  
 
6.1. The Institutional Architecture of Academic Research and Innovation 
As discussed in Chapter Five, mediating devices help actors attach value to their interactions 
within techno-economic networks and regulate how value may be appropriated from the products 
of these interactions. To illustrate, in this context, interactions may occur between potential 
investors and primary investigators of research labs (PIs), or between TTOs and research institutes 
(e.g. moving biological materials from on lab to another). At each point, mediating devices define 
the terms of the interactions between these actors, most notably by outlining property rights and 
ownership (Mirowski, 2011) stipulating the terms of collaborations through MTAs, NDAs, or 
other contractual arrangements, thereby helping to commercialize new technologies (Scherer, 
2002), and acting as linchpins in the establishment of business models (Hope, 2008). These devices 
are fundamental to either accelerating or hindering innovation and the commercialization of new 
technologies. Here, I argue that (proprietary) mediating devices can hinder R&I by exhausting 
financial resources and creating administrative bottlenecks at universities.  
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This section focuses on mediating devices in the context of TTOs, and in particular on the 
ways in which proprietary devices executed by academic TTOs can create bottlenecks in the R&I 
process and drain capital from these institutes. Mediating devices are important here as they are 
the things that link labs, universities, industry, and government – in the form of contracts for 
research agreements, material transfer agreements, platforms in which shared research materials 
and data are housed, and so on. They facilitate collaboration between these entities, and they enable 
commercialization by allowing for the translation of research across institutional boundaries where 
it can be further developed. Academic TTOs are an interesting case in understanding the impact 
of mediating devices on R&I, particularly because they are the sites at which a large majority of 
research contracts, MTAs, and patent applications are executed and filed for research in the life 
sciences.  
As outlined in Chapter Two, the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 created a new 
marketplace for knowledge and its byproducts and (further) blurred the boundary between the 
university and industry (Mirowski, 2011). In determining that the market “[was] the best way of 
getting university breakthroughs into the hands of the public, and patents create the incentive that 
[made] that happen,” universities began to develop technology transfer offices with the idea that 
patenting research was necessary to attract investment in research projects (Popp-Berman, 2012: 
6). TTOs operated (and continue to operate) under the principle that “universities had a 
responsibility to patent to prevent publicly funded research from languishing unused… Simply 
creating knowledge and making it accessible was not enough. Universities needed to harness the 
power of the market” (ibid: 95). Through the fortification of patent rights in the ensuing years, and 
the enactment of patent policies and research regulations founded on the bedrock of ownership and 
profiting from one’s ownership, universities were supposedly guaranteed a means of return on 
public capital investment in scientific research (Kraemer, 2006). The growth of university TTOs 
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following the passage of Bayh-Dole also helped to spur academic entrepreneurship across OECD 
countries, with patents “represent[ing] only one mechanism by which academic research results 
[were] transferred to the market place. Other mechanisms include[d] licensing, the generation of 
academic spin-offs, collaborative research, contract research and consulting,” as well as joint 
publishing and networking with industry practitioners (Grimaldi et al., 2011: 1047). In effect, 
universities became vendors of science, as much as they were sites of knowledge production 
(Geiger and Sá, 2008). 
Today, university TTOs in Canada and the United States focus primarily on drafting research 
agreements, promoting community engagement and research communication, facilitating external 
partnerships (e.g. between university labs and industry partners), nurturing early-stage and proof-
of-concept discoveries and facilitating the transfer of these ideas into marketable products, and 
licensing/commercializing intellectual property  (see Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2019b; University of Toronto, 2019; York University, 2019). MIT’s Technology Licensing Office 
defines technology transfer simply as “the movement of knowledge and discoveries to the general 
public,” occurring via “the formal licensing of technology to third parties” (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 2019b). Grants to third party licensees may include established companies or new 
startups, while license requirements generally stipulate terms “that require the licensee to meet 
certain performance requirements and make financial payments” to the home institute where the 
TTO is located (ibid, 2019a). 
Figure 1 below illustrates the technology transfer process from the initial submission and 
disclosure of a new technology through the patenting/protection phase and finally the 
commercialization of a marketable product.  
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Figure 1.: The standard academic tech transfer process (source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019b) 
 
During the patenting and protection stage, both financial and non-financial terms of the license are 
established: financial terms typically include annual fees, royalties, and equity shares (if a startup, 
rather than a product, is established), while non-financial terms generally include (non)exclusivity 
of the license or contract, and due diligence requirements of the licensee (ibid, 2019c). During this 
stage, the TTO also drafts and negotiates other proprietary devices beyond patents, including non-
disclosure agreements (NDAs), MTAs, reach-through license agreements (RTLAs), and option 
agreements. In the context of university TTOs, NDAs are used “to protect the confidentiality of an 
invention during evaluation by potential licensees,” as well as proprietary information used in 
research (ibid). Likewise, option agreements grant a third party the right to “evaluate the 
technology and its market potential for a limited time before licensing,” providing them with a 
non-commercial, internal-use license for a fee while they assume responsibility for the payment of 
patent costs during the option period (ibid). 
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According to a 2017 survey by the Association of University Technology Managers, start-
up formation in Canada increased 11% between 2016 and 2017, and 95% between 2012 and 2017 
(AUTM, 2017a). Further, in an increase of 62% since 2016, 907 start-ups were reported to be still 
operational at the time of the survey (ibid.) As the report notes, what can be inferred from these 
statistics is that “the role the technology transfer office (TTO) plays within an entrepreneurship 
ecosystem is growing and impactful. Recognizing that most university start-ups are formed around 
patented technology, this prolonged growth and increased survival rate reflect research showing 
that start-ups with patents are 35 times more likely to be successful” (ibid: 3). 
Mirowski (2011) argues that the introduction of MTAs (and their associated RTLAs and 
NDAs) from the mid-1980s onwards demonstrates the beginning of universities resorting “to 
contracts over research tools to control research happening in other universities” (p. 155). These 
devices are legally protected contracts facilitating the exchange of materials (e.g. cell lines or 
sequenced proteins) for safekeeping (e.g. in gene- or biobanks), for research or commercial use 
(Rodriguez, 2005). They may apply to “anything from materials that are simply under the control 
of the originator but have no formal intellectual property rights attached to them to proprietary 
materials protected by patents and trade secrets” (Bubela et al., 2015: 2). They transfer possession 
of the material in question, not ownership, meaning that the original party can still assert ownership 
rights (ibid).  
MTAs vary in their complexity, with some TTOs or organizations (such as the NIH’s 
Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement [UBMTA]) offering a boilereplate contract with 
simple conditions  (i.e. that an organization will not make any proprietary claims on byproducts of 
the material in question (Rodriguez, 2005). Others stipulate more complex legal conditions, such 
as limitations on publications and asset distributions, and controls on the development and use of 
material derivatives (ibid). These legal conditions may actually expand the rights of the institution 
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(e.g. the university at which a researcher is employed), particularly in the case of RTLAs. Unlike 
patents, MTAs include the material in question and its associated data as the subject matter of the 
license in question. As a result, Bubela et al. (2015) note “the terms of an MTA may…extend 
rights beyond the patented invention if they ‘reach through’ the patent to lay claim (e.g. for 
royalties) on anything developed using the invention or that incorporates the invention” (pp. 2-3). 
Examples of this include new inventions that use a previously patented amino acid sequence, a 
patented nucleotide, or developed using a patented reagent (ibid.).  
In his critique of RTLAs, Mirowski (2011) describes their use as “ransoming the future of 
[ones] research to someone whose only contribution was the provision of a single material 
accessory input into the process” (p. 155). Posner (2012) also emphasizes the capacity of contracts 
such as MTAs and RTLAs to limit the ability of the receiving party to freely conduct research, 
stating “if the only people who have access to your property happen to be the people with whom 
you have a contract, you can regulate their access by means of contract and forget about property 
law” (p. 6).5 As discussed throughout previous chapters, these types of mediating devices operate 
in the spaces between actors within techno-economic networks. Not only do they directly dictate 
ownership (or lack thereof) of the byproducts of research, but they also indirectly impact 
innovation by necessitating onerous legal or administrative work, such as in the case of MTAs 
executed by academic TTOs. Consequently, beyond simply placing research materials within legal 
confines, these devices outline the working relationships of academic researchers and their 
industry (or other academic) partners, in effect dictating the terms of collaboration.  
 
5 The difference between contract versus property law is an interesting tangent here. In the case of MTAs and RTLAs, 
there is a fundamental shift in the ways in which ownership and the control of property are exercised. With the use of 
a contract, IP is licensed rather than owned. In these cases, value comes from the contractual costs imposed on the 
licensee (see Birch and Muniesa, forthcoming). 
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MTAs and RTLAs can prove prohibitively costly, in terms of the actual associated financial 
costs for all parties involved but also in the time and resources required for university TTOs to 
execute them. As Lave et al. (2010) point out, as academic capitalism has expanded and university 
research has become increasingly commercialized, a growing number of research tools (even the 
most basic and commercially irrelevant) have become encumbered by these proprietary devices. 
Moreover, Mirowski (2011) notes the disparity between the operating costs associated with 
executing MTAs versus the profits that academic TTOs make from them. Aside from the 
transactional costs associated with these particular devices, the institutional costs associated with 
MTAs can hinder innovation given the time and experience required to execute them. As the 
Director of a large research consortium in Toronto noted: 
  
A material transfer agreement on average, if things go well, takes a month to execute. 
The University of Toronto alone executes a thousand per year, with the majority 
delayed. That is about equivalent to 100 person years [to execute]. In the 
biotech/pharma sector one fulltime [employee] equivalent – if you were running a 
company and you hire someone, you say how much money do I have to hire that 
person? It's about $200 to $250,000 [annually]. That's a fully loaded, fulltime 
equivalent and includes the [rent] of that person, the healthcare costs, the 
consumables, the HR team that, you know, all in. So, if you take 100 person year 
delays, times $200,000 per year per person is what it costs. So, trying to equate the 
delay into an economic terms like lost opportunity costs or something, comes out to 
about $20,000,000 in the hole at the University of Toronto just based on their policy 
of executing [these devices]. Now does this sort of MTA process slow down 
innovation? Well, it does and to me, and it slows it down by about $20,000,000 a 
year (Director, 2017). 
 
A Technology Transfer Officer at one of Toronto’s large research institutes similarly highlighted 
the negative effect executing MTAs and other contracts had on innovation broadly, stating: 
Yes, it's a hindrance in that the researcher can't transfer [materials] until the MTA is 
done. The problem is the legal departments and the TTOs that represent these 
researchers, they’re inundated with other work so an MTA that you think should take 
a day actually takes six months because we're dealing with bureaucratic processes on 
both ends…So in my opinion, the MTA itself is not the issue, it’s the amount of time 
that the legal department in every single institution takes in reviewing these 
documents. And again, when you look at it from the perspective of a legal department 
within an institution, there are a handful of them, like lawyers or contract agreement 
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reviewers and they have thousands of agreements to go over (Technology Transfer 
Officer, 2017). 
 
Likewise, the Direct of Intellectual Property at a large non-profit organization in Toronto 
emphasized the detrimental impact of limited human capital on the execution of these proprietary 
devices, and its subsequent impact on innovation, stating: 
Well [these devices] slow stuff down, I wouldn’t say they stifle. [Using these devices] 
definitely slows down innovation because you’re saying I won’t send you the materials 
until you sign this document and then our legal [team] looks at it and then their legal 
[team] there looks at it says ‘Oh you have to change this clause’ or ‘We don’t like this’ 
and then come back and so that to me is the biggest hold up. So academic legal council 
needs to change how they operate because it’s crazy slow… The issue is people as a 
limited resource (Director of Intellectual Property, 2017). 
 
Importantly, these costs are not just institutional in nature – they can mount up on a national 
scale and affect the budgeting of universities (see Deering and Sá, 2017). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, for example, the Canadian Government’s 2018 R&D budget allocated $9.8 billion 
over five years for scientific R&I (translating to roughly $1.96 billion per year) (Science and 
Economic Development Canada, 2018). It costs roughly $55 million annually to run technology 
transfer offices across the country with a return of $62 million, for a net revenue of $7 million on a 
$1.96 billion annual budget (De Baere and Maine, 2018). In a study conducted of roughly 2,100 
biomedical science researchers and faculty members act American universities (Blumenthal, 1997), 
19.8% of respondents reported “delaying publications of research results for greater than six months 
in order to prepare and file patent applications, to provide time for patent prosecution, to protect 
their intellectual property rights, or to resolve contentious intellectual property ownership issues” 
(Mgbeoji and Allen, 2003: 87). Moreover, the study found that these publication delays correlated 
with research groups collaborating with private firms attempting to commercialize university 
research, particularly given the involvement of university TTOs. The study concluded that 
“withholding results was not a common practice among life science researchers, but was much more 
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prevalent among faculty research groups pursuing university technology transfer opportunities and 
corporate partnerships” (ibid).  
Clearly there is a significant cost associated with executing MTAs and filing patent claims. 
Devices such as MTAs “give material content to the links uniting the actors” and in turn determine 
“the multiplicity of possible interactions that can arise” between actors within techno-economic 
networks (Miller and O’Leary, 2007: 710). The above quotes suggest that mediating devices such 
as MTAs themselves may not necessarily inhibit innovation (or at least not to the same degree as 
suggested by Edwards et al., 2017). Rather, their embeddedness in this institutional research and 
innovation architecture and broader techno-economic network – and by extension, the in/tangible 
administrative costs that arise in executing several thousand MTAs between several thousand 
research institutes annually – can have a particularly detrimental effect on both collaboration and 
knowledge translation. Undeniably, research materials are generally costly to produce, and 
supplying them freely to third parties may be financially impractical. However while MTAs do 
enable the distribution of research tools, the onerous legal negotiations and delays that are associated 
with their execution may in fact discourage the use of the materials that come under their purview 
(see Walsh et al., 2003, 2005; Murray and Stern, 2007).  
 
6.2. Mediating Devices and Organizational Collaboration  
Extending from the discussion above, the question of how mediating devices impact 
collaborative arrangements is raised. If, as argued, mediating devices are situated within complex 
techno-economic networks between actors, determining at what point in the R&I process actors 
within these networks interact, it is important to unpack how both proprietary and open mediating 
devices configure these interactions – in other words, whether they help or hinder collaboration. 
This section focuses on proprietary contracts and open access data libraries and screening 
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platforms, and their respective impact on collaborative research arrangements. In doing so, I 
discuss the impact that open and proprietary devices have on collaboration efforts in the 
pharmaceutical sector, and evaluate whether they facilitate or hinder innovation in the sector.  
 
6.2.1. Contracts and Collaborative Arrangements 
In the pharmaceutical sciences, R&I generally occurs in the form of public-private 
partnerships, sponsored research agreements, physical and virtual networks, and research consortia 
(OECD, 2011). What these formats have in common is the constant exchange of knowledge and 
information between groups of scientists, lawyers, tech transfer officers, investors, and so on (ibid). 
As the STS literature has emphasized throughout the field’s existence, knowledge is collectively 
constituted, meaning that collaboration is an intrinsic aspect of the R&I process, though what 
varies is the degree of openness inherent in these collaborations (ibid.). The degree of openness in 
these collaborative efforts is necessarily determined by the mediating devices used in these 
collaborations: whether negotiations are open or closed to external actors, whether the research in 
question and its byproducts will be enclosed behind proprietary barriers (e.g. NDAs, patents) or 
released into the public domain. These devices can have a fairly innocuous effect on collaborative 
arrangements: many contracts can act simply as a means of outlining the relationship between two 
or more actors. Lezuan and Montgomery (2015) argue that it is the initial proprietary IP that 
attracts others into a partnership, and ultimately, proprietary IP devices are the tangible assets that 
structure the process of relaying research between collaborators. As a tech transfer officer at a 
large provincial non-profit organization stated: 
The MTA and NDA frame the relationship [between research partners]. Service 
agreements and sponsored research agreements also have an additional benefit where 
they create a relationship and clearly outline who is responsible for what, so there’s 
no confusion or legal issues on the back end (Tech Transfer Officer, 2017). 
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They also outlined the “instinct” to add a layer of exclusivity when outlining these relationships in 
contractual agreements (particularly in the life sciences), noting “we [want a degree of exclusivity] 
one, to make sure they don’t steal our idea, but two, because I want to talk to them before 
partnering. I want to know if it makes sense for us to invest our resources in this relationship 
without losing any IP or trade secrets I bring in” (ibid). At the same time, however, the same tech 
transfer officer noted: 
I've been on the other side, too, where somebody's saying sign this NDA and there is 
something there that formalizes the relationship to a degree and it’s a hindrance 
because you can't talk as freely as you otherwise would. And now you got to get some 
other third party involved to sign an agreement. And agreements take a lot of time to 
review and approve, so it slows down a lot of things (ibid). 
 
While the instinct or predisposition to add a layer of exclusivity to research agreements is useful 
in outlining the responsibilities and expectations of all parties involved, it configures collaboration 
in particular ways. Even in cases such as large research consortia where proprietary devices are 
not used, open research agreements similarly act as a means of clarifying and outlining the 
relationship between two or more parties (see Hayden, 2010). The Director of one such consortium 
in Toronto noted the ease with which the standard collaborative contract they employed had 
expedited the collaboration process: 
The more we got into it the more we realized how powerful our open agreement was. 
Because when we met with collaborators and said, “we’re not going to file a patent, 
we’re keeping this one open” – it was like a three second collaboration deal and off 
we go. And so, our transparent policy of openness allowed us to collaborate with a 
bang and get more science done per dollar invested in us. But in our current 
organization we have such a transparent agreement that we can decide literally in 
seconds whether [a partnership] is going to be feasible. So, if a company comes to us 
and says would you like to collaborate and what we would like out of it is to get X, 
Y, and Z and if we find anything we’d like to patent it, we just say no. We’re the ones 
who don’t do the deal because our principle is that we will never enter into a 
collaboration where the expressed intent is to file a patent on research and our 
agreement makes that clear (Director, 2017). 
 
In contrast, as discussed in Section 6.1, these proprietary devices can also act to create bottlenecks 
and generally slow down efforts to innovate through collaborative efforts. By adding a proprietary 
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dimension to research partnerships, some interviewees argued the inclusion of a patent requirement 
or NDA in a research agreement diverted focus away from the actual research being conducted 
and towards profits. The Managing of Operations of a large incubator lab in Toronto noted as 
much, stating: 
I feel like people don’t even have a good opportunity to get collaborative and start 
working. If you start thinking about patents or who can and can’t discuss what right 
out of the gate, don’t even waste your time… I strongly discourage people from 
worrying about patents on Day 1 because I think you will discover things along the 
way that you have absolutely no idea that you’re even looking for yet. But if you start 
worrying about the patent as the first step, you’re probably going to be stymying your 
own efforts because you’ll pigeonhole yourself too soon. This extends to 
partnerships, when the concern becomes about the patent and the profit, and not the 
innovation (Managing of Operations, 2017). 
 
As suggested above, focusing primarily on IP often results in one looking for IP-relevant findings. 
Likewise, the CEO of a small biologics firm and scientific advisor to a large VC firm in Toronto 
outlined the particularly unfavourable effects of proprietary mediating devices on collaborative 
arrangements: 
 
At the micro level, [proprietary devices] certainly create a barrier, right. If I want to 
collaborate with someone, we’ve got to put in place a contract, we’ve got to spell out 
intellectual property rights and who owns what and fair royalties and things like that, 
going back and forth – we have to do that and that takes time and it takes money and 
you have get lawyers to outline those contracts, and all that just means that none of 
the research is getting done (CEO, 2017). 
 
Similarly, the Director of Fund Operations of a large provincial research trust also highlighted the 
negative impact of proprietary devices on collaborative agreements, stating: 
I’ve come across a few contracts that say, basically, we co-own whatever you create, 
or you’re giving us an exclusive license to commercialize this. And, our opinion is 
that’s simply trying to profit off of our work, not help us do the work. Because we’re 
not a contract research organization. So, if you give us money, it’s an academic 
relationship, we’re not a lab for hire. So, you don’t get to own inventions that we 
create (Director of Fund Operations, 2017). 
 
What these quotes suggest is that in theory, proprietary mediating devices do not necessarily create 
a barrier to innovation or inhibit collaboration, particularly as seen in the context of research 
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consortia like the SGC where openness is laid out explicitly at the front end of a collaborative 
negotiation. Rather, proprietary devices such as patents, MTAs, and NDAs tend to configure 
collaborative relationships as transactional relationships where the primary focus is on are 
ownership and profit.  
 
6.2.2. Open Databases and Collaboration 
As discussed in previous chapters, the shift in focus of research from objects (e.g. the gene, 
the protein) to systems (e.g. the genome, the proteome) in the late 1980’s resulted in scientific R&I 
becoming largely data-accelerated, interdisciplinary, and increasingly dependent on databases, 
libraries, and screening platforms. Researchers rely heavily on databases to interrogate nucleotide 
sequences of interest, compare protein sequences, and search for sequence data in particular 
disease contexts (Birch et al., 2018). For example, gene therapy in cancer research has become 
increasingly reliant on research commons for the development of sequence data (i.e. gene, protein, 
or other transcript sequences). In the case of structural genomics, high-throughput technologies 
employed to determine the three-dimensional structure of proteins used in drug targeting and 
discovery are expensive to run and maintain, with the average cost of deciphering a protein 
structure estimated to be roughly US$300,000 (Chandonia and Brenner, 2006; Sá and Tamtik, 
2011). As Stephan (2015) notes, while some of the equipment used in contemporary R&D, 
“…although expensive, [is] still affordable at the lab or institutional level. Some, however, such 
as nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), [carry] sufficiently large price tags to encourage, if not 
demand, collaboration across institutions” (339, emphasis added). Traditionally, drug discovery 
also involves substantial preclinical optimization (e.g. detailed studies of drug potency, safety, 
pharmacokinetics), “which significantly increases the resources, time, and risk associated with 
developing new medicines” (Janes et al., 2018: 10750). As such, discovering new therapeutic drug 
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targets and new clinically relevant compounds is “a Mount Everestonian size task” in terms of 
both the breadth of data that must be evaluated and the financial resources needed to conduct such 
evaluations (Roy et al., 2010: 764).  
The challenge and resource-burden of accessing data that would otherwise be prohibitively 
costly to duplicate is mitigated by the availability of open devices such as open screening libraries 
and platforms (Janes et al., 2018). Open devices allow researchers to leverage “prior investments 
in medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, and toxicology, which helps to focus, or even eliminate, 
resource intensive chemistry and profiling” efforts (ibid: 10750). Moreover, as Lezuan and 
Montgomerey (2015) note,  
Where the traditional profit incentive is seen as inoperative or too uncertain to 
warrant risky expenditures on research, the key is to create new communities of 
sharing, to trigger processes of reciprocal exchange that will reactivate the circulation 
of resources. Actors with the relevant expertise and capabilities—academic 
institutions, governments, philanthropic organizations and, critically, pharmaceutical 
companies—must join forces and launch new collaborative ventures (p. 5). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, openness enables heterogenous collaboration by establishing ease 
of engagement, while open science initiatives “tend to involve collaborative projects that pool the 
work of many participants and make advances available to a broad community,” ensuring that 
research results are non-proprietary (Feldman and Nelson, 2008: 25). The CEO of a small biotech 
firm, and faculty member of a large research hospital in Toronto highlighted the research 
opportunities afforded by open drug screening platforms, stating: 
That [open screening library] was a huge, huge benefit to us because it meant that we 
didn’t have to go and assemble our own library of compounds as our initial screening 
tool. We had our own hundred thousand compound library in-house but you didn’t 
even go to that big screen until you put it through the first openly licensed one in 
order to just see if anything stuck. We started all of our screenings with that library 
of pharmaceutically active compounds, …and we used those as our jumping-off 
points to start any drug discovery process because as much as we have an in-house 
compound library, and as much as we had hundreds of thousands of compounds in 
the library, starting with a broad set of data presents, obviously, a much greater 
computational challenge to try and crunch that, analyse all that, and the existing 
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technology is such that you can't just start with a really, really big screening set and 
try to go looking for something. It's just an intractable problem (CEO, 2017). 
 
Similarly, the Manager of a large incubator lab in Toronto underlined the potential usefulness of 
open repositories of data, particularly for researchers undertaking upstream drug discovery 
projects:  
But I'm wondering if you're right, that if we could make more freely available the 
consolidation of all these companies’ data to anyone doing drug development, and 
we say we've all pooled our resources and this is the cherry-picked, best starting 
point, screening set. Something like that might be really, really cool, really cost and 
time effective. It would be really advantageous to say, you've got your best 
probability of success if you start by at least screening this compound library 
(Manager, 2017). 
  
Highlighting the efficiency of having some degree of openness in the R&I process, the same 
Manager also stated: 
If you look at not just the individual players here, but if you think about all these 
companies existing in the same sector, and if you think about just the loss of 
productivity of everybody, in theory, starting the same or similar project at once and 
they're all starting from scratch, think of just the loss of potential of people screening 
the same dead ends and the same bad ideas but not telling each other that they're 
doing it. I'm thinking about it, not about individual companies, but just about the 
productivity of the sector on the whole. There must be so much lost in terms of 
resources, so much lost utility, of everybody doing the same bad ideas and following 
the same bad leads at the same time until they all weed out those early bad ideas and 
start getting on with something that actually looks promising (ibid). 
 
As Janes et al. (2018) have noted, the use and availability of open databases of chemical 
compounds and drug targets dramatically reduces the time and resources required to translate 
upstream research through trials and into clinical setting. Having “more eyes” going over data sets 
and research results necessarily leads to products with low or no commercial potential being 
weeded out of the R&D process sooner (ibid). Further, collaboration is facilitated by the ease of 
access to research materials. While this differs from the collaborative arrangements seen in 
proprietary contract research agreements (where the results of R&I remain confidential between 
the participating parties), contributing data and research materials (i.e. sequence data or crystal 
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structures) to open databases is nonetheless a collaborative effort. Examples of these 
multidisciplinary, international efforts include the Structural Genomics Consortium (SGC), the 
Repurposing, Focused Rescue, and Accelerated Medchem (ReFRAME) Initiative, the Human 
Genome Project, and the International HapMap Project, all of which receive public and private 
funding. In each example, “participation extends beyond a single lab, institution, or research 
contract, commercial barriers to entry are low, and participation is not limited by proprietary 
restrictions” (Birch et al., 2018: 602).  
By mediating between non-proximal actors within a broader network, open devices such as 
screening platforms or data libraries have effectively changed the spatial pattern of collaborations, 
creating commons-like research networks and allowing more disparate, heterogeneous teams of 
researchers to work together (Hoekman et al., 2019; Feldman and Nelson, 2008). The database or 
library, acting as an (open) mediating device, serves as an intermediary between actors within these 
broader networks. For example, the SGC releases its data into the Protein Data Bank, where it may 
be freely accessed by anyone with the requisite software (SGC, 2017a). In doing so, the SGC 
creates a cost-efficient way to ensure as many research groups as possible can coordinate R&I 
efforts and create new pharmaceutical products without having to duplicate prohibitively costly 
research. This is facilitated by the openness inherent in the devices employed by the SGC. 
ReFRAME is another example of a successful open access library facilitating collaboration by 
reducing barriers to entry, wherein a library of “roughly 12,000 high-value compounds composed 
of purchased or resynthesized FDA-approved drugs (38%), as well as investigational new drugs 
currently or previously in any phase of clinical development (59%), including 522 non-
commercially available compounds” (Janes et al., 2018: 10753). Like the SGC, compounds 
included in ReFRAME are available to collaborators “around the world via a simple material 
transfer agreement, which contains a commitment to global access” (ibid). As per Hoekman et al. 
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(2010), the use of these open devices has effectively altered the proximal dimensions of 
collaborative arrangements, as the reduction of cost barriers has broadened who may participate in 
the drug discovery process. 
As discussed above, mediating devices serve to configure the relationships between actors 
within techno-economic networks; these devices, operating at the nexus between disparate actors, 
can entail onerous legal and administrative deliberations in the collaborative research process. 
Conversely, open devices, such as open research agreements with no limitations on publication or 
disclosure beyond the requirement that collaborators not exercise intellectual property rights in a 
way that would preclude access to research results, are a means of increasing transparency in 
business practices (Gitter, 2013) and expediting R&I as a result. Moreover, as noted by several 
interviewees above, the inclusion of proprietary devices in collaboration negotiations adds a 
financial and bureaucratic burden to the process of outlining research agreements. Openness in this 
context may grant research groups (particularly those coming from academia) who “may not have 
the financial capacity to navigate the maze of patent rights and licensing” more flexibility in terms 
of their ability to collaborate (Feldman and Nelson, 2008: 25). As will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven, however, while openness lowers barriers to entry (see Hope, 2008), the current “rules of 
the game” are such that to be able to bring new drugs to market and to profit in this particular 
sector, protecting one’s intellectual property and maintaining some degree of ownership is crucial. 
 
6.3. Patents and the Legal Architecture of Research and Innovation: A Case Study of 
Patenting in Ontario 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Patent Act (1985) governs pharmaceutical patents in 
Canada, outlining patentability criteria, establishing standards of patent enforcement, and 
providing a minimum period of market exclusivity for disclosures of inventions (Hore, 2004). The 
Patent Act originally conferred an 18-year period of exclusivity on new disclosures, though 
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following litigation on behalf of the United States through the World Trade Organization Canada 
has since adopted a fixed 20-year patent term (WTO, 2001). This section briefly outlines the legal 
mechanisms that embed proprietary mediating devices into the architecture of research and 
innovation and end up making open devices untenable options for firms commercializing new 
pharmaceutical products.  
In 1996, the Government of Ontario mandated pharmaceutical manufacturers with products 
approved for sale by a federal regulator (Health Canada) to apply to the Ontario Formulary, a 
document listing pharmaceutical products for which reimbursement is provided by the Ontario 
Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) or the Ontario Drug Benefit Program for seniors (PausJenssen et 
al., 2003). The Formulary acts as a guide to physicians and pharmacists for which drug products 
are covered through provincial health insurance, which products may be interchangeable (e.g. in 
the context of brand name versus generic products), and, importantly, sets the provincial standard 
for the price of drug products (Government of Ontario, 2019). Manufacturers seeking to list their 
products on the provincial formulary are required to provide a comprehensive economic analysis 
outlining the cost effectiveness of the product, while “Formulary committees, once primarily 
focused on the clinical efficacy and safety of products, now consider economic issues when 
reviewing products for inclusion” (PausJenssen et al., 2003: 286). 
The significance of proprietary mediating devices (particularly patents) as they relate to the 
Formulary was raised in a discussion with a senior partner of a major Toronto-based legal firm 
representing a large global pharmaceutical firm. Specifically, they noted that after the price of a 
patented drug is agreed upon and listed on the Formulary, ensuing (generic) market entries are 
priced accordingly. They stated: 
The reason I tell you that is that if [a large pharmaceutical firm] gets a licensed 
product on the Formulary, the second entry into the market will be at a lower price 
and the third entry will be at an even lower price. Where the license is a percentage 
of revenue, you don’t want multiple players because that's going to decrease the costs, 
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decrease the revenues and therefore decrease the royalties back. That's a reason why 
open licenses don’t work… Legally, you can always command a higher fee for 
someone who has exclusivity. If the licensee has the monopoly, they can go to the 
pharmacies or the hospitals and say, “Look we're the only guys you can get the 
product from, our price is controlled but here it is.” You can’t do that without the 
proprietary license. So from my perspective as the lawyer and from the licensors 
perspective, without the proprietary license the revenue and the marketplace is 
lowered, driven down in part by generic competition and also the Formulary (Partner, 
2017).  
 
Essentially, this system ensures that the market is constructed on the basis of patent first, followed 
by a generic entry, thereby reducing costs but (at the same time) giving the monopoly price to the 
first (patented) mover. This suggests that not only are these proprietary devices embedded within 
the regulatory and oversight architecture of R&I, but they also configure the price of new drugs 
and the places these drugs are sold. They are not just features of this architecture; they are essential 
components of it – hence, competition within Ontario’s drug market hinges on the tiered pricing 
system of the Formulary, in which the price of the patented drug determines the pricing of 
subsequent market entries.  
Stemming from this, in highlighting the embeddedness of proprietary devices such as patents 
in the legal architecture of R&I, the CEO of a small biologics firm and Entrepreneur-in-Residence 
of a large global biotech investment firm noted, 
There’s this whole onerous legal architecture that’s all built to ensure that the dollars 
that investors put into our company are used to generate new intellectual property 
and that intellectual property is wholly owned or licensed, so it’s a big deal for us. 
Any open license or open source would derail that investment for us (CEO, 2017). 
 
In the above quotes, open devices are explicitly described as things that inhibit the competitiveness 
of new drugs on the market. Schumpeter (1942) argued competition had a negative impact on 
innovation, stating that the uncertainty inherent in competitive markets diminished any potential 
return on investment (ROI) and by extension minimized incentives to invest in R&D and innovate. 
Conversely, Arrow (1962) argued competition was the catalyst for innovation, and this debate has 
remained prominent in both economics and innovation studies over the last five decades (see also 
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Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1978, 1982; Romer, 1990). Vives (2008) highlighted 
more complex factors affecting the relationship between competition and innovation; specifically 
market size, entry costs, and product substitutability, where increases in product substitutability 
(e.g. access to generic drugs) encourages R&D, and larger market size may prompt investment in 
R&D. More recently, Negassi et al. (2019) found that there is a positive correlation between high 
competition and innovation in both the public and private sector. While this quote obviously does 
not demonstrate one way or another the quantitative effect of open devices on innovation, it does 
highlight the notion that the use of open devices is difficult even to conceive of given the 
entrenchment of their proprietary counterparts within the legal and regulatory architecture of 
Canada’s pharmaceutical market.  
Significantly, as discussed previously in Chapter Five, what this interview data shows is that 
factors affecting the use of mediating devices such as patents or open licenses, extend beyond a 
research group or firm’s immediate circumstances to the broader techno-economic network of 
which they are a part (Callon, 1991). Callon’s (1991) discussion of the relationship between 
science and capitalism makes the argument that political economy and technoscience cannot be 
divorced, particularly given the ways in which the former informs and shapes the latter. Miller and 
O’Leary (2007) also argue that certain devices – in this case, proprietary devices like patents – 
“link science and the economy through acting on capital budgeting decisions” (p. 702), and in 
doing so contribute to the process of making markets. In terms of broader policy implications, it is 
evident that macro-level regulatory requirements affect the mediating devices used in the 
commercialization of pharmaceutical products, and conversely, the use of these devices affects the 
market in which pharmaceutical products are circulated. Moreover, this data highlights the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to introduce a degree of openness into a system built on 
proprietary ownership and exclusion.  
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6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on specific mediating devices as they relate to the legal, administrative, 
and regulatory architecture of research and innovation processes. First, I discussed material 
transfer agreements as they relate to academic TTOs, noting in particular the difficulties and costs 
associated with executing MTAs and the impact of this on public pharmaceutical research and 
innovation. Second, I unpacked the impact of mediating devices on collaboration agreements, 
focusing specifically on the effect of proprietary versus open contracts on research and innovation. 
Finally, I discussed patents and their role in the legal architecture of research and innovation, 
outlining the impact they have on commercializing new pharmaceutical products in Ontario and 
the impact this has on the use of open devices. 
These discussions suggest that mediating devices – primarily proprietary devices – are 
embedded in the broader architecture of research and innovation. The embeddedness of proprietary 
devices has resulted in an additional layer of in/tangible administrative costs and onerous legal 
negotiations being added to the R&I process that, more often than not, impedes this process. This 
is evident in the case of academic TTOs, where executing MTAs and RTLAs can prove 
prohibitively costly in terms of both financial costs and the time/resources required, in addition to 
the disparity between operating costs and profits. In the case of collaboration agreements, 
proprietary devices have the effect of reconstructing collaborative relationships into transactional 
relationships where the primary priorities are ownership and profit, rather than research and 
innovation. Finally, as the case study on patenting in Ontario suggests, the deeply rooted nature of 
patents in Ontario’s legal and regulatory framework for commercializing new pharmaceutical 
products has perpetuated a system built on proprietary ownership and exclusion, and all but 
ensured that attempts to introduce a degree of openness into this system would be difficult to 
imagine and implement.  
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7. Evaluating Open and Proprietary Mediating Devices 
 
The impact of open and proprietary devices on technoscientific innovation has been debated 
at length in the STS and innovation studies literature. As discussed in previous chapters, however, 
labeling open and proprietary mediating devices as strictly either facilitators or hinderers of 
innovation is reductive. For instance, some scholars have argued proprietary devices impede 
innovation in the biological sciences by limiting avenues of inquiry, obstructing collaboration and 
excluding certain groups from R&I, and creating bottlenecks through patent thickets (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998; Mirowski, 2011; Caulfield et al., 2011). Mirowski and Sent (2002) and Radder 
(2010) have also been critical of the ways in which proprietary, commercialized R&I is inherently 
self-limiting. In the legal context, Posner (2002, 2003) has been particularly critical of the ways in 
which expansive proprietary property rights limit the production of intellectual property itself. 
Other scholars, such as Lezuan and Montgomery (2015), are critical of the ways in which 
proprietary devices are described in the literature as a means of enclosing knowledge and 
information and entangling partners in long-term collaborations, arguing they are necessary for 
outlining collaborative research relationships and provide incentives for investing in research. 
They write: 
Rather than a tool to protect a market monopoly and exclude others from the use of a 
particular innovation, [proprietary] IPRs are…an attractor to bind diverse interests to 
a shared mission and give material reality to the new drug development enterprise. In 
other words, instead of demarcating public and private domains, property [devices] are 
used to increase the porosity of that boundary, allowing heterogeneous actors to come 
together around projects where that distinction is temporarily suspended (p. 7). 
 
In this chapter, I address research question 3: How do different devices facilitate or hinder 
collaboration and knowledge translation in this sector? At what stage in the innovation process 
are they most effective, and why; and research question 4: How can they be employed in the 
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development of innovation strategies so as to streamline the process of drug development? In doing 
so, I first examine the impact of broad versus narrow patent claims and their impact on innovation. 
More often than not, the implementation of proprietary devices too early in the R&I process, 
particularly in the case of broad upstream patent claims involving tool compounds, results in 
bottlenecks that slow down or stop knowledge translation entirely. Conversely, the use of open 
devices downstream in the commercialization process of new drug candidates is likely to derail 
private investment. Following this, I conduct a case study of the open molecule JQ1, a tool 
compound used in the development of therapeutic products for certain types of cancer. The purpose 
of this case study is to highlight the importance of distinguishing between research tools versus 
marketable products when attempting to understand the overall impact of open and proprietary 
mediating devices on pharmaceutical innovation. I argue that the impact of these devices, in terms 
of both accelerating the translation of pharmaceutical research and encouraging collaboration, is 
dependent on two factors: firstly, when they are employed in the innovation process (i.e. upstream 
versus downstream); and secondly, what they are applied to (i.e. tool compounds used to develop 
candidate drug products versus the products themselves). As will be discussed, this is significant 
given the dichotomous and incompatible image of open and proprietary devices that is presented 
in the STS and innovation studies literature outlined above.  
 
7.1. Broad Versus Narrow Patent Claims 
Just as examining when these devices are employed in the innovation process is critical for 
understanding their net effect on innovation, so too is unpacking the scope of the 
research/knowledge/data enclosed by them. In the case of proprietary devices, specifically patents, 
the STS literature tends to present them as a dichotomy; as being either obstructions to innovation 
or catalysts of it (see Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Mirowski, 2011; Lezaun and Montgomery, 2015). 
  
160 
This section focuses specifically on the scope of patent claims and the subsequent effect on 
pharmaceutical innovation.  
What does it mean to make a broad versus narrow claim? Typically, broad patent claims are 
made upstream and are speculative in nature (Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, 
2005). For example, a broad patent claim might be made on a molecule with potential commercial 
application for multiple diseases, while conversely, a narrow claim would be made further 
downstream after the molecule has been modified and refined so as to be directly applicable to one 
disease. For instance, patenting gene segments that are relevant drug targets for several disparate 
diseases would fall under the umbrella of a broad patent claim. In this example, researchers seeking 
to understand either the expression of the gene in question on a certain type of tumour or the impact 
of a chemical compound aimed at that genetic segment would be required to pay for access to that 
gene segment (Abbott, 2001). Stemming from this, the practice of “evergreening” involves 
obtaining multiple patents covering different features of the same product (Canadian 
Biotechnology Advisory Committee, 2005).  
As Posner (2002) notes, the central principle of patent law is that market exclusivity is 
conferred upon the inventor on the basis of the patent application itself, in which novelty and utility 
are explicitly outlined. Moreover, the majority of intellectual property – “even of a distinctly 
innovative sort” – builds heavily on existing IP; thus, if the patent system is operating as it should, 
other inventors or researchers should be able to build upon the existing patent to create new/better 
products (ibid: 12). Where issues arise, however, is when patent claims are speculative in nature 
and lack demonstrable utility, as in the case of scaffold compounds for instance. In biochemistry, 
scaffold compounds are core structures made up of smaller molecules; they are not drugs, though 
many structural analogs that make it through to market contain the same core scaffold compound 
(Dimova  et al., 2018). Broad patent claims on scaffold compounds are becoming increasingly 
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common, and essentially mean that any products with specific clinical designations derived from 
the scaffold core are limited by proprietary IPRs (in other words, the approximate skeleton of a 
drug with no direct clinical use has been enclosed behind a proprietary barrier) (Lowe, 2018). 
Mgbeoji and Allen (2003) describe these broad, upstream patents as speculative patents, where the 
patent seeks to claim potential future technologies yet invented, and argue that they create 
bottlenecks in the drug development process by delaying the translation of knowledge. 
While the majority of interviewees did not fall strongly on either side of patents-as-
obstructions-to-innovation debate, one particularly interesting and recurring point of note 
concerned the scope and location (i.e. upstream versus downstream) of patent claims. The 
overwhelming majority of interviewees, even those staunchly in favour of employing proprietary 
devices in R&I, commented on the detrimental “bottleneck” effect resulting from broad, upstream 
patent claims. For example, the Chief Scientist of a large research consortium argued that the 
proprietary boundary (i.e. the demarcation point at which open, fundamental research becomes 
enclosed behind proprietary devices such as patents) should be moved further downstream as a 
means of facilitating collaboration and accelerating innovation: 
I think the whole field should move the proprietary boundary further along the drug 
discovery pipeline to free up the exchange of ideas and reagents earlier in the 
[innovation] process. I think that would speed up biomedical research and 
development greatly. I do think that, instead of protecting everything from the very, 
very beginning, that moving that bar further down the drug discovery pipeline would 
make things go faster from the beginning (Chief Scientist, 2017). 
 
Additionally, the Director of Intellectual Property of a large non-profit organization in Ontario 
argued that patent claims should cover only specific drug applications, rather than all possible 
applications of a given compound: 
I never understood this urgency to have these big broad [patent] claims; I mean really 
I think that’s overstepping what the patent system was supposed to do. I think there’s 
absolutely no reason why within some reasonable degree of scope, you couldn’t go 
after a more narrow claim that more specifically captures what you’re pursuing 
clinically and yet, excludes sort of the immediately obvious variations right, that 
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somebody could try and enter onto the market too soon. But there’s no reason why we 
need [these broad claims] – we’re going to get further faster if the basics are shared 
(Director of Intellectual Property, 2017). 
 
Likewise, the Venture Development Manager of the same non-profit organization made a similar 
case for requiring patent claims to fall within the scope of a specific drug application, stating: 
What is the problem with having a more narrow [patent] scope on a molecule? You 
know, still within some reasonable scope limitation, one that’s going to work and be 
protective enough to get [the drug] to the clinic and get your ROI. You’ll have some 
investors who say that’s not good enough, someone could come along and maybe 
they’re going to tweak this part [of the molecule] over here and they could get around 
you. My response is, it’s better to be more narrow because you’ve selectively found 
out that you need to make these changes to make [the molecule] work, it has to cross 
the blood brain barrier, it has to accumulate at a certain concentration and it has to 
work specifically through that receptor and not the five others that look just like it. 
That’s what we want; we don’t want the broad claim because nobody’s going to 
develop a clinical product outside of that selection (Venture Development Manager, 
2017). 
 
These quotes imply that while the use of proprietary devices such as patents does not necessarily 
impede pharmaceutical innovation, their location in the innovation process does. The use of 
proprietary devices upstream delays the translation of research data by increasing transaction costs 
required to access critical fundamental knowledge and data, thereby creating bottlenecks around 
the movement of knowledge downstream or across institutional boundaries. By extension, this 
may limit the ability of researchers to pursue tangential avenues of inquiry that involve the patented 
subject matter (e.g. a patented scaffold compound) (Mgbeoji and Allen, 2003). Empirical evidence 
from Lerner (1994) has suggested that “a one standard deviation increase in average patent scope 
is associated with a 21% increase in the firm’s value” (p. 319). More simply, the marginal value 
of broad patent claims is increased when there are many substitutes of the same product in the 
same class (i.e. in the same class of drugs). This explains the push by private firms for research 
partners (particularly those at public research institutes) to file broader patent claims. The Director 
of the Industry Liaison Office at a large university in Toronto noted as much, stating: 
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Let’s say you have a very general compound that has applicability in cancer, HIV, 
multiple sclerosis. There might be three different pharmaceutical companies that have 
an interest in each of those applications or in one of those applications. With that initial 
compound, that individual can say well, I can do a deal with each three of these 
organizations, I can make money from them and I have the ability of streamlining the 
development of this technology down the road. It becomes a situation where the 
robustness of that filing versus its value in the commercial landscape or in the real 
world is really what the value that the company's looking for – what you filed a patent 
application for originally has a really broad claim, and [large pharmaceutical] firms 
love that. Is it great for everyone else [doing similar research]? Maybe not. But firms 
love that because they can now make money off all three applications instead of just 
one, so you need to try to claim as broadly as possible (Director, 2017). 
 
The Director of Intellectual Property of a large non-profit organization in Ontario expressed 
frustration at this outlook on upstream research: 
Having worked in the patent world, I’ve felt for a while the claims being issued are 
way too broad and I do think that’s what can have a negative impact on innovation. 
That said, they don’t preclude you from doing the research, they just preclude you from 
commercializing. Instead of saying: I have a drug for this sub-population of 
Alzheimer’s that also treats this population of ALS, this sub-population of MS, how 
about saying I have a drug for Alzheimer’s, you know? The claim needs to be of the 
drug that targets receptor X for treating disease Y, not just a molecule that might bond 
with X if we tweak it here and there. I think the point at which the biology and the 
animal models show some selective advantage over a small class of compounds, I think 
at that point, the minute somebody has devised a class of compounds that work for a 
specific clinical indication that is within some reasonable scope, then I think [the IP] 
has to be proprietary. But not before then (Director of Intellectual Property, 2017).  
 
Historically, there are of course many examples of patented drugs or technologies built on earlier 
patents and unpatented work. For instance, Merges and Nelson (1990) cite Genentech’s patent 
claim (U.S. Patent 4704362) on specific recombinant proteins, a breakthrough stemming from both 
patented and unpatented upstream research. However, in biomedical R&D, while broad upstream 
patent claims may in fact be “good for business,” the proliferation of these overlapping claims and 
licenses nonetheless impedes pharmaceutical innovation by slowing the movement of research 
downstream (Eisenberg, 1996). The effective result of this is an obstacle to access fundamental 
knowledge and info required to develop clinical products. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, to receive a patent in Canada the application must demonstrate 
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novelty and utility as well as non-obviousness, as per s. 2 and s. 28.3 respectively of the Canadian 
Patent Act (Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, 2005). Under the Patent Act, genetic 
or biological material with known utility are also considered patentable subject matter (ibid). 
However, stemming from the discussion above, section 53(1) of the Canadian Patent Act stipulates 
that a patent is void “if the specification and drawing contains more or less than is necessary for 
obtaining the end for which they purport to be made” (Mgbeoji and Allen, 2003: 84). This is 
particularly relevant in the context of broad versus narrow patent claims. Recently, the Canadian 
Intellectual Property Office’s (CIPO) Commissioner of Patents (2011) rejected Geron 
Corporations application to patent a purified telomerase molecule, stating the claim did not 
“adequately distinguish the invention from the prior art since the telomerase protein was previously 
known” (p. 6). Moreover, the claim was rejected on the basis of the comprehensive application 
value of the telomerase protein itself (CIPO, 2011).  
Demonstrably, given recent legal decisions, the CIPO recognizes the harm these broad 
claims may potentially have on innovation further downstream. In terms of policy implications, 
this is significant. Given the ongoing reduction of public funding for scientific R&I and its 
reorientation in universities towards public/private partnerships, research agendas have been 
reconfigured and reshaped in accord with the commercial or social interests of the groups 
subsidizing it (Lave et al., 2010). With decreasing public funding of science, the onus has fallen 
on public research institutions to forge partnerships with private industry to ensure that research 
generates innovative socio-economic gains (such as much-needed novel pharmaceutical products). 
As universities pursue commercially oriented research agendas designed to develop and market 
commercial products, and consequently file for broad upstream patent claims, fundamental 
scientific knowledge will be limited. Upstream research enclosed behind these proprietary devices 
“will not provide broad-based contributions to science, and like- wise innovations with maximum 
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benefit to society will be limited” (Mgbeoji and Allen, 2003: 89). Rejecting these unnecessarily 
broad upstream patent claims is essentially an acknowledgement by the CIPO that commercially 
oriented research “generally produce the innovative impact within the scientific community as 
research designed at characterizing basic biochemical and genetic processes” (ibid). The purpose 
of this section is to demonstrate the significance of when proprietary mediating devices are 
employed, and how this affects pharmaceutical innovation. I argue innovation is negatively 
affected when proprietary devices are applied to upstream pharmaceutical research not predicated 
on a direct clinical application. This is specifically due to the high transaction costs required to 
access critical fundamental knowledge and data that arise for researchers downstream. 
 
7.2. JQ1: A Case Study on Openness 
Given the pitfalls of employing proprietary devices discussed above, the question of whether 
openness offers a panacea to these problems arises. Would maximized openness and the increased 
use of open devices truly transform the process of drug discovery and development, as argued by 
bench scientists and STS scholars alike (see Edwards et al., 2017; Hope, 2008)? Longitudinal 
studies following and comparing open and proprietary drug compounds as they move from the lab 
through clinical trials and finally to the market are unavailable, given both the time necessary to 
develop new drug products as well as the relative newness of the open science movement (and 
particularly its recent foray into the pharmaceutical sector). Most long-term evaluations of the 
impact of proprietary devices on pharmaceutical innovation tend to focus on citation metrics as a 
means of evaluating impact. For instance, a quantitative assessment of patent-paper pairs by 
Murray and Stern (2007) examined the bibliometric citation rate for scientific publications before 
and after formal IP rights associated with the publication were granted. The study found an anti-
commons effect that becomes more pronounced over time, notably for researchers with public 
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sector affiliations, suggesting intellectual property rights do, in fact, have an impact on the 
diffusion of scientific knowledge (ibid; see also Williams, 2011).  
This section is a case study of JQ1, an open access molecule argued to have expedited drug 
development by virtue of its openness (Arshad et al., 2016). The case in question involves a 
thorough discussion with an Adjunct Professor at a large teaching hospital in Toronto who is also 
the CEO of a small biologics firm (hereby referred to as AP). Our discussion focused specifically 
on their experience using proprietary analogs and their critique of JQ1 molecule.  
Arshad et al discuss the impact of JQ1’s availability in an open compound library at length 
in a 2016 opinion piece. The article begins by describing the current state of drug discovery as 
being costly and inefficient, noting that it takes roughly 10-15 years to move a drug candidate from 
target discovery through to market at a cost of roughly $1.8 billion per new molecular entity 
(NME), despite increasing R&D budgets across North America and Europe (ibid: 322). Stemming 
from this, the authors argue that the traditional, proprietary model of drug development is 
unsustainable and suggest increased openness – in terms of increased use of open devices and 
increased methodological transparency/decreased barriers to access – as a viable alternative (ibid). 
The authors then argue that by making JQ1 freely available in an open library, they have expedited 
the process of moving the molecule from the lab to the clinic, stating that JQ1 is currently in Phase 
I and II clinical trials in the United States (ibid). The authors also conduct a bibliometric study and 
patent citation analysis to compare the use of JQ1 versus its proprietary counterparts in later 
research. They argue that the initial open availability of JQ1 positively impacted the number of 
patents filed for compounds involving the same scaffold compound (ibid: 327). 
To begin, JQ1 is an inhibitor of the family of bromodomain proteins (including BRD2, 
BRD3, and BRD4), a group of proteins known to be highly relevant drug targets in both human 
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cancer and multiple sclerosis (Qu et al., 2018). As AP noted in our discussion and their critique of 
Arshad et al.’s (2016) discussion of the molecule: 
[Arshad et al.] refer to JQ1 as a drug candidate throughout this paper, and clearly, 
they’ve never been involved in drug discovery, because a drug candidate has a very 
specific meaning. And a drug candidate is a compound that is essentially ready to go 
into humans or barring that, but you could also define something as going into 
regimented, pre-clinical talks as a drug candidate. So generally, when you’re in the 
drug discovery business, you start out with a hit, which is just a compound that hits 
your targets with some predefined level of potency. And then the next step is to engage 
in medicinal chemistry, and work on that. And so, in our case, it took us over two years 
to transition from a hit to a drug candidate. And between having that hit and having a 
drug candidate, we synthesized more than 1,500 iterations [of the initial molecule]. So, 
there’s a very big difference between a drug candidate and a hit, and throughout this 
paper they refer to JQ1 as a drug candidate. It’s not, and this is very important, it’s not 
semantics (AP, 2017).  
 
As Filippakopoulos et al. (2010) also highlight, JQ1 is not a product intended for use in a clinical 
setting. It is a tool, much like the crystal structures sequenced by the SGC, used to develop 
pharmaceutical products. This is due in large part to its short half-life, as AP further points out: 
Now, [Arshad et al.] also are a little bit vague in this paper about where JQ1 came 
from, and I’ve been familiar with JQ1 for a long time. JQ1 came out of an academic 
lab, it’s not from [a large pharmaceutical firm] as they somewhat allude to. It came out 
of an academic lab in the US, and they were looking for inhibitors bromodomain, and 
they identified JQ1. So JQ1, tying all this together, is more a hit and less a candidate; 
it’s never been optimized for pharmacodynamics, pharmacokinetics, any of the things 
that a drug discovery firm will do. Indeed, one of the major limitations of JQ1 is its 
very short half-life. So, you put it into an animal, you put it into a human, and it’s 
metabolized in about half an hour, this is very short. Too short to be a legitimate 
product (AP, 2017). 
 
Stemming from this, a review of clinicaltrials.gov, a site maintained by the US National 
Library of Medicine listing all publicly and privately funded clinical trials occurring in the United 
States, shows no current or cancelled trials of JQ1 (National Institutes of Health, 2019). As this 
relates to Arshad et al.’s (2016) argument that the open availability of JQ1 has expedited its 
progress from the lab to the clinic, AP argued: 
I think, pivotal to the argument being made in this paper, part of the argument is that 
essentially by using an open innovation model and an open platform, they have 
expedited the progress of JQ1 from hit or to the clinic, and then they make this 
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statement that it is currently in Phase I and II clinical trials, which is false. There’s no 
clinical development of JQ1 going on right now, there’s absolutely none (AP, 2017).  
 
To assess the impact of the molecule’s open availability, Arshad et al. (2016) compare JQ1 to three 
drug candidates: Selumetinib, a drug product developed and approved by AstraZeneca for the 
treatment of lung and thyroid cancer, and PRI 724 and MK 1775, two similar (but proprietary) 
first-in-class molecules also used in the treatment of cancer (ibid: 323-324). The authors use two 
metrics to compare the R&D stages of translation for each molecule, namely bibliometric citation 
rates and patent citation rates (ibid). The authors argue JQ1 has had a greater number of citations 
compared to its proprietary counterparts; therefore, suggesting open availability can increase the 
“dissemination and awareness of a drug candidate’s discovery” and “may lead to wider, more 
multidisciplinary community acknowledgement of drug candidate discovery” (ibid: 325). 
Moreover, Arshad et al. (2016) conducted an assessment of the number of downstream inventions 
involving bromodomains (targeted by JQ1) versus those involving the targets of its proprietary 
counterparts. The authors concluded that, due to the higher number of inventions involving 
bromodomains, the open availability of JQ1 positively impacted downstream innovation (ibid: 
327-328). However, as AP (2017) reiterated, the comparison is not necessarily accurate, given the 
difference in hit compound versus legitimate drug candidate. In their critique of this analysis, AP 
noted: 
It’s really not a fair comparison, comparing a hit with legitimate drug candidates. [JQ1] 
is something that’s really not eligible going to humans. So, to make the argument that 
you’ve expedited the process to clinical development is just not reality… So [Arshad 
et al.] talk about the publication and citation data. They say okay, we’ll compare the 
day the first reference in PubMed6 to these other three candidates, and they use that 
date as T0 to do various calculations of citations. Well, in our business, and for 
companies, we typically don’t publish anything until the patent is issued, until all the 
work is done. So, there’s a considerable lag in the industry that you don’t see in 
academia. Remember JQ1 came out of a university. In academia, you’re trying to 
publish as soon as you bloody well can. In industry there are certain hurdles that you 
need to clear before you’re going to be in a position to publish. In many cases you 
 
6 A scholarly database maintained by the NIH 
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won’t see a publication on a compound or a target from a pharmaceutical company 
until even ten years after the initial work was done. So, to compare those as both being 
T0 is kind of a little bit misleading. I think a bigger and more specific kind of problem 
with all this was around one of the key arguments – that by using an open innovation 
model you increase the number of citations. The problem is if you look at the original 
paper JQ1 was published in, and published in Nature, which is arguably the best 
scientific journal in the world, it has the highest impact factor of any basic research 
journal. Its impact factor is about 40 if not a little bit higher, so the average number of 
citations per paper is 40. And you compare that for example to MK 1775, that was 
published in Current Drug Targets, which has an impact factor of 3.5. So, that is an 
average 3.5 citations per article. So naturally, you’re going to have a lot more citations 
for something that was published in Nature compared to something that’s published in 
Current Drug Targets that nobody reads. So this is meaningless. I mean all of this 
could be accounted for by one, publications in Nature, the others are all in inferior 
journals. Even PNAS, which is where the Selumetinib was published, it’s only got an 
impact factor of 9. Again, you’re comparing that to 40 or 42 for Nature, big difference 
(AP, 2017).  
 
Regarding the comparison of patent metrics, AP noted as much:  
 
[Arshad et al.] are looking at patent families, and they’re searching a database to see 
how many related patent families cited the various targets [of JQ1, Selumetinib, PRI 
724 and MK 1775]. They talk about bromodomain, WNT pathway, and checkpoint 
kinase, so three categories of targets [for JQ1, PRI 724 and MK 1775 respectively]. 
But let’s actually look at the search they ran. In the case of PRI 724, WNT pathway is 
not the specific therapeutic target of this molecule. So anything that cites its specific 
target is not included. But then you at JQ1 and they cite not only BRD-4, which is 
extensively the main target of JQ1, but they also cite BRD-1, BRD-2, BRD-3, BRD-
5, 6, 7, 8, 9. So, you’re talking about apples and oranges, you’ve got one little irrelevant 
target space, compared to all of the BRDs, which of course is hot area research right 
now. It’s a completely inappropriate comparison. And the same holds true [for MK 
1775], where they’re not necessarily looking at its primary target (AP, 2017).  
 
AP made a final, salient point regarding the arguments made by Arshad et al. (2016), namely that 
the patent metrics discussed clearly demonstrate the ability of open availability to spark innovation. 
As they point out, JQ1 was maybe one factor but by no means the factor in the proliferation of 
inventions involving bromodomains. Moreover, JQ1 was published shortly after the sequence of 
bromodomain crystals became available, raising the question of whether or not that availability is 
actually what sparked downstream innovations. They noted:  
Now the key point that [Arshad et al.] make is that the initial open access availability 
of JQ1 positively impacted the number of patents filed regarding inventions involving 
bromodomains, that’s a statement they make, and that seems to be a pretty key learning 
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in this article. But the interesting thing is that 2010 [when JQ1 was published] was just 
after the time you started to see [bromodomain] crystals being sequenced. Here you 
had JQ1 published, but you also started to have, right before that, the emergence of the 
actual BRD crystals, many of which came from the SGC. So, to say that it was JQ1 
that stimulated that work in bromodomains, again, I don’t think the evidence supports 
that, I don’t think there’s any link whatsoever. And I think JQ1 had very little to do 
with the increase in the number of patents involving bromodomains, it’s really more 
about the huge availability of the crystals. So, you know, their argument is flawed in 
my view, from beginning to end. The way they actually generate all their data in the 
first place makes their argument questionable (AP, 2017). 
 
While AP’s refutation of the arguments put forth by Arshad et al. (2016) do not necessarily 
negate all evidence supporting the positive impact of open devices on pharmaceutical innovation, 
what is important to note here is the following: first and most importantly, JQ1 is not a drug 
candidate, it is a tool compound (Qu et al., 2018). Stemming from this, comparing bibliometric 
and patent citation data of upstream tool compounds to downstream pharmaceutical products 
approved for clinical use is misleading. As discussed in the previous section, the use of open 
devices such as open libraries or databases, particularly as it relates to fundamental science, will 
facilitate innovation as the knowledge/data in question tends to be used more prevalently 
downstream (Gitter, 2013; Harnad et al., 2008; Murray and Stern, 2007). As AP (2017) noted, the 
general argument of Arshad et al. (2016) is not incorrect per se, but rather is problematic. While 
the open availability of JQ1 positively affected innovation downstream, the same could not be said 
for Selumetinib, PRI 724 and MK 1775 because these molecules already exist downstream 
(AstraZeneca, 2019; National Cancer Institute, 2018; National Institutes of Health, 2018). They 
have already passed the rigor of target discovery, pre-clinical and clinical trials, and FDA approval 
– they are products with designated clinical use. Again, this is not to negate the argument of Arshad 
et al. (2016) that open devices facilitate innovation, but rather to point out the flaws in the 
comparison their argument is based upon. As will be elaborated upon in the final section of this 
chapter, the key take away from this case study, then, is that parsing the difference between tools 
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and products is critical the understanding impact of proprietary devices such as patents on 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
7.3. Operating Within the Rules of the Game 
As evidenced in the discussion above, open devices such as open libraries and platforms may 
be critical in the development and dissemination of research tools, while patents or other 
proprietary devices can be used to expedite the development of drug candidates through to the 
clinic, all within the same R&I paradigm. What, then, does this mean in a more applied context? 
Are patents and other proprietary devices truly a “necessary evil” of pharmaceutical innovation? 
When asked if open devices were a feasible alternative (to proprietary devices) for pharmaceutical 
R&I in Canada, the CEO of a small biologics firm and Entrepreneur-in-Residence of a large global 
biotech venture firm said as much: 
For now we have to operate within the rules of the game, as they are set. So the rules of 
the game basically say you’ve got to protect your intellectual property with patents, 
those patents fundamentally generate a huge amount of value for not only our company 
but they also make up the vast majority of the monetary value of the assets of most of 
the companies in our investor portfolio. What we do for a living is we take intellectual 
property usually in the form of at least some basic patent filings and we try to make 
those as valuable as possible by generating a whole bunch of additional proprietary data 
that shows how awesome these now patent-protected chemical entities of molecules are. 
So for us to operate these businesses and for us to play within the rules of that game, the 
patenting and the protection of intellectual property is almost the be-all-and-end-all of 
how we generate monetary value (Entrepreneur-in-Residence, 2017).  
 
This raises a new question: If the existing IP framework was different, and market exclusivity was 
a non-issue for pharmaceutical firms developing new drug products, would the current “rules of 
the game” change? The same Entrepreneur-in-Residence addressed this as well: 
So what if the rules of the game were fundamentally different? I’ve always thought that 
the whole social contract around patents is a little bit weird right, this idea that you 
know, we’re going to incentivise inventors to disclose their inventions by giving them a 
20 year monopoly on the use of those inventions. I think if we really look at it and study 
it the way that you’re studying it, I think the jury is still out on whether it’s actually 
enhanced or impeded innovation. If I look at just our industry, the downside of patents 
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and having to protect innovations is that we don’t share information, we don’t share data 
with colleagues, collaborators, competitors, you name it, any kind of partners or 
stakeholders that we have, we don’t share that data very freely because we’re so 
concerned about protecting it and keeping it under patent protection because that’s what 
generates monetary value. If the rules of the game were changed to say that every piece 
of data ever done in a human clinical trial needs to be shared publicly, that would be 
hugely valuable I think to the overall field of medicine, the overall field of 
pharmaceutical discovery (ibid). 
 
How would this paradigm shift affect innovation? They added: 
 
And I think it would probably – and this is just a bit of a thought experiment – something 
radical like that would probably increase the pace of innovation in pharmaceutical 
discovery and certainly the pace of adoption of new discoveries and new pharmaceutical 
compounds. It would be incredibly difficult for a biotech company like ours to attract 
investor dollars unless we had really solid patented states when investors come look at 
our company and do IP diligence. In our industry it’s basically the case that if you take 
100 different patents or 100 different molecules that are under different intellectual 
property protection, 99 of them are going to be worth zero dollars and one is going to 
be worth a billion dollars and if you have any intellectual property leakage around that 
one that’s going to be worth so much, that billion dollars gets cut in half or it gets cut 
by an order of magnitude. So the value of that proprietary set of patents and data around 
an individual molecule, the value can just be so vast, literally billions of dollars that 
we’re all fighting tooth and nail to keep all our data and our results and our intellectual 
property in this silo (ibid). 
 
This suggests as much: research scientists, executives, and investors alike understand the value of 
openness and open devices in terms of facilitating the translation of knowledge, and they 
acknowledge the potential obstructions to innovation posed by proprietary devices. In terms of 
policy implications, as Rai and Eisenberg (2003) note, the challenge to policymakers moving 
forward “lies in distinguishing discoveries that are better developed and disseminated through 
open access from discoveries that are better developed and disseminated under the protection of 
intellectual property rights” (291). What can be gleaned from this dissertation is that basic, 
upstream research (the majority of which tends to be tools) is likely better developed and 
disseminated through open proprietary devices. Similarly, the development of products 
downstream will likely benefit most from the application of proprietary devices.  
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Privatization holds both risks and rewards: while patenting may offer incentives for 
researchers to undertake risky research projects, too many owners holding property rights in 
previous discoveries, the stacking of multiple licenses (e.g. patents and RTLAs), or the deployment 
of proprietary devices too soon upstream may present barriers to future research (Cohen, 2004; 
Birch et al., 2018). Paradoxically, limiting the use of proprietary devices may, in fact, be necessary 
to facilitating the production of IP and ensuring its widespread use (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). 
Hope (2008) notes, “the challenge, then, of modelling open source licensing in bio-technology is 
to create new licenses that can accommodate the complexity and variety of biotechnology transfer 
agreements, yet remain faithful to the underlying logic of open source” (p. 144-145). The argument 
being made here, though, is that perhaps openness/the use of open devices is not feasible for all 
stages of drug development. As the above quote indicates, the rules of the game at the moment are 
such that to be able to develop a product that reaches the market, and subsequently recoup the 
associated costs, proprietary devices are necessary. This does not necessarily mean that changes 
to this paradigm are not needed – currently, pharmaceutical R&D is prohibitively expensive and 
unsustainably slow, and this model has not been significantly adjusted or improved by any stretch 
(Collins, 2011; Gassman and Reepmeyer, 2005). However, one of the principal problems of IP 
management in the pharmaceutical sciences that needs to be taken into account when discussing 
potential policy solutions is the heterogeneity of the IP in question. Unlike in the development of 
computer software, where open devices may be easily applied, “this technological heterogeneity 
[in the pharmaceutical sciences] gives rise to heterogeneous patterns of ownership.... Each 
technology is thus covered – often incompletely – by a patchwork of different protections” (Hope, 
2008: 144). Software tools used in biotechnology and bioinformatics for instance are easily 
adaptable to the more open IP environment for information technology. For the bulk of drug 
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discovery, though, where developers are seeking to recoup the costs of product development, it 
simply isn’t feasible to argue for increased openness (Mgbeoji and Allen, 2013). 
The Director of Intellectual Property at a large non-profit organization in Ontario pointed 
out that one of the primary issues perpetuating this unsustainable system of drug development is 
the lack of public funding in Canada that forces researchers to partner with industry, whereby the 
use of proprietary protections is mandated. They noted:  
That’s the quid pro quo: we need the money, so we have to follow the rules to be 
successful in the current model. But the current model sucks. The current model of drug 
development is you claim broadly, take [the drug] to market and then realize it really 
only works in 10% of the population. We’re kind of stuck in this vicious cycle. I don’t 
think you can reasonably expect to do everything in a closed box the way pharma’s done 
for years and they’ve learned that, right, they’ve all hit these patent cliffs. All their big 
products are coming off patent, clinical trials are hard, most of them failed depending 
on the clinical indication, so now what? Well, now they’re going around trying to partner 
with academics. From a university perspective that’s great cause they take 40% 
overhead on research grants. For the professor it’s good, it gets her name on some 
patents. Maybe it ends up being a big licensing deal, maybe it doesn’t, and maybe it just 
goes nowhere. I don’t know how anything changes unless you have [federal] granting 
agencies that want to step up and say we want to keep it all in Canada and be able to 
license and commercialize as we want, we don’t want industry dictating the terms to us. 
And we’re at a disadvantage because these agencies just don’t have the money for us to 
do the R&D. There has to be a change of thinking for [a paradigm shift] to happen. 
[Private firms] have to have some evidence that open innovation is beneficial to them, 
because they’re in business to make money, they’re responsible to their shareholders, 
and they need to act in their own best corporate interests, right? They wouldn’t be doing 
that if they threw everything into the open (Director of Intellectual Property, 2017). 
 
This suggests that even the practitioners of drug development see the need for a system in which 
open and proprietary devices are used together in different ways. Clearly, as AP noted, neither 
open nor proprietary devices on their own are sufficient for expediting pharmaceutical innovation. 
AP also noted as much, stating: 
Would we be able to develop new products without an intellectual property framework? 
The answer’s no. You have to remember that universities seldom develop drug products. 
You know maybe back in like the twenties with insulin and drugs like that, but that’s 
far from the norm. It’s really for-profit entities that generate the vast majority of drugs 
and a lot of people don’t understand that. And I think there needs to be a profit motive 
there for entrepreneurs and industry to see what it takes to spend the huge amount of 
money required to develop new drugs. I mean having access to a crystal is absolutely 
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critical, right. And I think you know SGC has contributed a third of the crystals in the 
Protein Data Bank or something, so I think that’s a really good model. So I think that 
really works. But when it comes to the core IP of a product that is monetized, I do think 
that that needs to be protected, I do think it needs to be proprietary and that’s necessary 
first and foremost to be able to secure the capital necessary to move these things forward, 
venture capital in particular. It’s very, very difficult to raise venture capital as it is, the 
risks are so high, you need so much money, there needs to be a profit motive. [Investors] 
want the world and they want things protected from end to end, you know. And so trying 
to convince them that there should be less exclusivity I think it’s going to be a tough 
sell, that’s not the real world of entrepreneurship and biotech (AP, 2017). 
 
Acknowledging the unavoidable costs associated with drug development, AP concluded the 
interview by stating:  
I think that knowing the economic realities of how expensive it is to develop these 
products; [proprietary devices are] an essential tool when used correctly for the right 
property at the right time. I suggest then that in the early days, openness is needed so as 
to get things initially started. But to use the intellectual property tools and the experts 
like the IP lawyers and patent agents to develop that product so that someone would be 
willing to invest in it, to take it the rest of the way. The economic reality is that you 
won’t be able to get these technologies translated out into the world unless you develop 
something like a company that could actually mobilize that. Because a patent to be 
licensed is only a piece of paper until somebody actually goes and does something with 
it. So you need that [proprietary device] in place to secure investment in something that 
will be accompanied that could then translate that into the world (ibid).  
 
As the quotes above indicate, patents appear to be the only viable (though perhaps not sustainable) 
means of achieving a return on investment in the development of a new drug product. 
 
7.4. Distinguishing Between Tools Versus Products 
The previous section outlined in detail the importance of first distinguishing between the 
types of things that open and proprietary devices are applied to, before making blanket statements 
regarding their efficacy and impact on innovation. This section discusses this in further detail, 
unpacking the importance of differentiating between tools and products and why this matters in 
the context of mediating devices and pharmaceutical innovation. 
In the case of JQ1 above, Arshad et al. (2016) make the claim that open devices (in particular 
open libraries and platforms) positively impact pharmaceutical innovation by increasing the 
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“dissemination and awareness of a drug candidate’s discovery” and facilitating “wider, more 
multidisciplinary community acknowledgement of drug candidate discovery” (p. 325). Beyond a 
brief technical description of its applications, the article contains no detailed discussion of the type 
of molecule JQ1 is and in fact erroneously categorizes it as a drug candidate. Similarly, though 
scholars of STS, innovation studies, and economics of science have discussed the impact of open 
and proprietary devices at length, I have yet to find any discussion of their differential impact on 
pharmaceutical tools versus products. Among others, Heller and Eisenberg (1998), Mirowski and 
Sent (2002), Mirowski (2011), Caulfield et al. (2011), and Lezuan and Montgomery (2015) have 
discussed upstream versus downstream property rights and the impact of broad patent claims 
versus narrow patent claims (as outlined in section 7.1. of this chapter). However, there is no 
comparative analysis of the kinds of things that are subject to broad patent claims or impacted by 
the use of open/proprietary devices. Perhaps it is generally assumed by these scholars that the 
reader understands that if a broad patent claim is made it will enclose a tool rather than a product, 
or if a proprietary device is employed downstream it will be applied to a product. While this may 
be the case, it is nonetheless critical to explicitly distinguish between tools and compounds in 
discussions of open and proprietary devices. This is especially relevant in the context of the SGC, 
an entirely open consortium that has successfully partnered long-term with a number of large, for-
profit global pharmaceutical firms (SGC, 2017b). How does the SGC maintain these partnerships 
given its open business model and the open devices embedded in their day-to-day operations? The 
answer, as AP noted in our discussion, lies in the differentiation between tools and products: 
There are tools and then there’s the product itself. I think that that parsing is absolutely 
critical. Again, I’ve seen no evidence that having an open access compound, molecule, 
candidate, hit – I’ve seen no evidence that that facilitates bringing drugs to market 
faster. I think there’s likely unlimited evidence that having tools like the SGC creates 
is massively beneficial, and indeed, we have made use of their open access crystals on 
multiple occasions and that’s facilitated our efforts without any doubt about it, 100%. 
So, it’s the tools versus the product itself, that’s what makes the difference. [The 
SGC’s] partners don’t care if [the crystal structures] are openly available, because 
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having the tools means they’ll get to the drug faster and they're betting they're the only 
ones who can make that drug, even if everyone else has the tools to do it. But when it 
comes to the core IP that forms the basis of the product that is monetized, I that that 
needs to be protected. Firms want it protected. It needs to be proprietary and that’s 
necessary first and foremost to be able to secure the capital necessary to move 
[pharmaceutical products] forward, especially for venture capital in particular. It’s 
very, very difficult to raise venture capital as it is, these [firms] want the world and 
they want things protected from end to end. And so trying to convince them that there 
should be less exclusivity around the product, I think it’s going to be an impossible 
sell. Around the tool? Sure (AP, 2017).  
 
Similarly, the Director of Fund Operations of a research trust at a large non-profit organization in 
Ontario highlighted why the SGC’s open model works, stating: 
We partnered with [the SGC] and used several of their crystals and that worked fine. 
But that was early [in the R&I process], we actually called [their compound] a tool 
compound. But that compound was not a drug, it actually didn’t bind to the protein, 
and it didn’t have the other properties you would want to see in a drug, such as low 
toxicity and high solubility, it didn’t pass through the intestine. All the good properties 
you’d want in a drug. So what our chemistry team did is start from that point [where 
the work of the SGC ended] and then developed a program to create a drug from that 
starting compound. So the SGC took [the research] up to a certain point, and then our 
chemists took it a proprietary way further, to try to bring a drug to market. And we 
have filed for patent protection on the compounds we’ve created from there (Director 
of Fund Operations, 2017). 
 
Again, what this suggests is that open devices are suitable in the context of tools with little 
direct commercial pressure. From this quote one can extrapolate that the open availability of tools 
does in fact facilitate innovation due in large part to the reasons discussed in section 7.1. (i.e. lower 
transaction costs, fewer barriers to entry, etc.). As Megbeoji and Allen (2003) reiterate, one of the 
critical underlying principles in the enforcement of intellectual property regimes “is the significant 
potential for economic gain. A significant portion of biomedical research is private, and the 
primary impetus for continued private research and innovation is capital earnings” (p. 89). 
Extending from this, it is also logical that open devices should be used up to the point at which a 
product is devised for a specific clinical use within a reasonable scope, whereby proprietary 
devices may be introduced with as little detrimental effect on innovation as tenable. This is due in 
part to the fact that there is little profitability potential with tool compounds beyond fees from 
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MTAs and patents (i.e. they will not be sold on a mass scale as a drug product would) – there are 
few reasons for industry to enclose them behind proprietary barriers. Along this line, the Director 
of Intellectual Property of a large non-profit organization in Ontario stated: 
I believe in the idea that tools and scaffold compounds should be open, with some 
basic understanding that fundamental science that should be free to everybody, there’s 
no reason why those shouldn’t be. So you find a tool compound that works in a [drug] 
screen or you develop a tool compound because you’ve sequenced the crystal structure 
– it’s 99.9% likely that [tool compound] is not going to be what you take to market 
because it’s not going to have all the pharmacokinetic data [a marketable drug would], 
and we’re going to have to figure out all the liability issues, the bioavailability, all of 
those other usual developments are going to have to happen – but I don’t know why 
the starting materials shouldn’t be free for everybody. And I’d like to believe pharma 
– big pharma – is getting close to that because they realise they have all these libraries 
of scaffold compounds that have been sitting on shelves and research programs that 
have been discontinued for various reasons, that have been kept all in their proprietary 
warehouse, but what if there’s potential for second life for some of those, right? So by 
making them open and having people with the scientific and biological knowledge be 
able to go at them, that would be really interesting, that would really help the state of 
[drug development]. I think that [making proprietary claims on those compounds] is 
ridiculous because those thousands of structures aren’t clinically relevant. They're not 
going to make money. But at the end of the day, you need some exclusionary rights on 
what you’re going to bring to market – and I think they should be pretty narrow 
(Director of Intellectual Property, 2017). 
 
Likewise, the PI of a bioinformatics lab at a large university in Toronto also argued in favour of 
keeping tools openly available through the use of open devices, stating: 
I think open access, open source, open innovation all benefit basic research, we need 
[open devices] to make new biological discoveries. And then eventually those 
[discoveries] get translated into commercial products. So, I think the question always 
comes down to, what is the value of basic research, and you know, my lab isn’t directly 
going to be making money from what we produce. Maybe there is no obvious 
[monetary] value but maybe the biological discoveries we make and the tools that we 
produce are useful and will get turned into products down the road (PI, 2017).  
 
What this again highlights is the importance of keeping research tools openly available, and 
demonstrates the net positive impact open mediating devices can have on pharmaceutical 
innovation when applied to tools rather than products. Moreover, this also indicates that the use 
of proprietary devices does not necessarily have a negative impact on pharmaceutical innovation, 
but that their impact is likely determined by their application to either tools or products.  
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7.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the impact of open and proprietary devices on 
pharmaceutical innovation, in terms of both accelerating the translation of pharmaceutical research 
and encouraging collaboration, is largely dependent on: firstly, when they are employed in the 
innovation process (i.e. upstream versus downstream); and secondly, the context in which they are 
employed (e.g. in a consortium versus a small- to medium-sized firm versus an academic lab). 
More often than not, the implementation of proprietary devices too early in the R&I process, 
particularly in the case of broad upstream patent claims, results in bottlenecks that slow down or 
stop knowledge translation entirely. Conversely, the use of open devices downstream in the 
commercialization process of new drug candidates is likely to derail private investment. I have 
also argued that parsing the difference between research tools versus marketable products is crucial 
in understanding the net impact of open and proprietary mediating devices on pharmaceutical 
innovation. This is significant, particularly given the dichotomous and incompatible framing of 
open and proprietary devices that is presented in the STS and innovation studies literature 
discussed above. As demonstrated, open devices such as open libraries and platforms may be 
critical in the development and dissemination of research tools, while patents or other proprietary 
devices can be used to expedite the development of drug candidates through to the clinic, all within 
the same R&I paradigm. As such, I argue that in contrast to the discussions presented in the 
literature discussed, these devices may be complimentary at particular stages of R&I, and, when 
used together, can accelerate advancements in the pharmaceutical sector. The broader policy 
implications of this argument will be discussed in Chapter Eight.  
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8. Conclusions 
 
The challenge, presented in Chapter One of this dissertation, is clear: how can open and 
proprietary devices be used together as a means of furthering advancements in pharmaceutical 
research and accelerating the development of novel drug candidates? This chapter will summarize 
the research questions answered in the previous three empirical chapters. Thus far, I have argued 
that the dichotomous and incompatible framing of open and proprietary devices that is presented 
in the STS and innovation studies literature is often reductive. Labeling open and proprietary 
mediating devices as strictly either facilitators or hinderers of innovation is an oversimplification, 
and a more nuanced approach is critical for forming sound policy decisions. This chapter begins 
with an overview of what has been discussed so far, followed by a summary of the key findings. 
It concludes with a discussion of policy recommendations and avenues of future inquiry.  
 
8.1. Summary 
This research focused broadly on pharmaceutical R&D and the development of novel clinical 
products in this sector. As discussed in Chapter One, drug development is notoriously expensive, 
slow, and precarious. As Collins (2011) and others (see DiMasi et al., 2016) note, pharmaceutical 
R&D averages 13 years and roughly $1.5 billion per new chemical entity (NCE) from initial 
laboratory target discovery through regimented clinical trials to U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval. These figures are continuing to rise. However, while basic 
research often produces promising results upstream, research outputs lag far behind associated 
costs (particularly for universities) and the number of new medicines has not increased 
proportionately with investments made in basic pharmaceutical R&I. Downstream, attrition rates 
in late stage clinical trials are especially high and contribute to the risk and unpredictability 
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associated with investing in pharmaceutical R&I (Gassman and Reepmeyer, 2005).  
The issue at stake in this dissertation stems from the fact that commercialization threatens to 
enclose crucial knowledge and information and restrict its access behind proprietary IP protection, 
slowing drug development even further. This has wide-ranging implications, as the need for novel 
diagnostic and therapeutic drugs able to combat increasingly insidious and prevalent diseases has 
grown in recent years. Moreover, because pharmaceutical R&D often relies heavily upon 
collaboration and access to diverse knowledge, the enclosure of knowledge behind proprietary 
barriers threatens to impede pharmaceutical innovation by raising transaction costs and barriers to 
entry (Feldman and Nelson, 2008). Bottlenecks in the development process arise when broad 
proprietary IP rights are applied upstream in the research process, as even the most commercially 
irrelevant research is often now encumbered by MTAs and broad patent claims (Scherer, 2002).  
Openness and the increased use of open devices such as open databases and screening 
platforms has offered a potential solution to navigating through complex networks of proprietary 
IP licenses and patents, primarily by releasing project data into the public domain and ensuring 
broad user access (Gitter, 2013). Though science initiatives offer low entry costs and increased 
methodological transparency, there is significant debate within the science and technology studies 
(STS) and innovation studies literature concerning open and proprietary IP devices. In many cases, 
open and proprietary devices are often presented as dichotomous and incompatible. This work, 
however, built on the argument that open and proprietary devices may be complimentary 
depending on where they are employed in the R&I process.  
Chapter Two offered an overview of the existing body of literature relating to the broader, 
theoretical concerns with scientific knowledge and its production, research commercialization and 
academic capitalism, innovation studies and innovation models, intellectual property, and open 
science. Here, I outlined the concept of mediating devices as the analytical approach used 
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throughout this dissertation. While the works discussed form a crucial component of the theoretical 
skeleton of this research, I argue there is nonetheless a significant gap in this literature that has yet 
to be addressed: despite much discussion of their significance as tools of commercialization, 
scholars in STS and innovation studies have yet to analyze how proprietary and open devices vary 
in terms of their efficacy when they are employed at different stages in the R&I process.  
Chapter Three provided an overview of the methodological approach taken in this research. 
Specifically, I discussed data collection and analysis methods employed in this work. As this work 
was essentially an empirical case study of pharmaceutical innovation in Ontario, this chapter also 
outlined the reason for focusing specifically on the R&I efforts occurring at MaRS Innovations, 
the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research, JLABS, the Structural Genomics Consortium, and the 
University Health Network. As I discussed, these organizations were chosen because they employ 
a diverse range of proprietary-to-open arrangements and commercialization strategies.  
Chapter Four outlined the integral role of proprietary devices in the international legal and 
policy architecture that in large part determines the path of scientific innovation, particularly in the 
context of pharmaceuticals. This chapter focused specifically on the TRIPS Treaty, its impact on 
Canadian IP policy, and both US and Canadian IP policy and law respectively. The purpose of this 
chapter was to highlight the fact that proprietary devices such as patents, MTAs, and other 
proprietary IP mechanisms remain hallmark features of commercialization strategies across the 
globe, and to note the challenge of introducing open devices into R&I processes as a result of this 
embeddedness.  
Chapter Five focused on the concept of innovation itself and endeavoured to unpack it by 
highlighting its contextual basis and discussing how it is measured and how funding sources play 
a role in this. In analyzing the concept of innovation and how it is measured, the purpose of this 
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chapter was to shed light on the impact of funding and investment decisions on drug development 
and highlight financial motivations that drive R&I. 
Chapter Six evaluated specific mediating devices in the context of the broader architecture 
of research and innovation. I discussed the institutional architecture of R&I at universities, as well 
as the ways in which mediating devices shape collaborative agreements and are embedded within 
the provincial legal and regulatory architecture of pharmaceutical innovation. The primary 
argument in this chapter is that mediating devices – particularly proprietary devices – are 
inherently embedded in the current architecture of research and innovation. Further, that this 
embeddedness has resulted in an additional layer of in/tangible administrative costs and onerous 
legal negotiations being added to the R&I process that, more often than not, makes the use of open 
devices especially difficult and impedes innovation in this sector. 
Finally, Chapter Seven examined two specific cases of proprietary and open devices in 
action. I first discussed the impact of broad versus narrow patent claims and their impact on 
innovation, highlighting the negative effects of implementing proprietary devices too early in the 
R&I process and open devices too far downstream in the commercialization process of new drug 
candidates. Following this, I conducted a case study of the open molecule JQ1 as a means of 
highlighting the importance of distinguishing between research tools versus marketable products 
when attempting to understand the net impact of open and proprietary mediating devices on 
pharmaceutical innovation. The overall argument of this chapter is that a more nuanced unpacking 
of open and proprietary mediating devices is necessary for improving the costs and translation 
times associated with pharmaceutical innovation in Canada, and for ensuring broader societal 
needs for novel and efficacious therapies are met more efficiently. 
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8.2. Key Findings  
In terms of contributions to knowledge, this dissertation endeavoured to fill gaps in the existing 
STS, innovation studies, and political economy of science literature relating to intellectual property 
and open innovation. In Chapter One I introduced the concept of mediating devices, arguing these 
devices are the linchpins that enable collaboration, commercialization, and knowledge transfer, 
and/or determine valuation of the products and processes of R&I. A primary purpose of this 
dissertation was to situate and evaluate these devices within the broader context of corporate 
strategy, technology transfer, public policy, and academic capitalism. Further, I argued that 
unpacking mediating devices in this context may help to the refine and streamline institutional 
innovation strategies, and may help to rapidly and cost-effectively translate innovative research 
findings from the lab to the clinic, particularly by highlighting which devices work for whom, and 
when. Ultimately, by examining the context in which pharmaceutical innovations develop as well 
as the devices that enable innovations to be rapidly and cost-effectively diffused to clinical settings, 
Canada will be better situated to address salient health policy issues (e.g. how to foster a sustainable 
and efficient environment for pharmaceutical R&D) and to answering the demand for novel 
diagnostic and therapeutic drugs. 
Moreover, in addressing research question 2 (Which proprietary and open devices are used in 
pharmaceutical R&I? For whom, and why?), I evaluated the ways in which open and proprietary 
devices shape collaboration agreements and (re)configure the commercialization of new 
pharmaceutical products in Ontario. Here I argued that mediating devices – particularly proprietary 
devices – are inherently embedded in the architecture of Canadian research and innovation, making 
the application of open devices particularly difficult.  
In answering research question 3 (How do different devices facilitate or hinder collaboration 
and knowledge translation in this sector? At what stage in the innovation process are they most 
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effective, and why?), I argued that the efficacy of open and proprietary devices, both in terms of 
accelerating the translation of pharmaceutical research and encouraging collaboration, is dependent 
on: firstly, when they are employed in the innovation process (i.e. upstream versus downstream); 
and secondly, what they are applied to (i.e. tool compounds used to develop candidate drug products 
versus the products themselves). From this, I argued that the role of open versus proprietary devices 
in facilitating or hindering innovation is dependent on several variables: namely, collaborative 
arrangements and the nature of the IP in question (e.g. a tool used in the development of drug 
candidates versus a pharmaceutical product itself). The context-dependent nature of these devices 
is a nuance little discussed or analyzed in the STS literature.   
Finally, in answering research question 4 (How can these devices be employed in the 
development of innovation strategies so as to streamline the process of drug development?), I argued 
that, contrary to the dichotomous and incompatible framings of open and proprietary devices that is 
presented in the STS and innovation studies literature (discussed at length in Chapter Two), these 
devices may be complimentary at particular stages of the R&I process, and, when used together, can 
accelerate advancements in the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
8.3. Applications and Recommendations for Future Research 
What does a successful innovation policy model look like then? Knowledge production by 
consortium, as in the case of the SGC, is not the only alternative as suggested by the OECD (2011: 
37). One solution might be for Canadian federal granting agencies (such as NSERC and CIHR) to 
mandate the open availability of research designated basic or fundamental. Already NSERC (2018a) 
requires the open publication of funded research projects – this could be extended to include a 
requirement that research products be shared in open access libraries or screening platforms. In 
terms of downstream product development, it will be difficult for federal granting agencies to dictate 
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when proprietary devices may be employed given the increasingly reduced amount of funding 
available to public research institutes. This will need to be addressed in federal and provincial 
budgets; as discussed in Chapter Seven, the realities of pharmaceutical development in Canada are 
such that public funding for R&I continues to decrease, and thus the current “rules of the game” 
require researchers and firms to adhere to the traditional proprietary commercialization model in 
order to profit from their innovations.  
The Canadian government should also continue to foster and support Canadian Centre’s of 
Excellence, focusing particularly on sites of open innovation and translational science. As it stands, 
the Government of Canada currently funds a number of Centres of Excellence (outlined in detail in 
Chapter Three), including MaRS Innovation, the SGC, the Center for Drug Research and 
Development, the Quebec Consortium for Drug Discovery (CQDM), and the Institute for Research 
in Immunology and Cancer among others (Industry Canada, 2016). The purpose of these centres is 
to promote collaborative and externalized R&D between public research institutes and private firms 
to commercialize discoveries and fill public funding gaps (ibid). Industry partners include 
AstraZeneca, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson&Johnson, Merck, Novartis, 
Pfizer, Sanofi, and Takeda (ibid). While these centres operate under varying models (i.e. some are 
incubators, some, like the SGC, are entirely open), it would be beneficial for the Canadian 
government to develop a more cogent, uniform policy on openness and open data sharing that would 
be applicable to these centres. As demonstrated in the case of the CQDM’s open innovation business 
model, the centre is still able to leverage funding from major private firms for pre-competitive 
research, while industry collaborators such as Pfizer, Merck, and AstraZeneca benefit from their 
open partnership by gaining early access to data given their constant interactions with research 
partners (Nasto, 2015). Demonstrably, these types of open models are broadly applicable, 
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particularly as it relates to upstream/pre-competitive research, and compatible with public/private 
partnerships that are so prevalent in Canada’s current pharmaceutical R&I landscape. 
One potential solution to be explored is the use of an open science financial trust. As outlined 
by Edwards et al. (2017), in an open science trust, “reagents are treated as a public-good resource 
governed by principles that promote the public interest, in this case, open science. [An] open science 
trust agreement codifies these public-good principles. Under its terms, a recipient of research 
reagents becomes a ‘trustee’ of the reagents. Trustees are bound by principles that specifically 
prohibit filing any patent claims that would restrict use of the reagents by others” (1). Generally, 
within this model, any profits generated from products developed go back into the trust to fund the 
next venture (ibid).  
Stemming from this, trust-based initiatives such as M4K Pharma – the science and business 
successor of the SGC – offer an opportunity to evaluate whether making the tools/products 
distinction is relevant in the development of new drug candidates, and may potentially lead to a 
paradigm shift towards open drug development. M4K is a newly founded pharmaceutical firm in 
Toronto whose aim is to develop treatments for rare pediatric diseases with small target populations, 
starting specifically with diffuse intrinsic pontine glioma (DIPG) as its first initiative – a rare form 
of pediatric brain cancer with a five-year survival rate of <1% (M4K Pharma, 2019). In employing 
the business model of the SGC, M4K will not use any proprietary devices such as patents or MTAs, 
and the results of its research (i.e. the drug prototype) will be released entirely into the public domain 
and collaborators (such as CROs, academic partners, and other firms) will also be encouraged to 
openly publish research and data (ibid). M4K retains Investigational New Drug (IND) data as a 
means of maintaining international market exclusivity while avoiding filing for proprietary licenses. 
Interestingly, however, unlike the SGC, M4K Pharma is developing products to be tested in clinical 
trials and approved for sale and clinical use, rather than simply tools. Unlike in traditional modes of 
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pharmaceutical development, where funding sources typically include VC, equity markets, and 
internal cash flow, M4K will rely solely on public grants, and foundational and philanthropic 
donations to fund its R&D (ibid). Moreover, M4K is wholly owned by the Agora Open Science 
Trust, a trust created to hold the economic interests of M4K’s financial contributors “whose sole 
beneficiary is open science and the public good” (ibid). Any profits from M4K’s inaugural DIPG 
project will be used to launch subsequent initiatives. While it is too soon to make any definitive 
statements regarding the success of the M4K model, this will be an interesting case against which 
the tools versus products hypothesis can be tested in real time. 
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